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Modern Dynamic Programming Approaches to Sequential Decision Making
Seungki Min
Dynamic programming (DP) has long been an essential framework for solving sequential
decision-making problems. However, when the state space is intractably large or the objective
contains a risk term, the conventional DP framework often fails to work. In this dissertation, we
investigate such issues, particularly those arising in the context of multi-armed bandit problems
and risk-sensitive optimal execution problems, and discuss the use of modern DP techniques to
overcome these challenges such as information relaxation, policy gradient, and state
augmentation. We develop frameworks formalize and improve existing heuristic algorithms (e.g.,
Thompson sampling, aggressive-in-the-money trading), while shedding new light on the adopted
DP techniques.
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Background
Dynamic programming (DP) has long been an essential framework for solving sequential
decision-making problems in a wide variety of domains. In a DP framework, the stochastic en-
vironment that the decision maker (DM) encounters is described by a Markov decision process
(MDP), and the optimal policy that maximizes the expected cumulative reward (or minimizes the
expected cumulative cost) can be obtained by solving the Bellman equation analytically or numer-
ically.
Despite its wide applicability, the DP approach often presents challenges in real-world appli-
cations. When the state space is continuous or intractably large, for example, the optimal policy
cannot be implemented unless the Bellman equation admits an analytic solution. When the DM
is not risk-neutral (e.g., the DM’s objective is not just the expected reward but also contains some
risk term), the Bellman’s optimality principle is no longer valid. In what follows, we illustrate
such challenges that arise in multi-armed bandit problems and risk-sensitive optimal execution
problems, and discuss how to overcome these issues using modern DP techniques.
1.1 Bayesian multi-armed bandit problem and Thompson sampling algorithm
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) problem concerns a situation where the DM is given a set of
arms with unknown reward distributions and decides which arm to select at each time so as to
maximize the cumulative reward. This problem specifically highlights the issue that the DM has
to find a balance between exploitation (i.e., selecting the currently known best arm) to maximize
the immediate reward and exploration (i.e., selecting an arm that has not been tested enough) to
maximize the informational gain. As the simplest instance of a reinforcement learning problem,
the MAB problem has received enormous attention over the past decades.
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In the earliest work in the bandit literature, the MAB problem was considered in a Bayesian
setting and formulated as an MDP problem, in which the DM’s belief on the unknown model
parameters is interpreted as a state that evolves according to the Bayes’ rule whenever the DM ob-
serves a reward realization. Under this MDP formulation, the optimal policy exists as a solution to
the associated Bellman equation; e.g., the seminal work of [1] characterizes such an optimal policy
in a discounted infinite horizon setting. However, the optimal policy is not feasible to implement
in most cases, since the belief state space is intractably large (its size scales exponentially in the
number of arms) and the Bellman equation cannot be solved explicitly.
We particularly focus on Thompson sampling (TS), which we understand as an approximate
DP solution that effectively mitigates the curse of dimensionality discussed above. TS utilizes the
idea of “posterior sampling”; i.e., at each decision epoch, it draws a random sample of the model
parameters from the posterior distribution and selects the arm that is best given the sampled model
parameters, i.e., it makes a decision as if the sampled model parameters are the ground truth. Due
to its intuitive mechanism and computational efficiency, it has been enjoying tremendous success
in practice and is being adopted and implemented by Google, Microsoft, Facebook, and many
other firms in their daily operations.
However, TS often falls short of achieving a state-of-the-art performance as it does not explic-
itly take into account the value of exploration, i.e., its arm-selection rule does not consider how
the DM’s belief will change during the remaining time periods. This can be critical in practical
settings, in which, for example, a time constraint restricts the amount of learning, or each action
conveys a different amount of information, or the extra randomness in the system naturally leads
to “free” exploration.
In this dissertation, we examine the use of two different DP techniques, namely, information
relaxation and policy gradient, and develop two general frameworks that provide systematic ways
to improve TS, with the aim of producing a better approximation of the Bayesian optimal policy.
• Thompson sampling with information relaxation penalties (Chapter 2). We first propose
a framework that naturally generalizes TS by extending the idea of posterior sampling. An
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algorithm in this framework draws a random sample of the entire future reward realizations
in addition to the model parameters and decides which arm to pull by solving a deterministic
reward maximization problem with respect to the sampled future scenario in the presence of
penalties. We show that TS is a special case that follows from a particular penalty scheme
and can be improved by incorporating penalties that reflect the value of future information
more precisely.
• Policy gradient optimization of Thompson sampling policies (Chapter 3). We then pro-
pose a data-driven framework that can numerically optimize the control parameters of TS
using the policy gradient method. While the policy gradient is a general tool for optimizing
a randomized policy, it fails to work for TS since the likelihood of an arm being selected by
TS cannot be written in a closed form in general. To overcome this issue, we interpret the
sampled model parameters as a pseudo-action taken by TS, whose probability distribution is
available in a closed form, and then apply the policy gradient in this pseudo-action space.
Comparison of above two frameworks shows that the one with information relaxation improves
the performance of TS by investing additional online computation cost without need of extra con-
trol parameters, whereas the one with policy gradient does it by investing additional offline com-
putation cost without need of application-specific analysis. Generally speaking, the former is more
analytical and more suitable for situations where there exist some restrictions in the DM’s deci-
sion making, whereas the latter is more practical and more widely applicable. Both frameworks
leverage ideas developed in simulation literature and provide systematic ways to improve TS that
achieve a more precise exploration–exploitation trade-off. We also provide theoretical analyses and
numerical experiments showing that our suggested methodologies effectively fix the shortcomings
of TS and achieve state-of-the-art performance in various settings.
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1.2 Risk-sensitive optimal control problem via a conditional value-at-risk measure
In real-world applications, the DM often wants to be conservative in the face of uncertainties,
by optimizing performance in adverse scenarios rather than focusing on average performance. This
has long been an important topic in operations research and has been studied in the areas of risk-
sensitive optimization and robust optimization.
In Chapter 4, we consider the use of conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) as an objective, which
measures the average cost in a certain fraction of worst scenarios, i.e., the conditional average in
the tail of the cost distribution. CVaR is particularly favored in practice also in theory because it
offers a very intuitive quantification of uncertainty and also has nice mathematical properties. In
the studies of optimal control under a risk measure, however, it has been considered difficult in
general to apply the conventional DP framework due to the time-inconsistency of the risk measure
(roughly speaking, a composition of CVaR measures is not a CVaR measure).
As an alternative, we leverage the idea of state augmentation that introduces an extra state vari-
able representing the quantile value (at which the CVaR value of the future cost is measured),
and develop a CVaR dynamic programming framework in the continuous-time setting. More
specifically, we show that a certain type of CVaR-optimal control problem can be described as
a continuous-time stochastic game between the DM who controls the original state process and an
adversary who controls the quantile value process, based on the dual representation of the CVaR
measure. We further derive a Bellman-like optimality equation that has a form of minimax opti-
mization by exploiting the martingale representation theorem.
We adopt the suggested methodology to solve a “risk-sensitive optimal execution problem”,
given a task of liquidating a specific amount of a financial asset, the DM controls the liquidation
rate adaptively to the price change so as to minimize the CVaR value of the total transaction cost,
measured at a target quantile level. By solving partial differential equations that follow from
the optimality equation, we derive the optimal dynamic trading strategy in a closed form, and
characterize its “aggressiveness-in-the-money” behavior formally. An analytic comparison with
4
the optimized static trading strategy is also provided.
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Chapter 2: Thompson Sampling with Information Relaxation Penalties
2.1 Introduction
Dating back to the earliest work [2, 1], multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems have been con-
sidered within a Bayesian framework, in which the unknown parameters are modeled as random
variables drawn from a known prior distribution. In this setting, the problem can be viewed as a
Markov decision process (MDP) with a state that is an information state describing the beliefs of
unknown parameters that evolve stochastically upon each play of an arm according to Bayes’ rule.
Under the objective of expected performance, where the expectation is taken with respect to
the prior distribution over unknown parameters, the (Bayesian) optimal policy (OPT) is character-
ized by Bellman equations immediately following from the MDP formulation. In the discounted
infinite-horizon setting, the celebrated Gittins index [1] determines an optimal policy, despite the
fact that its computation is still challenging. In the non-discounted finite-horizon setting, which we
consider, the problem becomes more difficult [3], and except for some special cases, the Bellman
equations are neither analytically nor numerically tractable, due to the curse of dimensionality. In
this paper, we focus on the Bayesian setting, and attempt to apply ideas from dynamic program-
ming (DP) to develop tractable policies with good performance.
To this end, we apply the idea of information relaxation [4], a technique that provides a sys-
tematic way of obtaining the performance bounds on the optimal policy. In multi-period stochastic
DP problems, admissible policies are required to make decisions based only on previously revealed
information. The idea of information relaxation is to consider non-anticipativity as a constraint im-
posed on the policy space that can be relaxed, while simultaneously introducing a penalty for this
relaxation into the objective, as in the usual Lagrangian relaxations of convex duality theory. Under
such a relaxation, the decision maker (DM) is allowed to access future information and is asked
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to solve an optimization problem so as to maximize her total reward, in the presence of penalties
that punish any violation of the non-anticipativity constraint. When the penalties satisfy a condi-
tion (dual feasibility, formally defined in §2.3), the expected value of the maximal reward adjusted
by the penalties provides an upper bound on the expected performance of the (non-anticipating)
optimal policy.
The idea of relaxing the non-anticipativity constraint has been studied in different contexts [5,
6, 7, 8], and was later formulated as a formal framework by [4], upon which our methodology is
developed. This framework has been applied to a variety of applications including optimal stopping
problems [9]; linear-quadratic and linear-convex control [10, 11]; dynamic portfolio execution
[12]; and more [e.g., 13, 14]. Typically, the application of this method to a specific class of MDPs
requires custom analysis. In particular, it is not always easy to determine penalty functions that (1)
yield a relaxation that is tractable to solve, and (2) provide tight upper bounds on the performance
of the optimal policy. Moreover, the established information relaxation theory focuses on upper
bounds and provides no guidance on the development of tractable policies.
Our contribution is to apply the information relaxation techniques to the finite-horizon stochas-
tic MAB problem, explicitly exploiting the structure of a Bayesian learning process. In particular,
1. we propose a series of information relaxations and penalties of increasing computational
complexity;
2. we systematically obtain the upper bounds on the best achievable expected performance that
trade off between tightness and computational complexity;
3. and we develop associated (randomized) policies that generalize Thompson sampling (TS)
in the finite-horizon setting.
In our framework, which we call information relaxation sampling, each of the penalty func-
tions (and information relaxations) determines one policy and one performance bound given a
particular problem instance specified by the time horizon and the prior beliefs. As a base case for
our algorithms, we have TS [15] and the conventional regret benchmark that has been used for
Bayesian regret analysis since [16]. At the other extreme, the optimal policy OPT and its expected
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performance follow from the “ideal” penalty (which, not surprisingly, is intractable to compute).
By picking increasingly strict information penalties, we can improve the policy and the associated
bound between the two extremes of TS and OPT.
As an example, one of our algorithms, IRS.FH, is a very simple modification of TS that nat-
urally incorporates time horizon ) . Recalling that TS makes a decision based on sampled pa-
rameters for each arm from the posterior distribution in each epoch, observe that knowledge of
the parameters is essentially (assuming Bayesian consistency) as informative as having an infinite
number of future reward observations from each arm. By contrast, IRS.FH makes a decision based
on future Bayesian estimates, updated with only ) − 1 future reward realizations for each arm,
where the rewards are sampled based on the inital posterior belief. When ) = 1 (equivalently, at
the last decision epoch), such a policy takes a myopically best action based only on the current es-
timates, which is indeed an optimal decision, whereas TS would still explore unnecessarily. While
keeping the recursive structure of the sequential decision-making process of TS, IRS.FH naturally
performs less exploration than TS as the remaining time horizon diminishes. This mitigates a
common practical criticism of TS: it explores too much.
Beyond this, we propose other algorithms that more explicitly quantify the benefit of explo-
ration and more explicitly trade off between exploration and exploitation, at the cost of additional
computational complexity. As we increase the complexity, we achieve policies that improve per-
formance, and separately provide tighter tractable computational upper bounds on the expected
performance of any policy for a particular problem instance. By providing natural generalizations
of TS, our work provides both a deeper understanding of TS and improved policies that do not
require tuning. Since TS has been shown to be asymptotically regret optimal in some settings, e.g.,
by the metric of growth-rate [17] or by the metric of worst-case regret [18, 19], our improvements
can at best be (asymptotically) constant factor improvements by that metric. On the other hand, TS
is extremely popular in practice, and we demonstrate in numerical examples that the improvements
can be significant and are likely to be of practical interest.
Moreover, we develop upper bounds on performance that are useful in their own right. Suppose
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that a decision maker faces a particular problem instance and is considering any particular MAB
policy (be it one we suggest or otherwise). By simulating the policy, we can find a lower bound
on the performance of the optimal policy. We introduce a series of upper bounds that can also be
evaluated in any problem instance via simulation. Paired with the lower bound, these provide a
computational, simulation-based “confidence interval” that can be helpful to the decision maker.
For example, if the upper bound and lower bound are close, the suboptimality gap of the policy
under consideration is guaranteed to be small, and it is not worth investing in better policies.
2.2 Problem
2.2.1 Bayesian MAB with independent arms
We consider a Bayesian MAB problem with  independent arms and a finite time horizon ) .





each period C = 1, . . . , ) , the decision maker (DM) selects one among  arms, each of which
yields a stochastic reward whenever selected. We let A , {1, . . . ,  } denote the set of arms, and
let '0,= denote the random variable that represents the reward from the =th pull1 of arm 0 ∈ A.
For each arm 0, the rewards {'0,=}=∈N are independent and identically distributed according to the
distribution R0 (\0), where \0 ∈ Θ0 is the parameter associated with arm 0:
'0,= ∼ R0 (\0), ∀= ∈ N, ∀0 ∈ A. (2.1)
The parameter \0 is unknown to the DM, and is modeled as a random variable for which we have a
family of conjugate priors {P0 (H0)}H0∈Y0 , i.e., a space of distributions for \0 that is closed under
a Bayesian update with a reward realization '0,=. Given a hyperparameter H0 ∈ Y0 (also called
a belief ), consider a probability measure PH0 [·] under which the parameter \0 follows the prior
1One may consider an alternative stochastic model for the reward realization process in which the rewards are
defined through a time index (e.g., '0,C denotes the reward from arm 0 in period C). This would be mathematically
equivalent from the perspective of the DM. However, once the information set is relaxed, such a model is not equivalent
to ours: in our model, the DM is not allowed to skip any future reward realizations, and this is crucial for some of the
algorithms suggested in this paper. See the discussion in §2.3.3.
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distribution P0 (H0):
\0 ∼ P0 (H0), ∀0 ∈ A. (2.2)
Let EH0 [·] denote the expected value under this probability measure. For brevity, denote the vec-
tor of parameters and hyperparameters across arms by ) , (\1, . . . , \ ) and y , (H1, . . . , H ),
respectively. Define R, Θ, P, Y, Py, and Ey analogously. We will often describe an MAB instance
only with a tuple (), y) when the other components are clear in context.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the rewards are absolutely integrable for each hyperpa-





< ∞, ∀H0 ∈ Y0, 0 ∈ A, (2.3)
where the expectation is taken with respect to the random realization of the parameter \0 and also
with respect to the random realization of the reward '0,1.
We further define the outcome l ∈ Ω (also referred to as the future or scenario) as a combina-






that encodes all the uncertainties that the DM encounters in the environment and whose distribution
is denoted by I(y).
Policy. Given an outcome l, the reward at time C can be represented as a function of the DM’s
action sequence a1:C = (01, . . . , 0C) ∈ AC , i.e.,
AC (a1:C , l) , '0C ,=C (a1:C ,0C ) , (2.5)
where =C (a1:C , 0) ,
∑C
B=1 1{0B = 0} counts how many times an arm 0 has been played up to time
C (inclusive). Consequently, we define the history C (a1:C , l) as the information revealed to the
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DM up to time C when taking an action sequence a1:C given the outcome l:
C (a1:C , l) ,
(
01, A1(01, l), 02, A2(a1:2, l), . . . , 0C , AC (a1:C , l)
)
. (2.6)





C=0,1,...,) where FC , f
(
C (Ac1:C , l)
)
is the f-field generated by the history C .
A policy c is called non-anticipating if every action cC is measurable with respect to FC−1; i.e.,
each decision is made based only on the information revealed prior to that time. We denote by ΠF
the set of all non-anticipating policies, including randomized ones. The (Bayesian) performance
of a policy c is measured by the total reward that c earns on average, i.e.,




AC (Ac1:C , l)
]
, (2.7)
where ) and y specify, respectively, the length of the time horizon and the prior hyperparameters
of given the MAB instance.
Bayesian update. Whenever the DM observes a reward realization, as a Bayesian learner, she can
update her belief associated with the selected arm according to Bayes’ rule. More formally, we
introduce a Bayesian update function U0 : Y0 × R → Y0 so that after observing a reward A ∈ R
from an arm 0 ∈ A, the hyperparameter associated with arm 0 is updated from H0 to U0 (H0, A)
(e.g., if \0 ∼ P0 (H0), then \0 |'0,1 ∼ P0 (U0 (H0, '0,1))). We will often useU : Y × A × R→ Y
to denote the updating of the hyperparameter vector y; i.e., after observing a reward realization
A from an arm 0, the hyperparameter vector is updated from y to U(y, 0, A), where only the 0th
component is updated.
We further describe the time evolution of the DM’s belief throughout the decision making
process. Given an outcome l and an action sequence a1:C , the posterior hyperparameter vector at
time C can be recursively expressed as
yC (a1:C , l; y) , U (yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y), 0C , AC (a1:C , l)) , ∀C ≥ 1, (2.8)
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with y0 , y. We often write [yC (a1:C , l; y)]0 to denote the 0th component of yC (a1:C , l; y).
This hyperparameter vector yC (a1:C , l; y) sufficiently describes the DM’s belief given the history
C (a1:C , l).
Mean reward. We introduce several notions of mean reward that play a crucial role throughout
the paper. For each arm 0 ∈ A, we let `0 (\0) denote the conditional mean reward given the
parameter \0, and let ¯̀0 (H0) be the predictive mean reward given the hyperparameter H0:
`0 (\0) , E
[
'0,=
\0] , ¯̀0 (H0) , EH0 [`0 (\0)] . (2.9)





ˆ̀0,= (l; H0) , EH0
[
`0 (\0) |'0,1, . . . , '0,=
]
, (2.10)
which represents the predictive mean reward (i.e., the finite-sample Bayesian estimate of `0 (\0))
after observing first = rewards associated with the arm 0.
Remark 2.2.1. Fix an arm 0 ∈ A. The posterior predictive mean reward process { ˆ̀0,=}=≥0 is
a martingale adapted to the filtration generated by the sequence of rewards ('0,1, '0,2, '0,3, . . .).
Furthermore, it starts at the value of the prior predictive mean reward ¯̀0 (H0) and converges to
the conditional mean reward `0 (\0); i.e., ˆ̀0,0(l; H0) = ¯̀0 (H0) and lim=→∞ ˆ̀0,= (l; H0) = `0 (\0)
almost surely (see Proposition A.4.2 in the Appendix).
2.2.2 Natural exponential family
We will often consider the case where the reward distribution R0 (\0) belongs to the natural
exponential family. In this case, the closed-form expressions are available for the aforementioned




'0,= ∈ 3A | \0
]
= ℎ0 (3A) exp (\0A − 0 (\0)) , (2.11)
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where ℎ0 (3A) is the reference measure and 0 (·) is the log-partition function that is a logarithm
of the normalization factor. We then have a family of conjugate priors {P0 (H0)}H0∈Y0 where Y0 ,
{H0 = (b0, a0) |b0 ∈ R, a > 0}, so, for any given hyperparameter H0 ∈ Y0, the corresponding prior
P0 (H0) is also an exponential family distribution and can be described as
P(b0 ,a0) [\0 ∈ 3\] = 50 (b0, a0) exp (b0\ − a00 (\)) 3\, (2.12)
where 50 (b0, a0) is the normalization factor and a0 represents the effective number of observa-





 '0,1, . . . , '0,= ] = P(b0+∑=8=1 '0,8 , a0+=) [\0 ∈ 3\] . (2.13)
This property can also be expressed via the Bayesian update function as U0 ((b0, a0), A) = (b0 +
A, a0 + 1). We also have the following identities for the mean reward metrics:
`0 (\0) = ′0 (\0), ¯̀0 (b0, a0) =
b0
a0






where ′0 , 30/3\0. We refer the reader to [20] for further details.
Bernoulli and Gaussian MABs. We briefly illustrate the Bernoulli MAB and Gaussian MAB as
representative examples of the problem instance described by a natural exponential family. In the
Bernoulli MAB, the rewards of an arm are Bernoulli random variables whose success probability
is drawn from a Beta distribution. In the Gaussian MAB, the rewards of an arm are normally
distributed with an unknown mean and a known noise variance where the mean is also normally
distributed. Table 2.1 summarizes the previously defined notation.
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Bernoulli MAB Gaussian MAB
Prior distribution `0 ∼ Beta(U0, V0) `0 ∼ N(<0, E20)




'0,= ∼ N(`0, f20)
Parameter \0 \0 = log `01−`0 \0 =
`0
f20

























Mean reward `0 `0 (\0) = 4
\0
1+4\0 `0 (\0) = f
2
0\0
Predictive mean ¯̀0 ¯̀0 (U0, V0) = U0U0+V0 ¯̀0 (<0, E
2
0) = <0
Table 2.1: Description of a Bernoulli MAB and a Gaussian MAB. Here, XG (3A) denotes a Dirac
measure that has a single atom at G.
2.2.3 Bayesian optimal policy
In a Bayesian framework, the MAB problem can be viewed as a Markov decision process
(MDP) in which a state corresponds to an information state (or belief state) of the DM. It has the
following recursive structure that we will exploit throughout the paper. Given an MAB instance
with time horizon ) and prior belief y, suppose that the DM has just earned A by pulling an arm
0 at time C = 1. Then the remaining problem for the DM is equivalent to an MAB instance with
time horizon ) − 1 and prior belief U(y, 0, A). Based on this Markovian structure, we obtain the
following Bellman equations for the MAB problem: for all ) ∈ N and y ∈ Y,
&∗(), y, 0) , Ey
[
'0,1 ++∗() − 1,U(y, 0, '0,1))
]
, (2.15)
+∗(), y) , max
0∈A
&∗() − 1, y, 0), (2.16)
with +∗(0, y) , 0 for all y ∈ Y. The value function +∗(), y) represents the best possible per-
formance that a non-anticipating policy can achieve in the MAB problem specified by the time
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horizon ) and the prior belief y, or equivalently, the maximum expected future reward that one can
earn during ) remaining periods2 when the current belief is y.
While Bellman equations are, in general, intractable to solve and directly apply, they offer a
characterization of the Bayesian optimal policy (OPT). At a certain moment, when the remaining
time horizon is ) and the belief is y, OPT takes an action with the largest state-action value (Q-
value), i.e., pulls the arm ∗ = argmax0 &∗(), y, 0), and this action selection procedure is repeated
while updating ) and y according to Bayes’ rule as described in Algorithm 1. Such a policy
achieves the best possible performance among all non-anticipating policies:
+∗(), y) = sup
c∈ΠF
+ (c, ), y) = + (OPT, ), y), ∀) ∈ N, y ∈ Y. (2.17)
Algorithm 1: Bayesian optimal policy (OPT)
Function OPT(), y)
// ):remaining time horizon, y:current belief
1 return argmax0 &∗(), y, 0)
Procedure OPT-Outer(), y)
// ):time horizon, y:prior belief
1 y0 ← y
2 for C = 1, 2, . . . , ) do
3 Select C ← OPT() − C + 1, yC−1)
4 Earn and observe a reward AC and update belief yC ←U(yC−1, C , AC)
end
2We intentionally refrain from indexing the value function +∗ by time C, since such a representation conceals the
Markovian structure of the Bayesian MAB problem and leads to complicated expressions for the variables that exploit
this Markovian structure. To avoid confusion, the horizon ) will be written as an argument to functions whereas the
time index C will be written as a subscript, throughout the paper.
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2.2.4 Thompson sampling
Thompson sampling (TS) is a simple heuristic that makes decisions based on random sampling.
When the remaining time is) and the current belief is y, it samples the parameters )̃ from the prior3
distribution at that moment, P(y), and pulls the arm that is believed to be best given the sampled
parameters )̃ , i.e., takes action TS = argmax0 `0 (\̃0). Like OPT, it repeats this procedure at every
decision epoch while updating the belief y whenever a reward realization is observed.
Algorithm 2: Arm selection rule of Thompson sampling when remaining time is ) and
current belief is y
Function TS(T, y)
// ):remaining time horizon, y:current belief
1 Sample parameters )̃ ∼ P(y)
2 return argmax0{`0 (\̃0)}
Note that TS does not take into account the time information when making a decision. It applies
the identical sampling and selection rule, irrespective of the remaining time periods. This often
leads to the unnecessary explorations near the end of the horizon, which motivates our framework.
2.3 Information Relaxation Sampling
We apply the information relaxation framework [4] to the Bayesian MAB problem and propose
a general framework which we call information relaxation sampling (IRS). The main idea behind
the information relaxation is to relax the information constraint so that the decision maker (DM)
is allowed to exploit some future information that is supposed to be unknown. As in the usual
Lagrangian relaxation, an upper bound on the best possible performance can be obtained by solving
the relaxed problem.
To motivate in detail, let us consider a situation under which the parameters ) are revealed to
3Conventionally, the term “posterior distribution” is used to describe the distribution that TS samples the param-
eters from. We explicitly use “prior distribution” instead: for example, at time C = 1, the parameters are apparently
sampled from the prior, not the posterior, distribution. After observing a reward realization, we will have a posterior
but it will become a prior at the next decision epoch.
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the DM when the remaining period is ) and the current belief is y. The optimal action for this DM
is to keep playing the arm with the highest mean reward, i.e., argmax0 `0 (\0), and by doing so
will earn Ey [) ×max0 `0 (\0)] on average, which is indeed an upper bound on the performance of
the optimal policy, +∗(), y).
Let us now postulate a situation under which the same kind of DM is informed with sampled
parameters )̃ that are drawn from the distribution P(y). For this (falsely informed) DM, the op-
timal action is again to play the arm with the highest mean reward but now with respect to the
sampled parameters, i.e., argmax0 `0 (\̃0). This procedure effectively describes the arm selection
rule of Thompson sampling in the situation specified by the remaining horizon ) and the current
belief y.
Above, we motivated a performance bound, Ey [) ×max0 `0 (\0)], and a non-anticipating pol-
icy, TS, from the relaxation of the parameter information. Analogously, we can produce another
performance bound and another policy by considering a different set of future information to relax:
the performance bound is obtained by computing how much the clairvoyant DM can earn with this
additional information; and the policy is obtained by speculating which action the same kind of
DM will take if the additional information is replaced with sampled (simulated) instance.
We will particularly consider the relaxations of information that are less effective than the
full parameter information for the DM to maximize her future payoff. This will result in tighter
relaxations, in the sense of a better (tighter) performance upper bound as well as a better performing
policy.
In what follows, we formalize this idea utilizing the notion of information relaxation penalties
that allows us to describe and control the benefit from having additional information explicitly. We
will first describe the general framework and then propose a specific family of penalties that are
particularly suitable for Bayesian MAB problems.
Information relaxation penalties and the inner problem. Applying the information relaxation
framework developed by [4], we relax the non-anticipativity constraint imposed on policy space
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ΠF (i.e., cC is FC−1-measurable). Without loss of generality,4 we consider the perfect information
relaxation under which the DM is allowed to first observe all future outcomes in advance, and then
pick an action (i.e., cC is f(l)-measurable). As in any other Lagrangian relaxation, we impose
penalties on the DM for violating the non-anticipativity constraint.
We introduce a penalty function IC (a1:C , l;), y) to denote the penalty that the DM incurs at time
C, when taking an action sequence a1:C given an outcome l for an MAB problem with time horizon
) and prior belief y. The clairvoyant DM can find the best action sequence that is optimal for
this particular outcome l in the presence of penalties IC , by solving the following (deterministic)





AC (a1:C , l) − IC (a1:C , l;), y). (∗)
Definition 2.3.1 (Dual feasibility). Given ) and y, a penalty function IC is dual feasible if it is a





IC (Ac1:C , l;), y)
]
= 0, ∀c ∈ ΠF. (2.18)
We remark that the mapping a1:C ↦→ IC (a1:C , l) is a stochastic function of the action sequence
a1:C since the outcome l is random. This dual feasibility condition requires that the DM who
makes decisions on the natural filtration will receive zero penalties in expectation.
The complexity of the inner problem depends very much on the penalty function. Assuming
that the penalty function can be evaluated in $ (1) computation, an enumerative brute-force opti-
mization of the inner problem may require$ ( ) ) computations. In what follows, we will illustrate
that for suitably designed penalty functions, the inner problem exhibits a recursive structure and
thus can be solved effectively using dynamic programming techniques.
4Any partial information relaxation can be equivalently described within the perfect information relaxation by
adding additional terms into the penalty function. See the discussion after Theorem 2.3.1.
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IRS performance bound. We let , I (), y) be the expected maximal value of the inner problem
(∗), when the outcome l is randomly drawn from its prior distribution I(y), i.e., the expected total
payoff that a clairvoyant DM can achieve in the presence of penalties.:







AC (a1:C , l) − IC (a1:C , l;), y)
}]
. (2.19)
Once we have an algorithm to solve the inner problem, this value can be computed numerically via
simulation: let l1, l2, . . . , l( be the samples independently drawn from I(y), and ,B be the the
maximal value of the inner problem with respect to lB for each B = 1, . . . , ( separately. The bound




theorem shows that, I is indeed a valid performance bound of the stochastic MAB problem.
Theorem 2.3.1 (Weak duality and strong duality). If the penalty function IC is dual feasible,, I is
an upper bound on the optimal value +∗:
(Weak duality) , I (), y) ≥ +∗(), y). (2.20)
There exists a dual feasible penalty function denoted by IidealC , such that
(Strong duality) , ideal(), y) = +∗(), y). (2.21)
The ideal penalty function IidealC has the following functional form:
IidealC (a1:C , l;), y) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] (2.22)
++∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l; y)) − Ey [+∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l; y)) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)] .
Recall that a dual feasible penalty function does not penalize (in expectation) non-anticipating
policies, which include OPT. Even when the future information is available, the DM can earn +∗
under the penalties by implementing OPT without taking advantage of future information. When
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the DM makes use of future information, she can always outperform OPT, which leads to the weak
duality result. The ideal penalty IidealC precisely penalizes for the additional profit extracted from
using the future information, thereby removing any incentive to deviate from OPT and resulting in
the strong duality.
The ideal penalty is, of course, intractable, but its structure highlights what a good penalty may
look like. It implies that there are two sources of additional profit: in DP terminology, one from
knowing future immediate rewards and one from knowing future state transitions, each of which
will be taken into account later in this paper.
As another implication, it also shows that relaxing more the available information can always
be compensated by adding associated terms to the penalty function. That is, a partial information
relaxation (e.g., cC is measurable w.r.t. GC−1 such that f(C−1) ⊆ GC−1 ⊆ f(l)) with some
penalty function IGC is equivalent to the perfect information relaxation (i.e., 
c
C is measurable w.r.t.
f(l)) with a penalty function IGC + I
f(l)\G
C if the additional term I
f(l)\G
C exactly penalizes the
relative benefit from having more information f(l) than GC−1. Hence, it is sufficient to consider
the perfect information relaxation, as we do in this paper, and the actual amount of information
available for the DM can be equivalently controlled by adjusting the penalty function.
Before proceeding, we remark that the above results are already well established in [4] (see
Lemma 2.1 and Theorem 2.3 therein) for a general class of MDP problems, except for a subtle dif-
ference regarding the assumption on the predictability of reward realizations. In MDP problems,
the reward at each state is typically assumed to be deterministic (otherwise, it is replaced with its
expected value), since the stochastic evolution of the state is of a major concern. By contrast, in
MAB problems it is essential to consider the randomness of rewards since learning from the noisy
reward realizations is of a major concern, and therefore, we do not assume that AC is measurable
with respect to f(C−1). As a consequence, our ideal penalty function (2.22) has a slightly differ-
ent functional form than the one formulated in [4].5 We further exploit this fact when designing a
variety of penalty functions.
5[4] show that IidealC = +
∗ () − C, yC ) − E [+∗ () − C, yC ) | C−1], when AC is assumed to be measurable with respect
to f(C−1) and so AC − E [AC |C−1 ] = 0.
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IRS policy. Since the true outcomel is not available in reality, it cannot be used in online decision
making. We derive a non-anticipating policy by leveraging the idea of “posterior sampling,” which
utilizes the sampled outcome l̃ instead of the true outcome l.
Given a penalty function IC , we characterize a randomized and non-anticipating IRS policy cI
as follows. Exploiting the recursive structure of a Bayesian MAB problem, the policy cI specifies
“which arm to pull when the remaining time is ) and the current belief is y,” i.e., the very first
action that it would take in an MAB instance with horizon ) and prior belief y. Given ) and
y, it (i) first randomly generates an outcome l̃ (i.e., sampling from I(y)), (ii) solves the inner
problem to find a best action sequence ã∗1:) with respect to this randomly generated outcome l̃ in
the presence of penalties IC , and (iii) takes the first action 0̃∗1 that the clairvoyant optimal solution
ã∗1:) suggests. Analogous to TS and OPT, it repeats steps (i)–(iii) at every decision epoch, while
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updating the remaining time ) and belief y upon each decision making and reward realization.
Algorithm 3: Information relaxation sampling (IRS) policy
Function IRS(), y; I)
// ):remaining time horizon, y:current belief
1 Sample an outcome l̃ ∼ I(y): Equivalently, for each 0 ∈ A,
\̃0 ∼ P0 (H0), '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃0), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )}.











Procedure IRS-Outer(), y; I)
// ):time horizon, y:prior belief
1 y0 ← y
2 for C = 1, 2, . . . , ) do
3 Pull C ← IRS() − C + 1, yC−1; I)
4 Earn and observe a reward AC and update belief yC ←U(yC−1, C , AC)
end
In step (i), the random generation of the outcome l̃ given the belief y is equivalent to, for each
arm 0 ∈ A, sampling the parameter from its posterior, \̃0 ∼ P0 (H0), and then sampling the future
reward realizations, '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃0) for = = 1, . . . , ) . In other words, the IRS policy cI randomly
generates (simulates) a plausible future scenario within its own probability space specified by )
and y.
The optimization problem in the step (ii) is identical to the inner problem (∗) except that the true
outcome l is replaced with the sampled one l̃. Therefore, the dynamic programming algorithm
that solves the inner problem can also be utilized for this online decision-making process, not only
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for the computation of performance bound , I. Note that there can be multiple solutions to this
optimization problem and the tie-breaking rule may affect the performance of the policy. We do
not observe that the choice of tie-breaking rule is significance in our numerical experiments. In
some instances that follow, however, we will adopt a specific tie-breaking rule for the purpose of
theoretical analysis.
Also note that in step (iii) only the first action 0̃∗1 of the optimal solution ã
∗
1:) is utilized, and
at the following decision epoch a new outcome is sampled based on the updated belief. If we
consider an MAB instance with time horizon ) , the policy cI solves ) different instances of the
inner problem throughout the entire decision-making process, with a decreasing length of time
horizon, from ) to 1, and with a stochastically evolving belief state. See the IRS-OUTER procedure
in Algorithm 3, which is in fact identical to that employed in OPT and TS.
Remark 2.3.1. The ideal penalty yields the Bayesian optimal policy, i.e., cideal = OPT.
Recall that the ideal penalty (2.22) yields the performance bound, ideal that is equal to the best
achievable performance +∗, because the DM under the ideal penalty has no incentive to utilize any
future information. For the same reason, the corresponding IRS policy cideal does not utilize the
(randomly generated) future information in its decision making, and tries to make the best decision
based only on the information revealed so far. Therefore, its decision should always coincide with
the Bayesian optimal policy’s decision.
Choice of penalty functions. We have so far described the general framework that takes a penalty
function IC as input, and yields a performance bound , I and a policy cI as outputs. While any
dual feasible penalty functions can be utilized in general, we propose the following set of penalty
functions that are particularly suitable for the MAB problems:
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ITSC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − E [AC (a1:C , l) |) ] , (2.23)
IIRS.FHC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) | -̂)−1(l) ] , (2.24)
IIRS.V-ZEROC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] , (2.25)
IIRS.V-EMAXC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] (2.26)
+,TS () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) − Ey
[
,TS () − C, yC (a1:C , l))
C−1(a1:C−1, l)] ,




0∈A and the dependency of some expressions on ) and y is
suppressed for clarity. Also recall that the ideal penalty is given by
IidealC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] (2.27)
++∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) − Ey [+∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)] .
We can show that these penalty functions satisfy the dual feasibility condition (Definition 2.3.1);
see Appendix A.3.3 for a formal proof.
Remark 2.3.2. All penalty functions (2.23)–(2.27) are dual feasible.
This set of penalty functions results in a set of policies that ranges from Thompson sampling
(TS) to the Bayesian optimal policy (OPT) and a set of performance bounds that ranges from the
conventional regret benchmark ,TS (= E[) × max0 `0 (\0)]) to the optimal value function , ideal
(= +∗). More specifically, at one extreme, the simplest penalty function ITSC yields TS and,
TS as
outputs, and at the other extreme, the ideal penalty function IidealC yields OPT and +
∗ which would
be optimal. The other three penalty functions (IIRS.FHC , I
IRS.V-ZERO
C , and I
IRS.V-EMAX
C ) connect the
two extremes and are sequentially “better”, where we informally say that a penalty function is
better than another if it is closer to the ideal penalty function and thus yields a better performing
policy and a tighter performance bound. Deferring detailed explanations to §2.3.1–§2.3.4, we
briefly illustrate general principles to design “good” penalty functions and motivate these penalty
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functions.
In design of information relaxation penalties, we first need to determine to which informa-
tion set we relax the non-anticipativity constraint, i.e., what kind of additional information will be
revealed to the DM in the relaxation. Although we have described our framework based on the per-
fect information relaxation (i.e., the relaxation in which the DM perfectly knows the entire future
outcomes l), any imperfect information relaxation can be equivalently described within the per-
fect information relaxation using a properly constructed penalty function.6 Among the suggested
penalty functions,7 ITSC is the one that corresponds to the information relaxation to the parameter
information ) , IIRS.FHC corresponds to the information relaxation to the posterior predictive mean
rewards -̂)−1 (i.e., the finite-sample mean-reward estimates), and IidealC corresponds to no informa-
tion relaxation.
One principle to motivate a better penalty function is to choose a smaller set of future informa-
tion for the relaxation. When less additional information is revealed to the DM in the relaxation,
the additional profit that the DM can extract from this information becomes smaller, and hence
the DM has to make more realistic decisions that rely more on the currently available information
rather than the future information that is supposed to be unknown. Comparing IIRS.FHC with I
TS
C ,
one may notice that the finite-sample mean-reward estimates -̂)−1 are less informative than the
parameters ) for the DM to exploit in her profit maximization because, in terms of mean-reward
estimation, the parameters are informative as much as an infinite number of observations (i.e.,
E[`0 (\0) |)] = lim)→∞ E[`0 (\0) |'0,1, . . . , '0,)−1] = lim)→∞ ˆ̀0,)−1). In this sense, IIRS.FHC is
better than ITSC , and resulting policy c
IRS.FH and performance bound , IRS.FH improve upon TS
and,TS toward OPT and +∗.
Another principle to motivate a better penalty function is to adopt a more precise approxima-
tion of the ideal penalty function IidealC , particularly regarding the terms containing the optimal
6In fact, this is the main idea underlying the existence of the ideal penalty function; see the discussion after Theorem
2.3.1.
7We can motivate one more penalty function that corresponds to the perfect information relaxation. Such a penalty
function is simply given by IC ≡ 0, which is illustrated in Appendix A.1. However, we do not suggest it’s use since it
is even worse than ITSC .
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value function +∗. In the presence of penalties that reflect the value of the additional information
more accurately, the DM has less incentive to exploit this additional information in the relaxed
decision making problem, and similarly to the above argument, this leads to more realistic deci-
sions. Among our suggestions, IIRS.V-ZEROC approximates the term +
∗ with zero, and IIRS.V-EMAXC
approximates the term +∗ with a tractable upper bound ,TS. By doing so, IIRS.V-EMAXC takes into
account the continuation value of each action explicitly and improves upon IIRS.V-ZEROC .
Consider the inner problem associated with each choice of penalty function (2.23)–(2.27). Re-
call that each inner problem is a deterministic multi-period decision making problem that has a
form of maxa1:) ∈A)
∑)
C=1 AC (a1:C) − IC (a1:C). A penalty function IC effectively redefines what the
DM earns at each time, i.e., AC (a1:C) is replaced with AC (a1:C) − IC (a1:C). More specifically, the
penalty function ITSC effectively replaces the realized rewards associated with each arm with their
expected value given parameters ); as does IIRS.FHC (with their expected value given the finite-
sample mean-reward estimates -̂)−1); as does IIRS.V-ZEROC (with their expected value conditional on






Inner problem Run time
ITSC TS ,
TS Find a best arm given parameters. $ ( )
IIRS.FHC c
IRS.FH , IRS.FH Find a best arm given finite observations.
$ ( ) or
$ ( ))
IIRS.V-ZEROC c
IRS.V-ZERO , IRS.V-ZERO Find an optimal allocation of ) pulls. $ ( )2)
IIRS.V-EMAXC c
IRS.V-EMAX , IRS.V-EMAX Find an optimal action sequence. $ ( ) )
IidealC OPT +
∗ Solve Bellman equations. –
Table 2.2: List of algorithms following from penalty functions (2.23)–(2.27). TS refers to Thomp-
son sampling and OPT refers to the Bayesian optimal policy. Run time represents the computa-
tional complexity of solving one instance of the inner problem (∗), that is, the time required to
obtain one sample in a computation of performance bound , I or to decide which arm to select in
each period in a run of policy cI.
Table 2.2 summarizes these inner problems. As we sequentially increase the computational
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complexity of a penalty function, from ITSC to I
ideal
C , the penalty function more accurately penalizes
the benefit from knowing future outcomes, i.e., more explicitly prevents the DM from exploiting
future information. As a result, the inner problem becomes closer to the original stochastic opti-
mization problem, which results in a better performing policy and a tighter performance bound.
Using this approach, we achieve a family of algorithms that are intuitive and tractable, exhibiting
a trade-off between quality and computational efficiency. See Appendix §A.1 for an illustrative
example.
The run time in Table 2.2 represents the computational complexity of solving one instance of
the inner problem, i.e., the time it takes to obtain one sample in a computation of performance
bound , I or to decide which arm to select in each period in a run of policy cI. In this run-time
analysis, performing the Bayesian belief updating and the sampling of a random variable is counted
as a single operation.
2.3.1 Thompson sampling revisited



















Given an outcome l, and in the presence of penalties, a hindsight optimal action sequence is to
keep pulling the true best arm, i.e., argmax0 `0 (\0), for ) times in a row. The resulting perfor-
mance bound,TS reduces to the conventional performance benchmark,







which measures how much the DM could have achieved if the parameters had been revealed in
advance.
Remark 2.3.3. The performance bound ,TS is the conventional benchmark that has been widely
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used in the Bayesian regret analysis [16, 21, 22]. The Bayesian regret of a policy c is defined as






`0 (\0) − `cC (\cC )
]
= ,TS (), y) −+ (c, ), y), (2.30)
which quantifies the suboptimality of the policy c.
It is trivial to see that the corresponding policy cTS is equivalent to Thompson sampling. The
policy cTS utilizes a sampled outcome l̃ instead of the true outcome l; accordingly, it selects an
arm TS = argmax0 `0 (\̃0), where )̃ ∼ P(y), which is identical to the procedure described in
Algorithm 2. In order for the policy cTS to make a decision at a certain time, note that it does not
need to sample future rewards, and thus it requires $ ( ) computations only.
2.3.2 IRS.FH
Recall that ˆ̀0,)−1(l; H0) is the posterior predictive mean reward of an arm 0 that the DM will
have after observing ) − 1 reward realizations '0,1, . . . , '0,)−1 given the initial belief H0:
ˆ̀0,)−1(l; H0) , EH0
[
`0 (\0)
'0,1, . . . , '0,)−1 ] . (2.31)
Given (2.24), the optimal solution to the inner problem (∗) is to always pull the arm with the highest



















This inner problem yields the performance bound, IRS.FH, such that








and the policy cIRS.FH that is implemented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Arm selection rule of cIRS.FH when remaining time is ) and current belief
is y
Function IRS.FH(), y)
// ):remaining time horizon, y:current belief






'0,1 = '̃0,1, . . . , '0,)−1 = '̃0,)−1 ]}
IRS.FH (FH stands for finite horizon) is almost identical to TS except that the conditional mean
reward `0 (\0) is replaced with the posterior predictive mean reward ˆ̀0,)−1(l). As a finite-sample
Bayesian estimate of the conditional mean reward, ˆ̀0,)−1(l) is less informative than `0 (\0) from
the DM’s perspective. In terms of mean reward estimation, the DM will never be able to identify
`0 (\0) perfectly within a finite horizon, i.e., knowing the parameters is equivalent to having an
infinite number of observations. The inner problem of TS requires the DM to “identify the best
arm based on an infinite number of samples,” whereas that of IRS.FH requires the DM to “identify
the best arm based on a finite number of samples” and takes into account the length of the time
horizon explicitly. By restricting the DM’s access to fewer information, IRS.FH requires the DM




a, T 1( ) a
( a)
n =  (TS)
n = T 1 (IRS.FH)
Figure 2.1: (Left) Sample paths of posterior predictive mean reward process of an arm 0,{
ˆ̀0,= (l)
}
=≥0. This process is a martingale that starts at (prior) predictive mean ¯̀0 and converges
to conditional mean `0 (Remark 2.2.1). (Right) The distributions of ˆ̀0,)−1 and `0: ˆ̀0,)−1 is more
concentrated than `0, while all have the same mean ¯̀0 (H0).
To sharpen our comparison between IRS.FH and TS, let us compare the variance of ˆ̀0,)−1(l)
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and `0 (\0) induced by the randomness of outcome l. As depicted in Figure 2.1, `0 is more widely
distributed than ˆ̀0,)−1 because a larger (infinite vs. )−1) number of samples makes it easier for the
posterior to deviate from the initial prior (see also Remark 2.2.1). By Jensen’s inequality, we further
have , IRS.FH = E[) ×max0 ˆ̀0,)−1(l)] ≤ E[) ×max0 `0 (\0)] = ,TS for any problem instance,
meaning that IRS.FH yields a performance bound that is tighter than the conventional benchmark.
Also note that the same argument holds for the comparison between ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃) and `0 (\̃0) since
the synthesized outcome l̃ is identically distributed with the (true) outcome l. The variability
of ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃) (respectively, `0 (\̃0)) governs the randomness of the action taken by policy cIRS.FH
(resp., cTS), i.e., IRS.FH = argmax0 ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃) (resp., TS = argmax0 `0 (\̃0)). Given ) and y,
the policy cIRS.FH performs fewer random explorations than TS, as it is less likely to deviate from
the myopic decision to play an arm with the largest current estimate ¯̀0 (H0). More desirably, the
degree of exploration of cIRS.FH is controlled by the remaining time horizon as the variance of
ˆ̀0,)−1(l) depends on ) . At the last decision epoch () = 1), cIRS.FH takes a myopic action that is
indeed optimal.
Efficiently sampling ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃) for natural exponential families. In order to obtain ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃)
for each arm 0 for a synthesized outcome l̃, one may apply Bayes’ rule sequentially for each
reward realization, which will take $ ()) computations per arm.
As discussed in §2.2.2, in an MAB were the reward distribution is a natural exponential family,
the posterior predictive mean reward is given by




a0 + ) − 1
. (2.34)
Therefore, it is sufficient to sample the sum of)−1 future rewards, ∑)−1==1 '̃0,=, in otder to sample the
posterior predictive mean reward. Observe that the conditional distribution of the sum given \̃0 also
belongs to the natural exponential family, induced by a log-partition function () − 1)0 (\̃0). This
distribution may be tractable to compute: for example, its distribution is Binomial() − 1, `0 (\̃0))
for the Beta-Bernoulli case, and N
(
() − 1) · `0 (\̃0), () − 1) · f20
)
for the Gaussian case. In these
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settings, we can sample the sum
∑)−1
==1 '̃0,= directly from the tractable distribution (after sampling
\̃0) using $ (1) computation, and then use it to compute ˆ̀0,)−1(l̃) without sequentially updat-
ing the belief. In such cases, a single decision of cIRS.FH can be made within $ ( ) operations,
independent of ) , similar in computational complexity to TS.
2.3.3 IRS.V-ZERO
IRS.V-ZERO introduces a further complication in that its inner problem requires the DM
to consider her causal process in the course of solving the inner problem. Under the penalty
IIRS.V-ZEROC given in (2.25), the DM at time C earns E [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ], the expected
mean reward that she can infer from observations prior to time C. As we defined '0,= to be a reward
from the =th pull on arm 0 (not the pull at time =), the posterior belief associated with each arm
is determined only by the number of past pulls performed on that arm. Recall that ˆ̀0,= (l) is the
expected mean reward of arm 0 that the DM can infer from the first = reward realizations:
ˆ̀0,= (l; H0) , EH0
[
`0 (\0)
'0,1, . . . , '0,= ] . (2.35)
Therefore, the DM earns ˆ̀0,=−1(l) from the =th pull on arm 0, irrespective of the detailed sequence
of the past actions. More formally, the DM’s earning at time C is
AC (a1:C , l) − IIRS.V-ZEROC (a1:C , l) = Ey
[
`0C (\0C ) |C−1(a1:C−1, l)
]
= ˆ̀0C ,=C−1 (a1:C−1,0C ) (l), (2.36)
where =C−1(a1:C−1, 0), defined in (2.5), denotes the number of pulls conducted on a particular arm
0 prior to time C.
Let (0,= (l) ,
∑=
8=1 ˆ̀0,8−1(l) be the cumulative payoff from the first = pulls of an arm 0. Given
an outcome l, we observe that the total payoff is determined only by the total number of pulls on
each arm, and not the sequence in which the arms have been pulled. Therefore, solving the inner
problem (∗) is equivalent to “finding the optimal allocation (=∗1, =
∗
2, . . . , =
∗
 



























where #) , {(=1, . . . , = ) ∈ N 0 :
∑ 
0=1 =0 = )} is the set of all feasible allocations. Once the
(0,=’s are computed, we can solve this inner problem within $ ( )2) operations by sequentially
applying the sup convolution  times. The detailed implementation is provided in §A.2.1.
The policy cIRS.V-ZERO further needs to decide which arm to pull given the optimal allocation
(=̃∗1, =̃
∗
2, . . . , =̃
∗
 
) that is obtained for the sampled outcome l̃. In principle, any arm 0 that was
included in the solution of the inner problem, =̃∗0 > 0, would suffice, but we suggest a selection
rule by which the arm that needs the most pulls is chosen, i.e., IRS.V-ZERO = argmax0 =̃∗0. This
guarantees that cIRS.V-ZERO behaves like TS when ) is large, as formally stated in Proposition 2.4.1.
Comparison with TS and IRS.FH. Recall that in the inner problems of TS and IRS.FH, the DM
at time C earns E[AC |)] and E[AC | -̂)−1], respectively, which are the mean reward estimates that rely
on the information not available at the moment; e.g., ˆ̀0,)−1 is revealed only after playing the arm
0 for ) − 1 times. IRS.V-ZERO is more restrictive for the DM in the sense that she at time C earns
E[AC |C−1], which does not include any information that does not belong to C−1. IRS.V-ZERO
reflects the fact that the =th reward of an arm will not be revealed unless the arm is pulled = times,
and its inner problem requires the DM to allocate a pull in order to incorporate the next reward
realization into her information set; thus learning about an arm comes at the cost of sacrificing an
opportunity to learn about the other arms.
More specifically, let us focus on the total payoff of a particular allocation (=1, . . . , = ) under
each penalty function IIRS.V-ZEROC and I
IRS.FH
C . The allocation yields
∑ 
0=1 (0,=0 (l) in the inner
problem of IRS.V-ZERO whereas the same allocation yields
∑ 
0=1 =0 × ˆ̀0,)−1(l) in the inner
problem of IRS.FH. In terms of variability originating from the randomness of l, we observe that
each summand (0,=0 (l) =
∑=0
8=1 ˆ̀0,8−1(l) is less noisy than its counterpart =0 × ˆ̀0,)−1(l) since
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a larger number of observations makes it easier for the posterior to deviate from the initial prior
and hence the variance of individual terms ˆ̀0,0(l), . . . , ˆ̀0,=0−1(l) is smaller than the variance
of ˆ̀0,)−1(l) and, therefore,
∑ 
0=1 (0,=0 (l) is smaller than
∑ 
0=1 =0 × ˆ̀0,)−1(l). Analogous to
the comparison between IRS.FH and TS, we have that IRS.V-ZERO yields a performance bound
, IRS.V-ZERO that is tighter than, IRS.FH (formally stated in Theorem 2.4.1) and a policy cIRS.V-ZERO
that performs fewer random explorations than cIRS.FH.
2.3.4 IRS.V-EMAX
Under perfect information relaxation, the DM perfectly knows not only (i) what she will earn
at future times but also (ii) how her belief will evolve as a result of her action sequence. The
previous algorithms focus on the former component by making the DM adjust the future rewards
by conditioning (e.g., E[AC (0C) |)], E[AC (0C) | -̂)−1] and E[AC (0C) |C−1]). IRS.V-EMAX also focuses
on the latter component as well by charging the DM an additional cost for using the information
on her future belief transitions.
To motivate this in detail, recall that the ideal penalty IidealC (2.22) is
IidealC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − E [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] (2.38)
++∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) − E [+∗ () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)] ,
where +∗ () − C, yC) measures the value of having a belief yC at a future time C + 1. Note that, at the
moment the DM takes an action 0C , the next belief state yC = U(yC−1, 0C , AC) is not measurable with
respect to the natural filtration f(C−1) since the next observation AC is unknown. In DP terms,
the conditional expectation E [+∗ () − C, yC) | C−1] captures the expected value of a (random) next
state given the current state. Accordingly, the gap between its realized value and its expected value,
+∗ () − C, yC) −E [+∗ () − C, yC) | C−1], measures the additional gain from knowing the next belief
state yC . In addition to the term AC − E [AC |C−1 ] (= IIRS.V-ZEROC ), which measures the benefit from
knowing which action will yield a large immediate reward, the ideal penalty also penalizes the
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long-term benefit from knowing which action will lead to a favorable belief state.
The penalty function IIRS.V-EMAXC is obtained from I
ideal
C by replacing +
∗(), y) with,TS (), y),
which is rather tractable. The use of ,TS (), y) , Ey [) ×max0 `0 (\0)], introduced in (2.29),




,TS () − C, yC)











= ,TS () − C, yC−1) . (2.41)
In the associated inner problem, the payoff that the DM earns at time C is
AC (a1:C , l) − IIRS.V-EMAXC (a1:C , l) (2.42)
= ˆ̀0C ,=C−1 (a1:C−1,0C ) (l) −,TS () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) +,TS () − C, yC−1(a1:C−1, l)) (2.43)
= ¯̀0C ( [yC−1(a1:C−1, l)]0C ) −,TS () − C, yC (a1:C , l)) +,TS () − C, yC−1(a1:C−1, l)) , (2.44)
which is completely determined by the prior belief yC−1 and the posterior belief yC .
We further observe that, given l, the future belief yC (a1:C , l) depends only on how many times
each arm has been pulled, irrespective of the sequence of the pulls. For example, consider two
action sequences a1:C = (1, 1, 2, 1, 2) and a

1:C = (2, 1, 1, 2, 1). Even though the order of ob-
servations would differ, in both cases the agent would observe ('1,1, '1,2, '1,3) from arm 1 and
('2,1, '2,2) from arm 2 and end up with the same belief yC (a1:C , l) = yC (a

1:C , l). We may conclude
from this observation that a belief state can be sufficiently parameterized with the pull counts
n1: = (=1, . . . , = ) instead of action sequence a1:C .
As a result, the total number of possible future beliefs is $ () ), not $ ( ) ), and we can come
up with a dynamic programming algorithm that solves the inner problem within $ (2,) +  ) )




Finally, we propose the IRS.INDEX policy, which does not strictly belong to the IRS frame-
work, and does not produce a performance bound, but does exhibit strong empirical performance.
Roughly speaking, the IRS.INDEX is a single-sample approximation of the finite-horizon Git-
tins index [23], where the approximation is motivated by IRS.V-EMAX algorithm. It first solves
the single-armed bandit problem for each arm in isolation, and makes a decision based on the re-
sults of these subproblems.
Single-armed bandit problem. Consider a special case of an MAB instance in which there is
a single arm 0 that yields stochastic rewards '0,= ∼ R0 (\0) with an outside option that yields a
deterministic reward _. We have a prior distribution P0 (H0) over unknown parameter \0 whereas
the deterministic reward _ is known a priori.




, we can simulate the future belief trajectory (H0,=)=∈{0,...,)},
where H0,= is the belief after = reward realizations are observed:
H0,0 , H0, H0,= , U0 (H0,=−1, '0,=), ∀= = 1, . . . , ) . (2.45)
Let +∗(), H0, _) be the optimal value function associated with this single-armed bandit problem.
We consider the penalty function IIRS.V-EMAXC in which the value function +
∗(), H0, _) is approx-
imated by ,TS (), H0, _) = EH0 [) ×max(`0 (\0), _)]. We define A , {0, 1} such that 0C = 1 if






ˆ̀0,=C−1(l0) · 1{0C = 1} + _ · 1{0C = 0} − () − C) ×
(





subject to =C =
C∑
B=1
1{0C = 1}, 0C ∈ {0, 1}, ∀C = 1, . . . , ), (2.47)
where ˆ̀0,= (l0) , EH0 [`0 (\0) |'0,1, . . . , '0,=] = ¯̀0 (H0,=) and
Γ_= (l0) , EH0,= [max(`0 (\0), _)] . (2.48)

















where the decision variable = is the total number of pulls on the stochastic arm.
Let i0 (_, l0) be the (maximal) relative benefit from pulling the stochastic arm against not
pulling at all:
i0 (_, l0) , max
1≤=≤)
{












− ) × _. (2.50)
Note that max{·} was taken over = ≥ 1. We interpret the meaning of the sign of i0 (_, l0) as
follows: given an outcome l0, the stochastic arm is worth trying against the deterministic outside
option _ if i0 (_, l0) ≥ 0, and not worth trying if i0 (_, l0) < 0.
Given l0 and _, the value of i0 (_, l0) can be computed in $ ()) operations by precalculating∑=




8−1(l0) over = = 1, . . . , ) sequentially. The single-
armed bandit problem has an additional advantage of computational efficiency: in contrast to the
implementation of IRS.V-EMAX in the multi-arm setting, the approximate value function (cap-
tured by Γ_=) often admits a closed-form expression in the single-armed setting. In the cases of the
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Beta-Bernoulli MAB and the Gaussian MAB, for example, we have
E`∼Beta(U,V) [max (`, _)] = _ × betaU,V (_) +
U
U + V ×
(
1 − betaU+1,V (_)
)
, (2.51)











(·) represents the c.d.f. of Beta(U, V) distribution, andΦ(·) and q(·) represent the c.d.f.
and the p.d.f. of the standard normal distribution, respectively. With these expressions, Γ_= (l0)’s
can be computed very efficiently without using numerical integration or Monte Carlo sampling.
Index policy. We now return to the original MAB problem with  arms. Recall that the single-
armed bandit algorithm tells us whether an arm (given an outcome l0) is worth trying against the
deterministic reward _. We use this algorithm as a module to compute the index of each arm.
More specifically, consider a certain decision epoch when the remaining time is ) and the belief
is y. For each arm 0 = 1, . . . ,  separately, the policy cIRS.INDEX samples the future outcome l̃0
(i.e., draws \̃0 ∼ P0 (H0) and '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃0) for = = 1, . . . , )), and finds a threshold value on the
deterministic outside option that makes the arm barely worth trying:
_∗0 (l̃0) , sup {_ ∈ R ; i0 (_, l̃0) ≥ 0} . (2.53)
By the definition of i0 (_, l0), the threshold value _∗0 (l̃0) measures the value of arm 0 as an
opportunity cost of not pulling arm 0 at all, given a particular outcome l̃0. We use the value
_∗0 (l̃0) as an index of arm 0 so that the index policy plays the arm with the largest index, i.e.,
IRS.INDEX = argmax0 _∗0 (l̃0).
Although the monotonicity of the mapping _ ↦→ i0 (_, l̃0) is not theoretically proven, we
observe that the bisection search works sufficiently well in our numerical experiments. Since
each instance of single-armed bandit problems requires $ ()) computations to solve, the entire
procedure for arm selection requires a run time of $ (21 × )), where 21 represents the number of
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iterations in a bisection search. See §A.2.3 for the implementation details.
In addition to the IRS.INDEX policy described above, some numerical experiments include a
heuristic variation of it, called IRS.INDEX*, that is obtained by using






ˆ̀0,8−1(l0) − _ −
(
Γ_8 (l0) − Γ_0 (l0)
))}
, (2.54)
instead of (2.50). This alternative formulation yields indices that are relatively stable across the
different samples of outcome l̃0.
We note that our index, _∗0 (l̃0), is a random approximation of the finite-horizon Gittins (FH-
Gittins) index studied in [23], [24], and [25]. The original FH-Gittins algorithm precisely solves
the single-armed bandit problem, which is shown to be an optimal stopping problem in which one
must decide when to stop pulling the stochastic arm as one’s belief state evolves stochastically.
Applying the information relaxation framework to the single-armed bandit problem, we solve,
instead, a simple deterministic problem in which one must find a deterministic schedule optimized
to a particular belief trajectory associated with a randomly generated outcome l̃. As in the previous
algorithms, the penalties help us to obtain a solution close to the optimal stopping policy of the
original single-armed bandit problem.
2.4 Analysis
In this section, we provide theoretical analyses that characterize IRS policies and performance
bounds in particular for TS, IRS.FH, and IRS.V-ZERO.
Remark 2.4.1 (Single-period optimality). When ) = 1, all of the policies cIRS.FH, cIRS.V-ZERO,
cIRS.V-EMAX, and cIRS.INDEX take the optimal action; i.e., they pull the myopically best arm ∗ =
argmax0 ¯̀0 (H0).
Proposition 2.4.1 (Asymptotic behavior). Assume that `8 (\8) ≠ ` 9 (\ 9 ) almost surely for any two











TS (y) = 0
]
, ∀0 ∈ A. (2.55)









TS (y) = 0
]
, ∀0 ∈ A. (2.56)
TS (y), IRS.FH (), y) and IRS.V-ZERO (), y) denote the action taken by policies cTS, cIRS.FH,
and cIRS.V-ZERO, respectively, when the remaining time is ) and the current belief is y. These ac-
tions are random variables, since each of these policies uses a randomly sampled outcome l̃ of its
own. Remark 2.4.1 can be easily verified by observing that, when ) = 1, A1(0, l)−I1(0, l;), y) =
¯̀0 (H0) for any 0 ∈ A for each of the penalty functions. The results in Proposition 2.4.1 follow
from Remark 2.2.1 stating that the posterior predictive mean reward process converges to the con-
ditional mean reward, i.e., lim=→∞ ˆ̀0,= (l̃) = `0 (\̃0). The assumption `8 (\8) ≠ ` 9 (\ 9 ) is made to
avoid the ambiguity of the tie-breaking rule that is used in TS.
Remark 2.4.1 and Proposition 2.4.1 illustrate that cIRS.FH and cIRS.V-ZERO behave like TS during
the initial decision epochs, gradually shift toward the myopic scheme, and end up with the optimal
decision; by contrast, TS continues to explore. The transition from exploration to exploitation un-
der these IRS policies occurs smoothly, without relying on an auxiliary control parameter. While
maintaining their recursive structure, IRS policies take into account the time horizon ) , and natu-
rally balance exploitation and exploration.
Theorem 2.4.1 (Monotonicity of performance bounds). IRS.FH and IRS.V-ZERO monotonically
improve the performance bound
,TS (), y) ≥ , IRS.FH (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-ZERO (), y), (2.57)
8We assume a particular selection rule such that 0̃IRS.V-ZERO = argmax0 =̃∗0, as discussed in §2.3.3.
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and also
,TS (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-EMAX (), y). (2.58)
Recall that,TS (), y) = Ey [) ×max0 `0 (\0)] is the conventional regret benchmark.
Empirically (§2.5), we observe that, IRS.V-ZERO ≥ , IRS.V-EMAX. In addition, we have, IRS.V-EMAX ≥
, ideal since , ideal is the lowest attainable upper bound (Theorem 2.3.1). The second inequality
(2.58) holds in a stronger sense: for every outcome l, the maximal value of the inner problem
associated with,TS is greater than that of the inner problem associated with, IRS.V-EMAX.
While the entire proof is provided in §A.4.3, we highlight here the main ideas. The first result
(2.57) follows from the monotonicity of the information structure incorporated in each penalty
function: TS, IRS.FH, and IRS.V-ZERO replace the realized rewards with E(AC |)), E(AC | -̂)−1),
and E(AC |C−1), respectively, where ) is more informative than -̂)−1, and -̂)−1 is more informative
than C−1 for the DM to infer the value of future reward AC . Based on this observation, we use
a variant of Jensen’s inequality to prove the results.9 The second result (2.58) is proven based
on Theorem 4 of [10], which says that if an approximate value function +̂ is a supersolution
(Definition A.4.1) to the Bellman equation and a penalty function Î approximates the ideal penalty
with +̂ in place of+∗, the resulting performance bound, Î is smaller than +̂ . By showing that,TS
is a supersolution to (2.15), we prove that , IRS.V-EMAX ≤ ,TS since IIRS.V-EMAXC is constructed
upon,TS.
Although Theorem 2.4.1 compares the performance bound among IRS algorithms, we interpret
that its tightness, , I − +∗, reflects the degree of optimism that its corresponding policy cI pos-
sesses. Recall that , I is the expected value of the best possible payoff when the DM is informed
of some future outcomes in advance. The weak duality , I ≥ +∗ implies that IRS policies are
basically optimistic: an IRS policy takes an action as if it can earn more than the optimal policy
in the belief that the sampled outcome is the ground truth. In this sense, the gap , I − +∗ captures
how optimistically the policy cI interprets the sampled outcome. When, I −+∗ is relatively small
9 We remark that , IRS.FH ≥ , IRS.V-ZERO is not an immediate consequence of the fact that f( -̂) −1) is a stronger
filtration than f(C−1). It further relies on a particular structure of MAB problems: the rewards of an arm are inde-
pendent and identically distributed conditionally on the parameter. See §A.4.3 for a further discussion.
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for a certain penalty function IC , we may conclude that the penalty function IC makes the DM less
optimistic and induces a policy cI that performs fewer random explorations.
We further compare the performance of IRS policies using an alternative suboptimality mea-
sure. We define the “suboptimality gap” of an IRS policy cI to be , I (), y) − + (cI, ), y), and
analyze it instead of the conventional (Bayesian) regret, ,TS (), y) − + (cI, ), y). While its non-
negativity is guaranteed by weak duality (Theorem 2.3.1), more desirably, the optimal policy yields
a zero suboptimality gap (Theorem 2.3.1 and Remark 2.3.1). This measure coincides with the con-
ventional regret measure only for TS.
Theorem 2.4.2 (Suboptimality gap for natural exponential families). Consider an MAB instance
with a reward distribution that is a natural exponential family distribution, as described in §2.2.2,
in which each arm 0 ∈ A is described with a log-partition function 0 (\0) and a hyperparameter
H0 = (b0, a0). Suppose that all the log-partition functions are !-smooth, i.e.,
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3\20
0 (\0) ≤ !, ∀\0 ∈ Θ0, 0 ∈ A. (2.59)
Further assume that a0 = a for all 0 ∈ A. Then, for any ) ≥ 2, we have



































































Remark 2.4.2. For a Bernoulli MAB with symmetric arms, each of which has a prior Beta(U, V)





Remark 2.4.3. For a Gaussian MAB with symmetric arms, each of which has a prior N(<, E2)
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for its mean reward and a noise variance f2, we have ! = f and
√
a = E/f.
Theorem 2.4.2 indirectly shows to the improvements to the suboptimality gaps: although all
the bounds have the same asymptotic order of $ (
√
 ) log)), the IRS policies improve the lead-
ing coefficient or the additional term.10 These results hold for a wide range of MAB problems
including the Bernoulli MAB and the Gaussian MAB as stated in Remarks 2.4.2 and 2.4.3.
The proof of Theorem 2.4.2, provided in §A.4.4, relies on an essential property of IRS poli-
cies that generalizes the “probability matching” property of TS, i.e., a matching between nature’s
randomness and the decision maker’s randomness. It is well known that TS is randomized in a
way that, conditional on past observations, the probability that an action 0 is chosen equals the
probability that the action 0 is chosen by someone who knows the parameters. Analogously, the
IRS policy cI is randomized in a way that, conditional on past observations, the probability that
an action 0 is chosen equals the probability that the action 0 is chosen by someone who knows the
entire future but is penalized (Proposition A.4.4). Recall that the penalties are designed to penalize
the benefit from having additional future information. A better choice of penalty function would
prevent the policy cI from picking an action that is overly optimized for a randomly sampled future
realization, which in turn would improve the quality of the decision making.
Given the above observation, our proof utilizes the approach taken by [21] that exploits the
probability matching property of TS to bound its Bayesian regret. More specifically, for each
penalty function, we carefully construct a sequence of confidence intervals on the mean reward
such that the corresponding policy’s instantaneous suboptimality at each time (loss against the
10Recall that ,TS − + (cTS) represents the Bayesian regret of TS. It will be worth mentioning some known results
that may be comparable to the bound (2.60) established in Theorem 2.4.2.
For the cases where the reward distributions have a bounded support in [0, 1], [19] have shown that the Bayesian
regret of TS is bounded from above by 14
√
 ) ; and further shown that its asymptotic order is unimprovable in the
sense that for any policy there exists a prior distribution such that the policy experiences Bayesian regret no smaller
than 120
√




 ) in the context of Theorem 2.4.2, since we consider a specific prior and the policy optimized to that prior.
For Gaussian MAB in the non-Bayesian setting, [18] have shown that the regret of TS is$ (
√
 ) log)); and further
shown that its asymptotic order is unimprovable in the sense that for any policy there exists an instance (i.e., the set of
true mean values) such that the policy’s regret is at least Ω(
√
 ) log ).
While there is no result in the literature that is comparable to the other bounds (2.61) and (2.62), we conjecture that
they will be tight just as the bound for TS (2.60) is, given the fact all three policies exhibit the identical asymptotic
behavior for large ) (Proposition 2.4.1).
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hindsight solution) is bounded by the width of the confidence interval approximately. For a better
penalty function, the confidence intervals can be made tighter so that the total suboptimality can
also be bounded more effectively. In our analysis, the natural exponential family is assumed in
order to analyze the concentration of posterior distribution in a closed form, and the smoothness
condition on the log-partition function is assumed in order to guarantee that the reward distribution
is sub-Gaussian, whereas [21] consider an arbitrary reward distribution with a bounded support.
2.5 Numerical experiments
2.5.1 Experimental setup
We conduct numerical simulations to evaluate the effectiveness of our framework in compari-
son to alternative algorithms. In addition to the IRS algorithms discussed so far, we consider other
recently developed algorithms that are particularly suitable for a Bayesian setting: the Bayesian
upper confidence bound [23] (BAYES-UCB, with a quantile of 1 − 1
C
), information-directed sam-
pling [22] (IDS), the optimistic Gittins index [26] (OGI, one-step look-ahead approximation with
a discount factor of WC = 1 − 1C ), and the Lagrangian index policies suggested in [27] (LAGR-RT
and LAGR-OT, with a random and an optimal tie-breaking rule, respectively).
Our numerical experiments include Beta-Bernoulli MABs and Gaussian MABs. Given an
MAB problem instance specified by the prior distribution P(y) and the reward distribution R, we
simulate the policies and calculate the IRS bounds with respect to the different values of time
horizon ) .
Let ( be the number of simulations we perform. For each B ∈ {1, . . . , (}, we first sample the
parameters \ (B)0 ∼ P0 (H0) and the rewards '(B)0,= ∼ R0 (\ (B)0 ) for all = ∈ {1, . . . , )max} and 0 ∈ A,
which is equivalent to sampling an outcome l(B) ∼ I(y). Given the Bth sampled outcome l(B) , for
each time horizon ) ∈ {5, 10, 15, . . . , )max}, we simulate each policy c (that may utilize the time
horizon )); i.e., at each time C = 1, . . . , ) , the policy makes a decision11 on which arm to pull,
11Recall that IRS policies are randomized policies that perform their own simulations at each time along the sample
path. This posterior sampling procedure is independent of the random generation of true outcomes.
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cC , and then the associated reward, AC (Ac1:C , l
(B)) = '(B)
cC ,=C (Ac1:C ,
c
C )
, is revealed accordingly. After





) is recorded as the performance of c for the Bth sample,
and the expected performance + (c, ), y) is measured by its sample average across ( samples for
each ) .
In order to compute IRS bounds, we use the same set of samples l(1) , . . . , l(() . For each
penalty function I and for each ) ∈ {5, 10, . . . , )max}, we solve the associated inner problems with
respect to l(1) , . . . , l(() , and the IRS bound , I (), y) is evaluated by taking the average of the
maximal values over ( instances.
More explicitly, we use the following sample averages to calculate + (c, ), y) and, I (), y):

























Note again that the same outcome l(B) is used across the different values of time horizon ) and
across different algorithms. Sharing the randomness enhances the consistency of the estimates. In
what follows, we use 20,000 samples (i.e., ( = 20, 000).
Based on + (c, ), y) and ,TS (), y) measured with the sample averages, we calculate the
Bayesian regret of a policy c:






`0 (\0) − `cC (\cC )
]
= ,TS (), y) −+ (c, ), y), (2.64)
which is a conventional measure in performance analysis of Bayesian algorithms as discussed in
§2.3.1. We further calculate the regret (lower) bound obtained from a IRS penalty function IC :
RegretBound(I, ), y) , ,TS (), y) −, I (), y). (2.65)
By the weak duality (Theorem 2.3.1), we have BayesRegret(c, ), y) ≥ RegretBound(I, ), y) for
any c ∈ ΠF. By its definition, the regret bound produced by TS is zero.
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2.5.2 Results
Bernoulli MAB with two arms ( = 2). We first provide the results for a Bernoulli MAB in
which
`0 ∼ Beta(1, 1), '0,= ∼ Bernoulli(`0), ∀0 ∈ {1, 2}. (2.66)
We consider relatively short time horizons (≤ )max = 200) since we are focusing on a finite-horizon
regime rather than an asymptotic regime. In this particular case, since the state (belief) space is
discrete and small in size, $ ()4), we are able to solve the Bellman equations (2.15) numerically,
and thus we can implement the Bayesian optimal policy, which is labeled as OPT in what follows.
Figure 2.2 shows the regrets (solid lines) of all the policies discussed above and the regret
bounds (dashed lines) produced by the IRS algorithms.12 Table 2.3 provides further details includ-
ing the percentage improvement in regret over TS, i.e.,
RegretImprovement(c, ), y) , 1 − BayesRegret(c, ), y)
BayesRegret(TS, ), y) ,
and the improvement in regret bound over TS benchmarked to the regret of the best performing
algorithm, i.e.,
BoundImprovement(c, ), y) , RegretBound(I, ), y) − RegretBound(I
TS, ), y)
minc′ BayesRegret(c′, ), y)
.
In Figure 2.2, note that lower regret curves are better, and higher bound curves are better.
Comparing the IRS algorithms (TS, IRS.FH, IRS.V-ZERO, IRS.V-EMAX, and OPT), we first
observe a clear improvement in both the performance of policies and the tightness of bounds,
as we adopt a more complicated penalty function, albeit one that requires a longer run time: as
visualized in Figure 2.2, the regret curve approaches the OPT curve from above and the bound
curve approaches it from below, where the OPT curve represents the lowest attainable regret that
12There also exists a performance bound induced by the Lagrangian index policies. We omit it from Figure 2.2,
however, since that bound is not so tight and thus not informative to be displayed in the same plot; e.g., when ) = 200,
the associated regret bound is −12.54, which is far below the current x-axis.
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is the highest attainable regret bound at the same time. The suboptimality gap (the gap between
a regret curve and its corresponding bound curve) becomes smaller, which is consistent with the
implication of Theorem 2.4.2.
Finally, we note that the IRS.INDEX policy is outperforming all the other policies; i.e., the
regret curve of IRS.INDEX is surprisingly close to the OPT curve. Although it is developed based
on IRS.V-EMAX, it performs better than IRS.V-EMAX, and the reasons for that still need to be
researched.





















































Figure 2.2: Regret plot for a Bernoulli MAB with two arms. The solid lines represent the
(Bayesian) regret of algorithms, ,TS (), y) − + (c, ), y), and the dashed lines represent the regret














TS 3.45 (0.021) 0.0% 0.00 (–) 0.0% 17 ms
IRS.FH 3.17 (0.020) 8.1% 0.08 (0.040) 3.8% 37 ms
IRS.V-ZERO 2.87 (0.021) 17.0% 0.90 (0.055) 40.0% 527 ms
IRS.V-EMAX 2.70 (0.020) 21.8% 1.42 (0.326) 63.6% 29.5 sec
IRS.INDEX 2.29 (0.023) 33.6% – – 3.6 sec
BAYES-UCB 2.72 (0.020) 21.2% – – 44 ms
IDS 2.43 (0.028) 29.6% – – 3.7 sec
OGI 2.43 (0.028) 29.5% – – 262 ms
LAGR-RT 2.64 (0.046) 23.5% -12.54 – 19 ms*
LAGR-OT 2.64 (0.046) 23.6% -12.54 – 14 ms*
OPT 2.24 (–) 35.1% 2.24 (–) 100.0% –
Table 2.3: Simulation results for a Bernoulli MAB with two arms when ) = 200. The best results
are emphasized with bold letters. The third and fifth columns show the percentage improvements
over TS in regret and in bound respectively; e.g., IRS.V-EMAX achieves a regret that is 21.8%
better than that of TS, and yields a regret bound that accounts for 63.7% of the lowest regret
observed empirically.
The last column shows the average time required for a policy to make decisions along one sample
path including the time required posterior sampling for the case of IRS policies. ∗LAGR-RT and
LAGR-OT require substantial offline computation prior to simulation. This takes around 20 hours
in the setting of this simulation.
Bernoulli MAB with ten arms ( = 10). We next consider a Bernoulli MAB with ten arms and
)max = 500. IRS.V-EMAX and OPT are omitted from this simulation due to their computational
cost, and so are LAGR-RT and LAGR-OT for long horizons13 () > 350). Figure 2.3 and Table
2.4 show the simulation results. We again observe a monotonic improvement in the performance
of policies and the tightness of bounds among IRS algorithms, and the IRS.INDEX policy still
13 LAGR-RT and LAGR-OT require substantial offline pre-computation. This involves a convex optimization prob-
lem with ) decision variables, where a single evaluation of the objective function requires Θ()3) operations. As rec-
ommended by [27], we have implemented a cutting-plane method using a commercial optimization software (Gurobi),
but it takes over a week to complete the pre-computation when ) = 350.
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performs best.













































Figure 2.3: Regret plot for a Bernoulli MAB with ten arms. LAGR-RT and LAGR-OT are simu-












TS 23.59 (0.078) 0.0% 0.00 (–) 0.0% 50 ms
IRS.FH 22.08 (0.076) 6.4% 0.43 (0.042) 4.0% 300 ms
IRS.V-ZERO 19.54 (0.074) 17.2% 3.82 (0.058) 35.6% 17.0 sec
IRS.INDEX 13.62 (0.080) 42.2% – – 56.2 sec
BAYES-UCB 17.77 (0.077) 24.7% – – 140 ms
IDS 14.67 (0.093) 37.8% – – 16.4 sec
OGI 15.04 (0.092) 36.2% – – 2.6 sec
Table 2.4: Simulation results for a Bernoulli MAB with ten arms when ) = 500.
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Gaussian MABs ( = 2 or 10). We next consider Gaussian MABs in which
`0 ∼ N(0, 12), '0,= ∼ N(`0, 12), ∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }. (2.67)
Figure 2.4 and Table 2.5 show the case of two arms ( = 2), and Figure 2.5 and Table 2.6 show
the case of ten arms ( = 10). The algorithms LAGR-RT and LAGR-OT are not implemented for
Gaussian MABs since they require either discrete belief states or some form of state discretization.
The results are similar to those of Bernoulli MABs.




























































TS 7.47 (0.047) 0.0% 0.00 (–) 0.0% 17 ms
IRS.FH 6.94 (0.045) 7.1% 0.38 (0.100) 7.4% 37 ms
IRS.V-ZERO 6.38 (0.048) 14.7% 2.48 (0.133) 48.5% 625 ms
IRS.V-EMAX 5.97 (0.044) 20.2% 3.48 (1.154) 68.0% 13.3 sec
IRS.INDEX 5.12 (0.054) 31.5% – – 2.2 sec
BAYES-UCB 6.16 (0.045) 17.5% – – 38 ms
IDS 5.58 (0.068) 25.3% – – 679 ms
OGI 5.57 (0.067) 25.5% – – 196 ms
Table 2.5: Simulation results for a Gaussian MAB with two arms when ) = 200.






















































TS 58.28 (0.180) 0.0% 0.00 (–) 0.0% 35 ms
IRS.FH 56.20 (0.180) 3.6% 0.48 (0.156) 1.2% 215 ms
IRS.V-ZERO 52.46 (0.188) 10.0% 8.04 (0.216) 20.4% 13.7 sec
IRS.INDEX 39.40 (0.244) 32.4% – – 30.4 sec
BAYES-UCB 51.40 (0.178) 11.8% – – 77 ms
IDS 46.41 (0.324) 20.4% – – 4.0 sec
OGI 49.63 (0.335) 14.8% – – 1.6 sec
Table 2.6: Simultion results for a Gaussian MAB with ten arms when ) = 500.
Gaussian MAB with different noise variances ( = 5). We next consider a problem where
`0 ∼ N(0, 12), '0,= ∼ N(`0, f20 ), ∀0 ∈ {1, . . . , 5} (2.68)
and (f1, f2, f3, f4, f5) = (0.1, 0.4, 1, 4, 10). In this MAB instance, it is particularly crucial for
the algorithms to consider how much the DM can learn about each of the arms during the remaining
time periods, since the difficulty of estimating the mean reward of an arm 0 heavily depends on the
noise level f0 that varies across the arms.14
As shown in Figure 2.6, BAYES-UCB shows a particularly poor performance, as it keeps
pulling arm 5 without considering the fact that arm 5 is too noisy to be learnt within such a short
period of time (i.e., ) ≤ 500). By contrast, we observe that our IRS policies and IDS algorithm
outperform the BAYES-UCB, OGI, and TS algorithms, since they explicitly take into account the
value of exploration by quantifying the informativeness of a new observation for each arm (more
specifically, by considering how the belief will change as a new reward realization is revealed).
Notably, the IRS.FH policy, which is a very simple modification of TS, significantly improves the
performance of TS without degrading its computational efficiency.
The example also illustrates the significance of having a tighter performance bound. If the






14In order for the posterior distribution to be concentrated so as to have a standard deviation of 0.1, for example, one
observation is enough for arm 1 whereas 100 and 10,000 observations are required for arm 3 and arm 5, respectively.
15The IRS.INDEX* policy is a heuristic modification of the IRS.INDEX policy. See §A.2.3.
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of the benchmark. If the benchmark is set to ,TS instead, as in a conventional regret analysis, we







(looser) bound, which would suggest a larger margin of possible improvement.
























































TS 121.99 (0.615) 0.0% 0.00 (–) 0.0% 34 ms
IRS.FH 103.03 (0.628) 15.5% 11.75 (0.656) 16.2% 128 ms
IRS.V-ZERO 89.59 (0.690) 26.6% 38.47 (0.827) 53.1% 7.4 sec
IRS.INDEX 100.20 (0.657) 17.9% – – 12.8 sec
IRS.INDEX* 72.43 (0.866) 40.6% – – 12.3 sec
BAYES-UCB 220.66 (1.285) -80.9% – – 88 ms
IDS 94.63 (0.817) 22.4% – – 2.9 sec
OGI 151.61 (1.030) -24.3% – – 829 ms
Table 2.7: Simulation results for a Gaussian MAB with five arms with different noise variances
when ) = 500.
2.6 Extensions
Below, we describe several natural generalizations of the methods developed in this paper
beyond the setting of Section 2.2:
MAB with unknown time horizon. This paper studies finite-time horizon MABs for which we
suggest algorithms that exploit the knowledge of the time horizon ) and we focus on a relatively
small ) such that the time horizon becomes an important ingredient in optimally balancing explo-
ration and exploitation. We briefly illustrate how to relax our framework’s dependency on ) , i.e.,
how to extend to the setting with an unknown horizon and the setting with an indefinitely long
horizon.
First, our framework (penalties, policies, and upper bounds) can naturally incorporate the un-
known ) within the Bayesian setting; i.e., the horizon ) is also a random variable whose prior
distribution is known. As a simple case, if ) is independent of the DM’s actions, we can refor-
mulate the objective function of the inner problem as
∑∞
C=1 WC (AC (a1:C , l) − IC (a1:C , l)) where the
discount factor WC , P[) ≥ C] is the survivor probability, and AC (·) and IC (·) are the reward and
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penalty terms used in the paper. Alternatively, we can treat the random variable ) like the random
reward realizations by sampling ) from its prior distribution while a penalty function (addition-
ally) penalizes for the gain from knowing ) (one can imagine that the outcome l now includes
the realization of ) and not only the future reward realizations). Structural results such as weak
duality and strong duality will continue to hold.
Second, we can consider a practical modification of IRS policies when ) is large or infinite.
We can construct a dual feasible penalty function that mixes IRS.FH and IRS.V-ZERO,16 which




for some predefined constant )0.
Alternatively, we can convert the IRS.V-EMAX or IRS.INDEX policy into an anytime policy by
setting the inner problem’s horizon large enough, despite that the performance bound will no longer
be obtainable.
MAB in more complicated settings. Even though this paper develops a framework for the
stochastic MAB with independent arms, which would be the simplest and oldest problem in the
MAB literature, we believe that our framework applies to more complicated settings. Consider the
following examples:
• A finite-horizon MAB with correlated arms (e.g., '0,= ∼ N(x>0 ) , f20 ) where ) ∈ R3 is shared
across the arms, and x0 ∈ R3 is an arm’s feature vector): IRS.V-ZERO can be immediately
implemented by adopting the DP algorithm discussed in §A.2.2.
• MAB with the delayed reward realization: IRS.FH can be immediately implemented by
simulating the DM’s learning process in the presence of delay.
• MAB with a budget constraint (in which each arm consumes a certain amount of budget
and the DM wants to maximize the total reward within a limited budget. See [28]): all
IRS algorithms can be implemented by solving a budget-constrained optimization problem
instead of a horizon-constrained optimization problem.
16In its inner problem, IRS.V-ZERO-like penalties are applied for the initial b)0/ c pulls and then IRS.FH-like
penalties are applied for the later pulls.
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In these extensions, we obtain not only the online decision-making policies but also their perfor-
mance bounds as in this paper. Generally speaking, our framework provides a systematic way of
improving TS by taking into account the exploitation-exploration trade-off more carefully, par-
ticularly in the presence of some constraint that induces incomplete learning; the main challenge
would be to design a suitable penalty function that is tractable yet captures the problem-specific
exploration-exploitation trade-off precisely.
2.7 Conclusion
Contribution to MAB literature. We first highlight that our IRS framework generalizes Thomp-
son sampling to the finite-horizon MAB setting. As pointed out in [29], TS may perform poorly
in time-sensitive learning problems in which exploitation is rather more encouraged than explo-
ration. Interpreted as a special case of IRS policies, it is clear that TS is implicitly assuming an
infinite time horizon in the sense that its associated inner problem solves a best-arm identification
problem with an infinite number of observations. As summarized in Table 2.2, IRS algorithms
consider more complicated inner problems in which the benefit from exploration is limited by
the time-horizon constraint. While maintaining the Bayesian recursive structure of its sequen-
tial decision-making process, we improve TS within a unified framework that also includes the
Bayesian optimal policy as another special case.
Furthermore, the IRS framework provides a set of (Bayesian) performance bounds that are
tighter than the conventional benchmark that has been widely used since [16]. We believe that these
benchmarks would be useful, in a Bayesian setting, in measuring the optimality of an algorithm or
in assessing the intrinsic difficulty of an MAB problem instance.
Contribution to information relaxation literature. The information relaxation framework is cer-
tainly a powerful tool to obtain performance bounds in a general class of decision-making prob-
lems. Although there have been several studies [9] that elicit a decision-making policy based on
this framework, they are limited to using a performance bound as a proxy for the value function.
Instead of approximating the value function explicitly, the IRS framework considers simulation-
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based randomized policies that make each decision that is optimized to a single instance of a
simulated environment, and our results show that this scheme is very powerful in online learning
problems where random exploration is required.
In applying the information relaxation framework to a particular application, the most chal-
lenging task is to find a suitable penalty function that is tractable yet yields a tight performance
bound. In this paper, by exploiting the recursive structures embedded in the Bayesian learning pro-
cess, we derive a series of penalty functions so that users themselves can find a balance between
the quality of policies/bounds and the computational cost. We also provide theoretical analyses
of the tightness of performance bounds and the suboptimality of associated policies by leveraging
the existing analysis developed in the MAB literature. These analytic results would be rare in the
information relaxation literature due to the complex nature of the performance bound produced by
the information relaxation framework.
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Chapter 3: Policy Gradient Optimization of Thompson Sampling Policies
3.1 Introduction
In both academia and industry, Thompson sampling has emerged as a leading approach to
exploration in online decision making. This is driven by the algorithm’s simplicity, generality,
ability to leverage rich prior information about problem, and its resilience to delayed feedback.
But, like most popular bandit algorithms, it is a heuristic design based on intuitive appeal and
some degree of mathematical insight. The tutorial paper by [30] details numerous settings in
which Thompson sampling can be grossly suboptimal. We highlight several such situations:
• Settings where the time horizon is short relative to the number of arms. As an extreme
case, in the situation there is a single period remaining, the myopic policy is optimal and
Thompson sampling will over explore. At another extreme, if there are many arms, it may
be optimal to only restrict exploration to a subset so that a good arm can be identified in time
to exploit over a reasonable time frame.
• Thompson sampling does not directly consider reward noise. If there is a significant het-
erogeneity in the noise across arms, Thompson sampling may suboptimally pull noisy arms
about which there is little hope to learn.
• In settings with correlated arms, pulling a single arm may provide information about many
other arms. In these settings, there may be “free exploration” where, for example, a my-
opic policy might learn about all arms and the type of explicit exploration undertaken by
Thompson sampling may be wasteful.
An underlying theme in the above example is the fact that Thompson sampling does not make an
explicit exploration-exploitation trade off. Even in less extreme settings, Thompson sampling is
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generally thought to explore too aggressively.
Thompson sampling is designed for a Bayesian multi-armed bandit problem, a well-defined
optimization problem that has long been approached using the tools of dynamic programming.
Despite this, the literature offers no way to use computation, rather than human ingenuity, to im-
prove on standard Thompson sampling. We propose and benchmark the use of policy gradient
methods to optimize over a given family of Thompson sampling style algorithms. The proposed
methods use substantial offline computation, but the resulting policies can be executed without
additional real-time computation.
At first glance, it appears standard policy gradient algorithms [31] cannot be efficiently applied
to Thompson sampling. The challenge is that traditional policy gradient methods require compu-
tation of the score function of the distribution of actions. While, in principle, Thompson sampling
randomly draws an action at each decision point, the distribution over actions from which it sam-
ples is not available in closed form. Instead, efficient implementations sample a model parameter
from a posterior distribution and then select the action that is optimal under this sampled parame-
ter. Under such an implementation, it may be difficult to compute the probability of selecting each
action.
Our central insight is as follows: we view the posterior parameter sampled by Thompson sam-
pling as a kind of “pseudo-action”. In our framework, a sampling policy maps the history of
observations to a probability distribution over the parameter space. A full algorithm will, in each
period, draw a sample from according to the sampling policy and subsequently apply the base
action that is optimal under the sampled parameter. In standard Thompson sampling, the sam-
pling policy applies Bayes’ rule, mapping any history to the associated posterior distribution over
pseudo-actions (parameters). Mathematically, this is equivalent to the standard formulation which
views the decision as a choice of base action. Critically, however, by viewing the decision as a
choice of pseudo-action (parameter), the distribution of pseudo-actions for Thompson sampling is
often available in closed-form: it is simply the posterior distribution of the parameter. This simple
but powerful shift in perspective enables us to search over Thompson sampling style policies using
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policy gradient methods. Indeed, we will use policy gradient to search over a class of sampling
policies that are themselves parameterized by hyper-parameters we call meta-parameters.
A sampling policy could be parameterized in many ways. One option is to parameterize them
by complex neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate that even simple modifications of
standard Thompson sampling offer substantial benefit. One approach builds on Thompson sam-
pling by viewing the statistical parameters of the Bayesian model (e.g., the prior distribution, the
noise distribution, etc.) as meta-parameters. Another takes the posterior distribution used by stan-
dard Thompson sampling and reshapes it. Policy gradient methods for searching over the meta-
parameters are tractable as long as (i) the sampling policies can be applied efficiently and (ii)
given any history, one can efficiently calculate derivatives of the sampling distribution’s log den-
sity with the respect to the meta-parameters. Typically (ii) requires that probability density function
is known up to a proportionality constant.
Our work has a close conceptual connection to work on meta-learning [see e.g., 32, 33]. As
is nicely articulated by [34], many companies face a large sequence of experimentation tasks,
raising the question of how to effectively share information across these tasks. Consider a web
company who may run thousands of A/B tests per year, giving them strong prior knowledge of
the distribution of effect sizes and click through rates. Or a news article recommendation service
has a new set of articles each day and needs to experiment to learn which will be popular. Each
day can be viewed as its own instance of a bandit problem and the platform’s goal is to do well on
average across a large number of days. [34] suggest an empirical Bayesian approach, where the
prior of Thompson sampling is statistically estimated from data on previous tasks. This view of
meta-learning as learning a prior distribution has long been recognized. Our approach, however,
will not be to apply Thompson sampling directly using some form of statistically learned prior,
since Thompson sampling is not itself an optimal policy. If historical data can be used to build
a simulator of this meta-bandit problem, then it is more appropriate to search over Thompson
sampling like policies aiming to directly optimize the true performance metric, the average reward.
This idea — shifting from learning elements of the statistical model such as the prior distribution
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or noise model via statistical estimation to direct optimization — may especially be powerful in
settings where the statistical model is mis-specified.
Our contributions are as follows:
1. We develop a tractable framework for policy gradient estimation for sampling policies.
Several recent works have explored the use of gradient based search to tune bandit algo-
rithms [35, 36]. Relative to these works, one of our main contributions is to uncover a way
to apply policy gradient methods to Thompson sampling, allowing us to fine-tune a widely
used algorithm with strong theoretical guarantees. Very recently, an independent and con-
temporaneous pre-print by [37] discovered a similar approach to tuning Thompson sampling.
2. We provide and analyze multiple gradient estimators for sampling policies.
As in the broader application of policy gradient for reinforcement learning, there are mul-
tiple possible gradient estimators possible, through different choices of reward metrics and
baselines. We derive several novel policy gradient estimators that are specifically tailored to
Bayesian bandit problems. We are able to compare their variance theoretically and empiri-
cally.
3. We computationally demonstrate the benefits of our approach.
Through simple numerical experiments, we provide a compelling proof of concept. Policy
search produces policies that correct for shortcomings of Thompson sampling in short hori-
zon problems or problems with large discrepancies between the variances of arm rewards.
Perhaps more surprisingly, policy search offers substantial improvements over Thompson
sampling even in a canonical long horizon problem to which it is ideally suited. We also
compare against optimistic Gittins indices [38], information directed sampling [39], and
Bayesian upper confidence bound algorithms [40], confirming that direct policy search on
top of Thompson sampling produces state of the art results for widely studied problem set-




We consider a multi-armed bandit problem in a Bayesian setting.
Rewards. Let A be the set of arms, possibly infinite, among which the decision maker (DM) can
select at each time C = 1, . . . , ) . When the DM pulls an arm 0 ∈ A at time C, they earn a random
reward '0,C drawn from a distribution R that is parameterized by model parameters \ ∈ Θ, i.e.,
'0,C |\ ∼ R(\, 0). (3.1)
We assume that the rewards ('0,C)C∈[)] are conditionally independent and identically distributed1
given \, for each 0 ∈ A. We further define ` : Θ × A → R to be the mean reward function, i.e.,
`(\, 0) , E'∼R(\,0) ['] . (3.2)
As we consider a Bayesian setting, we view \ as a (multivariate) random variable that is sampled
from a prior distribution, which we denote by P(H0), i.e.,
\ ∼ P(H0), (3.3)
where H0 ∈ Y are the sufficient statistics that parameterize the prior distribution.
Information set. The parameters \ are unknown to the DM, but can be inferred by observing
the reward realizations sequentially revealed over time. More precisely, let C be the history, or






1One important case where the rewards are not i.i.d. is the case of contextual bandits. Here, the reward at time
C is given by '0,C |\, GC ∼ R(\, 0, GC ). Here GC is the context at time C, and this is a stochastic process that evolves
independently of the DM’s actions. The framework we develop here can be extended to accommodate contextual cases
as well in a straightforward fashion, but in the interest of simplifying the presentation we will not be explicit about
this.
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This includes the actions taken by the DM and the rewards realized through time C. We assume
that the DM has knowledge of both the prior distribution P(H0) and the functional form of reward
distribution R.
As a Bayesian learner, the DM will update their belief according to Bayes’ rule whenever
observing a new reward realization, and thus maintain a posterior distribution for \ at each time.
Without loss of generality,2 we assume that the posterior is represented as
\ |C ∼ P(.C). (3.5)
Here, .C ∈ Y is a random variable that denotes the sufficient statistics of the posterior distribution
after observing the history C (i.e., after observing the Cth reward realization). We set .0 = H0.
We will describe the randomness of our stochastic model more explicitly as follows. The
DM’s policy c is described by a sequence of deterministic mappings (cC)C∈[)] . Each mapping
cC : HC−1×E → A specifies the next action C as a function of history C−1 ∈ HC−1 that is revealed
immediately prior to time C, and random noise nC ∈ E that can be utilized for randomization in the
choice of action. Similarly, the reward realization is described by a mapping A : Θ × A × Ξ → R
that specifies the next reward realization, where any randomness is generated by the noise variable
bC ∈ Ξ. That is,
C = cC (C−1, nC), '0,C = A (\, 0, bC). (3.6)
We assume, without loss of generality, that the noise random variables (nC)C∈[)] are independent
and identically distributed, as are (bC)C∈[)] .
We define an instance or episode, denoted by , as a random variable that encodes all uncer-






2When P is a conjugate prior of R and belongs to the exponential family, the sufficient statistics .C will admit a
compact representation. In other cases, .C may represent the entire history, i.e., .C = C .
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In other words, given an instance , we exactly know what rewards will be realized for any given
action sequence 01:) ∈ A) committed by the DM. The set of all possible instances is denoted by
I.
Objective. The DM aims to earn as much reward as possible in expectation. Given the DM’s








where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of instance (i.e., the randomness of
the parameters \ and the reward realizations) and also any randomness of the choice of actions (if
c is a randomized policy).
To better illustrate our setup, we provide an example of a canonical multi-armed bandit problem
described with the notation introduced above.
Example 3.2.1 (Gaussian MAB). Consider a finite number of arms A , {1, . . . ,  }. Each arm
0 yields normally distributed rewards with an unknown mean \0 and a known variance f20 , where
the prior of \0 is given by a normal distributionN(<0,0, E20,0). The model parameters are given by
the vector \ , (\0)0∈[ ] .




, where (bC)C∈[)] are i.i.d. standard normal
random variables that randomize the reward realizations according to
`(\, 0) = \0, A (\, 0, bC) = \0 + f0bC . (3.9)
The posterior for a parameter \0 after time C is given by a normal distributionN(<0,C , E20,C). Here,






















As a collection of these sufficient statistics across the arms, .C , (<0,C , E20,C)0∈[ ] ∈ R2 , determine
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the posterior of the parameters \ given the history C .
3.3 Parameterized Thompson sampling
Thompson sampling (TS) [41] is a randomized policy that works as follows. At each time
C = 1, . . . , ) : (i) the parameters \̃C are sampled from the posterior distribution P(.C−1) given all
information prior to time C; and (ii) an action is chosen to maximize the expected reward given
these sampled parameters \̃C . In other words,
\̃C ∼ P(.C−1), TSC ← argmax
0∈A
`(\̃C , 0), (3.10)
where .C−1 ∈ Y are, as introduced in (3.5), the sufficient statistics describing the posterior dis-
tribution of true parameters \ given the history C−1. As time progresses, the above procedure is
repeated, while updating the posterior distribution according to Bayes’ rule.
An important characteristic of TS is “probability matching”. Under TS, the probability that
an arm 0 is selected at time C is equal to the probability that the arm 0 is indeed the best one that
Bayesian inference predicts, i.e.,
P
(






`(\, 0′) | C−1
)
, ∀0 ∈ A. (3.11)
However, probability in (3.11) is difficult to evaluate since it does not admit a closed-form expres-
sion in most cases and does not admit feasible policy gradient estimators.
We consider a class of variants of TS where the sampling policy in (3.10) is not the posterior
distribution, but instead is some other distribution parameterized by meta-parameters _ ∈ Λ ⊆ R3 .
In other words, given _, the corresponding sampling policy TS(_) repeats the following at each
time C:
\̃C ∼ P_ (C−1), TS(_)C ← argmax
0∈A
`(\̃C , 0), (3.12)
where P_ (C−1) is a distribution on the parameter space Θ that has arbitrary dependency on the
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meta-parameters _ and the history C−1. The sampling policy TS(_) is almost identical to the naïve
TS except that it samples the parameters from P_ (C−1) instead of P(.C−1). In this way, sampling
policies can be viewed as a natural generalization of TS, emitting at each time a randomized
pseudo-action \̃C (choice of parameters) from which a base action is determined, rather than directly
emitting a base action.
As we would like to employ policy gradient methods to optimize over the meta-parameters
_, we will assume that the probability density (or mass) function of the distribution P_ (C−1) is
differentiable with respect to _ over its domain Λ, for any realization of history C−1 almost surely.
Aside from this, the distribution P_ (C−1) defining the sampling policy is allowed to be essentially
arbitrary. However, in order to illustrate our ideas, consider the following example:
Example 3.3.1 (Posterior reshaping.). We adopt and generalize the idea proposed in [42], and let
the algorithm to sample the parameters from the a reshaped posterior distribution,





where P(·) is the posterior distribution defined in (3.5), and q_ : Y → Y is a differentiable
mapping, parameterized by _, that transforms one set of sufficient statistics to another.
Posterior reshaping is motivated by several arguments. Compared to the general parameteriza-
tion (3.12), the posterior reshaping does not parameterize “how to learn”. Instead, it parameterizes
how to utilize the learned results, while maintaining the Bayesian learning logic as it is. This can
significantly reduce the effort required for tuning the meta-parameters. Moreover, its implementa-
tion requires a minimal effort once one has already implemented the standard TS. Indeed, when
q_ (·) is the identity map, posterior reshaping reduces to standard TS. Hence, under appropriate
technical assumptions, a local policy gradient search starting at the identity map will be guaran-
teed to do no worse than standard TS.
As discussed in the introduction, the standard TS suffers from the over-exploration, for exam-
ple when the time horizon is short relative to the number of arms. Posterior reshaping can naturally
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address this, by reducing uncertainty in the sampling distribution. As an extreme example, consider
a situation where we are given a single time period (i.e., ) = 1). The optimal policy is myopic —
the optimal action is to pick the arm with the largest prior mean — which can be implemented by
reshaping the posterior distribution to concentrate on the prior mean. Such posterior concentration
also appears in the work of [43]. The IRS.FH policy they suggest is posterior reshaping sampling
policy.
Furthermore, it is possible that TS with the correct model parameters (e.g., the specification
of the prior distribution or the reward distribution) may not be optimal for the performance of the
algorithm. Within the framework of posterior reshaping, we can find the set of model parameters
that are empirically tuned for performance so as to outperform to the one with the correct values.3
A concrete examples of posterior reshaping in the Gaussian case can be developed as follows:
Example 3.3.2 (Posterior reshaping for Gaussian MAB). Using the notation of Example 3.2.1,






















for each 0 = 1, . . . ,  , where the sufficient statistics are given by (0,C−1 ,
∑C−1














0∈A ∈ R4 under
which \̃0,C is sampled from
\̃0,C ∼ N
(
_<0 + _f0 · (0,C−1
1 + _f0 · #0,C−1
,
_E0 (1 − C/))_
W
0
1 + _f0 · #0,C−1
)
. (3.15)









0 (precision ratio), and _
W
0 = 0 (variance decay exponent). The amount of exploration
3Even if the model is mis-specified, the policy gradient method can be applied, but we need to be careful in
the choice of gradient estimator in order to avoid a bias in the gradient estimation. See the related discussion in
Section 3.4.3.
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is controlled by _E0 and _
W
0 . In particular, the term (1 − C/))_
W
0 diminishes exploration near the end
of the horizon, where the benefit from exploration is limited.
Note that this parameterization scheme can be represented in the form of (3.13), since the
sufficient statistics of the realized observations (i.e., (0,C−1 and #0,C−1) are uniquely determined
from those of current posterior distribution (i.e., <0,C−1 and E20,C−1) and prior distribution (i.e., <0,0
and E2
0,0). Also note that the probability density function is differentiable with respect to _ given
that _E0 > 0 and _f0 > 0.
A more complex example is as follows:
Example 3.3.3 (Deep recurrent neural network parameterization). One might consider a recurrent
neural network (RNN) structure with, at each time C, input (C , 'C ,C), hidden state .̃C and output
being the sampled pseudo-action \̃C . The network would evolve according to





Here, the hidden state .̃C is analogous to a sufficient statistic in that it summarizes the history up




(·), with weights _. and _\ ,
govern the evolution of the hidden state .̃C and the output \̃C , respectively. The meta-parameters
_ , (_. , _\) would be optimized with policy gradient methods.
Example 3.3.3 is in the spirit of the approach of [35] and [36], where RNNs were fit with
policy search methods, but where the policies output actions. Here, to contrast, the RNN outputs
distributional parameters which are then sampled, leveraging on top of the structure of Thompson
sampling.
3.4 Policy gradient for Thompson sampling
We aim to search over the meta-parameters _ ∈ R3 so that the corresponding policy TS(_) im-
proves over the original TS significantly. For this purpose, we adopt the policy gradient framework,
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which applies variants of stochastic gradient ascent to optimize total expected reward. Formally,
one can have in mind the iteration,
_:+1 = _: + U: (_: , F: ) (3.16)
where (U: ) is a step-size sequence, (F: ) is a sequence of i.i.d. random variables, and  (_: , F: )
is an unbiased gradient, i.e.,














Typically, the F: denote the randomness used by a stochastic simulator. For the gradient estimators








C∈[)] consists of realizations of the random noise terms that determine the
reward realizations and the action selection of a randomized algorithm. In deriving and comparing
gradient estimators, we omit the dependence on : . It is worth noting that the iteration (3.16) is
meant for illustrative purposes, and other first order stochastic methods, e.g., Adam [44], can also
be utilized.
3.4.1 Score function gradient estimation
Most implementations of policy gradient use score function gradient estimation [31]. However,






, which is typically intractable
since there is no closed-form expression for the distribution of the chosen action.
We circumvent this issue by interpreting the sampled parameters \̃C as an (pseudo-)action taken
by the policy at time C. One can imagine an equivalent bandit environment whose action space is
set to the parameter space Θ and the decision maker earns the reward '̃\̃C ,C , 'C ,C associated with
the arm C , argmax0 `(\̃C , 0) as a result of his decision \̃C . Assume that the sampling distribution
P_ (C−1) under the any C−1 has a probability density function ?_ ( · ;C−1). Assume as well that
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denotes the score functions. This form of score function gradient estimator is well known to be




, which is referred to as the policy gradient theorem
in the reinforcement learning literature. Formally, unbiasedness requires technical conditions that
allow for the interchange of integrals and derivatives. We refer to [45] for appropriate conditions.
3.4.2 Admissible gradient estimators
The standard gradient estimator (3.17) can be very noisy due to the high variability of reward
realizations and random action selections. In this section, we propose a broader, more general class
of gradient estimators, and demonstrate that they remain unbiased as long as they satisfy a certain
admissibility requirement. Later, we will suggest a specific list of estimators for bandit problems,
and provide a theoretical comparison among them in terms of variance reduction.
General representation. With processes " , ("C)C∈[)] , which we call a reward metric, and




(C · ("C − C) . (3.19)
The reward metric "C is a random variable that accounts for the sum of rewards that the policy
earns on the remaining horizon C, C + 1, . . . , ) , and C is another random variable that represents
some benchmark for the rewards over the same period. Note that the estimator (3.17) can be
obtained by taking "C =
∑)
B=C 'B ,B and C = 0.
Admissibility. We state a condition on the reward metric " and the baseline  under which they
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induce an unbiased gradient estimator ",.
Definition 3.4.1 (Admissible reward metric and baseline). A reward metric " is admissible if for










A baseline  is admissible if C is integrable and C and \̃C are conditionally independent given
C−1 for all C ∈ [)], i.e.,
C ⊥ \̃C
 C−1. (3.21)
The first condition (3.20) ensures that a risk-neutral decision maker would not differentiate
between "C and the sum of future rewards when deciding the next action. These two measures have
the same expectation given any history (which corresponds to the state in dynamic programming
terms) and any pseudo-action \̃C . The second condition (3.21) ensures that the decision-maker
does not need to take baseline into consideration when making a decision, since the baseline is
independent of the next pseudo-action \̃C .
The above interpretation implies that the substitution of reward metric (from
∑)
B=C 'B ,B to "C)
and the presence of baseline C do not affect the DM’s decision at each time C, as long as they satisfy
the admissibility conditions (3.20)–(3.21). Therefore, we can infer that the generalized gradient
estimator (3.19) is equal in expectation to the standard one (3.17), which is proved formally in the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.4.1 (Unbiasedness of gradient estimator). If the reward metric " and the baseline 
are admissible, then E[",] = E[].





E [(C | C−1] = 0, (3.22)
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due to the property of the score function. By the condition (3.20), we obtain







































By the condition (3.21), we further obtain
E [(CC] = E [E ((CC |C−1)] = E [E ((C |C−1) × E (C |C−1)] = 0.





















which concludes the proof.
One particularly interesting class of reward metrics and baselines are those which are time
separable:




ÂB (1:B, ), C , 1C (1:C−1, ),
where ÂC : AC × I → R and 1C : AC−1 × I → R are the deterministic functions that satisfy
E [ÂC (01:C , ) | C−1, 1:C−1 = 01:C−1] = E [A (\, 0C , bC) | C−1, 1:C−1 = 01:C−1] , ∀ 01:C ∈ AC , C ∈ [)] .
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Then, the reward metric " , ("C)C∈[)] and the baseline  , (C)C∈[)] are admissible.
We remark that the baseline is allowed to be instance-dependent, meaning that it can depend
on instance  defined in (3.7) that determines the realizations of rewards and the true parameter
\. This is a considerable generalization of the literature in which baselines are typically chosen
as a deterministic function of state [46]. The use of common randomness [47] in the the baseline
and the reward metric can reduce variance, especially when most variation in observed algorithm
performance is driven by different realizations of the problem instance rather than differences in
the choice of meta parameter.
3.4.3 Reward metrics and baselines
We suggest a specific series of reward metrics and baselines that are admissible for Bayesian
bandit problems. A number of these take the time separable form of Example 3.4.1.
Reward metrics. The followings are possible choices for reward metric:
1. The observed reward "obsC ,
∑)
B=C 'B ,B.
2. The mean reward "meanC , E
[∑)
B=C 'B ,B
 \, C:) ] = ∑)B=C `(\, B).





where ˆ̀ ,C (0) , E [`(\, 0) |) , B = 0,∀B = C, . . . , ) ] that indicates the best estimate for
the mean reward of an arm 0 that the DM can infer through a finite number of observations.4
4. The posterior mean "BayesC ,
∑)
B=C E [`(\, B) |B−1, B ].
4This metric is valid only when the arms and their associated priors are independent. Using the notation of (3.6),
we further need to assume that the noise variable takes the form bC , (b0,C )0∈A where b0,C independent across 0. In
order for the DM to retrieve maximal information about a particular arm 0, it is required to pull the arm 0 throughout
the entire rest of the horizon (i.e., B = 0,∀B = C, . . . , )). The metric ˆ̀ ,C (0) represents the mean reward estimate that
the DM will have in this scenario, which also has a dependency on the instance .
72


















Recall that `(\, 0) is the mean reward function, defined in (3.2), that is a deterministic function
representing the expected reward of an arm 0 given the parameters \.
These metrics differ in the information set on which the conditional expectation of the sum
of future rewards,
∑)
B=C 'B ,B, is taken. The main motivation for deriving this series of metrics is
“Rao–Blackwellization,” i.e., integrating out some of the randomness in the future reward realiza-
tions and the future action selections. More specifically, the metric "meanC is obtained from "
obs
C by
integrating out the randomness of immediate reward realization while maintaining the dependency
on the (random) parameters \ and the (random) action sequence C:) . The metric "finC is motivated
from the fact that knowing the true parameters \ is as informative as having an infinite number of
observations for each arm, and improves over "meanC by taking into account how much the DM
can learn about \ with a finite number observations (i.e., by integrating out the uncertainties in \
that cannot be identified). Next, under the metric "BayesC , the DM earns the expected reward given
the posterior distribution at each time, which averages out the uncertainties in \ at each time step.
Finally, the metric "&C represents the Q-value of the given policy, i.e., the expected future reward
of the policy at a given state (history) and an action (arm), which averages out the all uncertainties
that arise after taking the action C .
We remark that these reward metrics are mostly taken from [43]. While the reward metrics "obsC










only in a Bayesian setting. In addition, accurate computation of "&C typically requires averaging
over many Monte Carlo simulations (e.g., roll-outs) which may be computationally expensive.
Baselines. We further provide a list of baselines as follows:
1. The null baseline nullC , 0.
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C is the reward (measured with the corre-
sponding reward metric) that the action sequence ★C = argmax0∈A `(\, 0) achieves in the




B=C max0∈A `(\, 0).
3. The self-play baseline selfC , "̃C where "̃C is the reward (measured with the corresponding
reward metric) that an independent run of the same algorithm achieves in the same instance.




B=C `(\, ̃B) where ̃1:) is
the action sequence taken in the independent run.




As proven in Theorem 3.4.1, each of these baselines can be used in a combination with any
of the reward metrics listed above. The baseline oracleC is an instance-dependent measure that
represents the performance of the omniscient policy that knows the values of true parameters \.
Given that "meanC is chosen as a coupled reward metric, the gap 
oracle
C − "meanC reduces to the
“regret” which is a measure of suboptimality that has been widely used in bandit studies. This
choice of baseline is natural when we expect adaptive algorithm to have small average regret. It
can be less effective in problems with a short time horizon, where the reward earned by an oracle
is not an attainable baseline.
The baseline selfC utilizes an independent run of the same randomized policy under the same
instance. The idea of self-play was adopted from [36] while we make a generalization regarding
the choice of reward metric and provide a formal proof of its validity. It effectively centers the
reward metric, i.e., E["C − selfC ] = 0, which helps stabilize gradient estimates. In our numer-
ical experiments, selfC shows an impressive performance across the different settings, though it
effectively requires the computational effort of running twice as many simulations.
Finally, the baseline +C is constructed analogously to the reward metric "
&
C , and it represents
the average performance of the given policy at the given state. In a combination with "&C , the gap
"
&
C − +C measures the relative benefit of the chosen action compared to the average, which is also
known as the advantage function. Like "&C , however, this baseline does not have a closed-form
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expression. The baseline +C can be understood as averaging the result of 
self
C (applied with the
posterior mean reward metric) across many independent runs of the algorithm. The randomized
baseline selfC has higher variance, but can be calculated at much lower computational cost.
Implementation issues. If we are equipped with a simulator that can generate instances with full
information, it is straightforward to compute the reward metrics and the baselines listed above
(apart from the computational efficiency). If we are running the algorithm in the real world situa-
tion, however, we may not be able to identify their values as we do not have an access to unrevealed
information such as true model parameters \. Nevertheless, in the Bayesian setting, we can over-
come this issue by sampling the unobserved variables at the end of an episode: For example, after
completing an episode, we can sample \̃ ∼ P(.) ) as if we perform one more step of TS, and
plug them into the formulas for reward metric or baseline. This is valid since \̃ is identically dis-
tributed with the true parameters \ given the observations revealed in that episode, by the virtue
of posterior distribution, and therefore the resulting gradient estimates ̃ will also be identically
distributed with the true one .
Note that any model mis-specification can lead to a bias of the gradient estimator. More specif-
ically, if the prior distribution or the reward distribution is mis-specified (e.g., the value of noise




C will result in biased
estimates. If the mean reward function `(·, ·) is incorrect, furthermore, all the reward metrics other
than "obsC will suffer from the bias. We expect that the users can determine whether there is an
bias during the training process and adopt a more robust metric if needed.
3.4.4 Variance comparison
The variance of a gradient estimator is a crucial factor for the performance of policy gradient.
In this section, we provide an analysis than can provide theoretical comparisons between estimators
of the form (3.19), including many of the estimators in Section 3.4.3.
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To begin, note that for an admissible estimator of the form (3.19), we have








(C · ("C − C)
]















where ",C , (C · ("C − C), and g ∈ [)] is a random time index that is independently and
uniformly distributed. Thus, given any admissible estimator ",, we can construct a related
single time estimator ) × ",g that is also unbiased. Loosely speaking, this estimator estimates
the gradient based on a the impact of an action taken at a single, randomly chosen decision epoch
g, rather than considering all decision epochs. Moreover, the simpler, single time estimator is more
amenable to analysis.
In the next theorem, we further provide a comparison between two single time gradient esti-
mators in terms of the variance they induce. For two square symmetric matrices  and , we say
   if and only if  −  is a positive semi-definite matrix. This gives a partial ordering of
symmetric matrices.
Theorem 3.4.2 (Variance reduction). Consider two reward metric and baseline pairs (" C , C) and
(" C , C) that satisfy
" C − C = E
[
" C − C
GC ] , ∀C ∈ [)], (3.23)













Then, g exhibits a smaller variance than g, in the sense that
Cov[
g
]  Cov[g] . (3.24)
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Proof. Fix C ∈ [)]. By the law of total covariance and conditioning on GC ,








































 g] = E [(g · E ["g − gGg]  g] = E [(g · ("g − g )  g] = E [g g] .


























Here, the inequality follows from (3.25). This concludes the proof.
Theorem 3.4.2 provides a pairwise comparison of two single time gradient estimators (i.e., g
and 
g
), when their reward metrics and baselines are related by (3.23). Ideally we would like









). However, this is challenging due to the interdependence across time between the
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score functions and the reward metrics. Nevertheless, we believe that Theorem 3.4.2 is informative,
and the ordering it implies is consistent with the numerical performance results we will see in
Section 3.5.
Theorem 3.4.2 implies that the reward metric based on the smaller information set (i.e., through
more averaging) produces a more precise gradient estimator than one based on the larger informa-
tion set (i.e., with less averaging). This is the same insight that drives the Rao-Blackwell theorem.
In the development of the reward metrics in Section 3.4.3, we have argued that some reward
metrics are motivated from the others via Rao-Blackwellization. In fact, the relationship (3.23)




C , and "
&
C (not including "
Bayes
C ). Indeed,
an application of Theorem 3.4.2 immediately yields the following ordering among the gradient
estimators:
Corollary 3.4.1.
Cov["obs,g ]  Cov["
mean,
g ]  Cov["
fin,
g ]  Cov["
& ,
g ],
for any choice of baseline  from null, oracle, self, and + . Here, note that the baselines oracleC
and selfC require a coupled reward metric. We assume they are coupled to the corresponding
reward metric in use in each estimator.
3.5 Numerical experiments
In this section, we report the simulation results of the policy gradient optimization of Thomp-
son sampling. We aim to illustrate the flexibility of our proposed framework as a meta-learning
platform for bandit tasks, compare the gradient estimators with different choices of reward metric
and baseline, and highlight the performance of optimized sampling policies in a comparison with
the other state-of-the-art algorithms.
Setup. We consider Gaussian multi-armed bandit (MAB) problems, introduced in Example 3.2.1,
for which we implement TS with parameterized posterior reshaping, described in Example 3.3.2.
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To highlight the improvement over the naïve TS, our experiments include the following configu-
rations:
1. Gaussian MAB with 10 arms ( = 10) and 500 time periods () = 500), where all arms have
the same prior distribution and the same noise variance. This is a typical setting that has
been studied in many prior works.
2. Gaussian MAB with heteroscedastic reward distributions, where we are given 5 arms ( = 5)
with very different noise variances and 50 time periods () = 50). Since each arm requires
a different amount of effort to learn its unknown mean, it is important to incorporate in-
formation about the noise variances into the decision making, which standard TS does not
do.
3. Gaussian MAB with an excessive number of arms, where we are given 20 arms ( = 20) with
identical priors and 20 time periods () = 20). In this setup, there is no hope of discovering
the true optimal arm. Nevertheless, standard TS continues to select arms that have never
been tried throughout the entire time horizon, which is very wasteful exploration.
Note that in all of these settings we have adopted the same parameterization of TS. This is to verify
that our proposed framework achieves the goal of meta-learning: The policy gradient procedure
finds the choice of meta-parameters _ ∈ R4 from Example 3.3.2 that is optimized for each of the
bandit settings, resulting in the algorithm that is trained to exploit the structure in each setting and
performs no worse than the standard version of TS. We highlighted that the optimized behavior
differs substantially across settings and at times differs substantially from TS.
Training. We implement the policy gradient algorithm based on the gradient estimator (3.19)
with different combinations of reward metric " and baseline . In each policy gradient iteration,
we compute the batch gradient, i.e., the average gradient measured across a set of independently
generated bandit instances, where the batch size (the number of instances) ranges from 1,000 to
5,000 across the settings. The Adam optimizer [44] is used to perform the gradient ascent steps.
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The random generation of Gaussian MAB instances is done according to the model described
in Example 3.2.1. To facilitate an accurate comparison between the gradient estimators, the esti-
mators share all the randomness in the instance generation and the random action selection. That
is, in the notation of (3.6), the same realizations of noise variables (nC) and (bC) are used for the
simulation of different policy gradient estimators.








{`(\, 0)} − `(\, C)
]
, (3.26)
which is measured via sample average approximation in our simulation. When computing the gra-
dient estimator during the training process, we obtain as a side product the regret that the algorithm
incurs in each training batch, and we report this trajectory of regret as a learning curve of the policy
gradient optimization. We naturally expect that the regret decreases as training proceeds. Finally,
we measure the regret of the trained policies (and the other bandit algorithms listed below) on the
evaluation batch, which is a set of instances generated independently of the training batches. As
done in training, the same set of instances are used for evaluating all the policies so as to facilitate
accurate comparisons among them.
Competing bandit algorithms. We consider the state-of-the-art bandit algorithms that are suitable
for a Bayesian setting: the Bayesian upper confidence bound [40] (BAYES-UCB, with a quantile
of 1 − 1
C
), information-directed sampling [39] (IDS), and the optimistic Gittins index5 [38] (OGI).
We compare the performance of the trained TS policies with these algorithms.
Implementation. All the code is written in Python, and the training module is implemented using
Tensorflow to utilize the automatic gradient calculation and the Adam optimizer. We use 64-bits
floating numbers for computation of gradient estimator.
5There are two free parameters in OGI. We use a one-step look-ahead and a discount factor of WC = 1 − 1C , which
was the primary focus of [38].
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3.5.1 Gaussian MAB in a standard setting ( = 10, ) = 500)
We first report the result for Gaussian MAB with 10 arms and 500 time periods. More specif-
ically, we are given ten independent arms with identical prior distributions: For each arm 0 =
1, . . . ,  and time C = 1, . . . , ) , we assume that
\0 ∼ N(0, 12), '0,C |\0 ∼ N(\0, 12). (3.27)
This setup has been also examined in the prior literature [38, 39].
For policy gradient optimization of TS with parameterized posterior reshaping, we adopt the
various combinations of reward metric " and baseline  for the gradient estimator ",. The
initial values for the meta-parameters _ are chosen in the way that the corresponding policy is
identical to the standard TS. The training batch size is set to 5,000 and the learning rate for Adam
optimizer is set to 0.01.
Figure 3.1 shows the learning curves obtained in our simulated training, and Table 3.1 reports
the performance of the trained TS policies as well as the other algorithms being compared. In every
combination of reward metric and baseline, we observe a steady improvement in performance over
the course of the training process (starting from the standard TS). The training performance largely
depends on the choice of baseline: with baseline oracle or self the algorithm shows an impressive
progress, catching the state-of-the-art algorithms within 300 policy gradient iterations and ending
up with policies that improve over the standard TS by 23% in terms of regret.
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Figure 3.1: Learning curves of parameterized Thompson sampling trained for Gaussian MAB with
10 arms and 500 time periods. A curve shows the progress of policy gradient optimization based on
a particular choice of reward metric " and baseline  for the gradient estimator ",, defined in
(3.19). The : th data point in each curve reports the average regret on the : th training batch, which
contains 5,000 independent instances. The dashed horizontal lines represent the performance of
the other algorithms measured with the evaluation batch containing 20,000 instances (also reported
in Table 3.1).
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Algorithm Reward metric Baseline Tr(Cov[",]) (×106) Regret (s.e.)
Trained TS
"obs null 3417.37 54.416 (0.208)
"mean null 3410.17 54.251 (0.197)
"Bayes null 3402.82 54.454 (0.207)
"obs oracle 7.84 45.699 (0.306)
"mean oracle 7.84 45.360 (0.299)
"Bayes oracle 7.97 45.335 (0.306)
"obs self 4.50 45.913 (0.306)
"mean self 4.50 45.409 (0.295)
"Bayes self 6.51 46.331 (0.318)
Naïve TS – – – 58.999 (0.191)
BAYES-UCB – – – 52.038 (0.186)
OGI – – – 50.381 (0.348)
IDS – – – 47.135 (0.335)
IRS.FH – – – 56.672 (0.180)
IRS.V-ZERO – – – 53.179 (0.187)
IRS.INDEX – – – 40.048 (0.251)
Table 3.1: Performance of the algorithms for Gaussian MAB with 10 arms and 500 time peri-
ods. Each trained TS uses the meta-parameters that are obtained from training procedure, i.e.,
the ones found at the end of 1,000 iterations of batched policy gradient ascent (Figure 3.1). The
performance is measured in regret, defined in (3.26), and computed via sample average approxi-
mation over 20,000 independent instances, and reported with the standard error. The best results
are emphasized with bold letters.
3.5.2 Gaussian MAB with heteroscedastic arms ( = 5, ) = 50)
We now explore a different configuration of the Gaussian MAB under which the naïve TS per-
forms particularly poorly. We consider five arms that have significantly different noise variances:
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For each arm 0 = 1, . . . , 5 and time C = 1, . . . , 50, we assume that
\0 ∼ N(0, 12), '0,C |\0 ∼ N(\0, f20 ), where f21:5 , (0.1, 0.4, 1, 4, 10). (3.28)
Note that it is crucial for the algorithms to consider the heterogeneity in the reward variances
since the variance f20 determines how much the decision maker can learn about the unknown
mean reward \0 within a finite number of observations: in order for the posterior distribution to
concentrate so as to have the standard deviation of 0.1, for example, a single observations is enough
for arm 1 whereas 100 and 10,000 observations are required for arm 3 and arm 5, respectively. This
is especially important when the time horizon is short, as in this case.
We use the training batches of size 1,000 for gradient estimation, and the Adam optimizer with
learning rate of 0.05 for policy gradient, and the evaluation batch of size 10,000 for evaluation.
While every combination of reward metric and baseline shows a very stable progress throughout
the policy gradient procedure, as shown in Figure 3.2, we observe that the baseline self works
slightly better than the baseline oracle, and so does oracle than null.
The evaluation results are shown in Table 3.2. We immediately observe that naïve TS and
BAYES-UCB particularly perform poorly as they make decisions based only on the posterior at
each moment without incorporating the noise variances into consideration. As the results show, by
optimizing posterior reshaping parameters, we can make TS to trade off exploitation and explo-
ration much more precisely, so that we can achieve a surprising improvement over TS by 35%–
40%.
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Figure 3.2: Learning curves of parameterized Thompson sampling trained for Gaussian MAB
with heteroscedastic arms ( = 5, ) = 50, f21:5 = (0.1, 0.4, 1, 4, 10)). A curve shows the progress
of policy gradient optimization based on a particular choice of reward metric " and baseline 
for the gradient estimator ",, defined in (3.19). The : th data point in each curve reports the
average regret on the : th training batch, which contains 1,000 independent instances. The dashed
horizontal lines represent the performance of the other algorithms measured with the evaluation
batch containing 10,000 instances (also reported in Table 3.2).
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Algorithm Reward metric Baseline Cov[",] (×104) Regret (s.e.)
Trained TS
"obs null 133.85 16.654 (0.200)
"mean null 75.33 16.723 (0.201)
"Bayes null 66.20 16.546 (0.200)
"obs oracle 78.76 16.315 (0.201)
"mean oracle 22.73 15.864 (0.201)
"Bayes oracle 9.75 15.693 (0.194)
"obs self 59.97 15.885 (0.199)
"mean self 49.15 15.417 (0.194)
"Bayes self 38.99 15.313 (0.194)
NAIVE-TS – – – 25.967 (0.158)
BAYES-UCB – – – 31.875 (0.256)
OGI – – – 23.785 (0.227)
IDS – – – 20.405 (0.205)
IRS.FH – – – 20.209 (0.169)
IRS.V-ZERO – – – 18.027 (0.175)
IRS.INDEX* – – – 15.685 (0.200)
Table 3.2: Performance of the algorithms for Gaussian MAB with heteroscedastic arms. Each
trained TS uses the meta-parameters found at the end of 1,000 iterations of batched policy gradient
ascent (Figure 3.2). The performance is measured in regret, defined in (3.26), and computed via
sample average approximation over 10,000 independent instances, and reported with the standard
error. The best results are emphasized with bold letters.
3.5.3 Gaussian MAB with an excessive number of arms ( = 20, ) = 20)
We finally investigate Gaussian MAB with an excessive number of arms, i.e., too many arms
compared to the length of time horizon. More specifically, we consider 20 arms and 20 time
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periods: For each arm 0 = 1, . . . , 20 and time C = 1, . . . , 20, we assume that
\0 ∼ N(0, 12), '0,C |\0 ∼ N(\0, 12). (3.29)
This setup is motivated from [48] in which the authors posit an extreme example where TS
faces an infinite number of arms with identical priors. In such an example, TS keeps pulling a
new arm throughout the entire process, since with zero probability the same arm gets the largest
sampled mean \̃0,C more than once: As a result, TS does not utilize any information obtained from
the past pulls, and always earns the prior mean E[\0] in expectation at each time. We aim to see
whether TS can resolve this over-exploration issue if optimized via policy gradient.
As in the previous setup, we use the training batches of size 1,000 and the learning rate of 0.05
for Adam optimizer, and the evaluation batch of size 10,000 for evaluation.
The simulation results are reported in Figure 3.3 and Table 3.3. As expected, the naïve TS
exhibits an extremely poor performance in this setup. At the end of the training process, we
observe that all trained algorithms have almost identical performance regardless of the choice of
reward metric and baseline in their gradient estimation. During the initial phase of training (i.e.,
during the first 300 iterations), in contrast, we can observe that the baseline null performs better
than the baseline oracle. This is in contrast with the heteroscedastic noise example. The intuitive
reason is that, in the current setup, the oracle performance does not provide a (nearly) attainable
benchmark for an adaptive algorithm.
Figure 3.4 visualizes how the parameterized TS is improved over the course of training. It
shows the distribution of pulls that each arm gets, measured at the beginning, middle, and end
of the training. At the beginning, since the initial values for meta-parameters are chosen to yield
the standard version of TS, it allocates the pulls evenly across the arms, i.e., one pull per one
arm in average. As training proceeds, we can observe that the distribution becomes more skewed,
i.e., the algorithm effectively ignored some arms as it realizes that it is wasteful to explore all of
the arms. The set of ignored arms are randomly determined during the course of policy gradient
87
optimization: While not reported here, across the choices of reward metric and baseline, the shape
of the distribution looks alike but the ordering of arms in the distribution is observed to be different.
Figure 3.3: Learning curves of parameterized Thompson sampling trained for Gaussian MAB with
an excessive number of arms ( = 20, ) = 20). A curve shows the progress of policy gradient
optimization based on a particular choice of reward metric " and baseline  for the gradient
estimator ",, defined in (3.19). The : th data point in each curve reports the average regret on
the : th training batch, which contains 1,000 independent instances. The horizontal lines represent
the performance of the other algorithms measured with the evaluation batch containing 10,000
instances (also reported in Table 3.3).
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Algorithm Reward metric Baseline Cov[",] (×104) Regret (s.e.)
Trained TS
"obs null 14.99 20.442 (0.125)
"mean null 13.00 20.568 (0.126)
"Bayes null 10.03 20.539 (0.127)
"obs oracle 40.80 20.570 (0.126)
"mean oracle 40.80 20.286 (0.125)
"Bayes oracle 30.73 20.510 (0.125)
"obs self 8.78 20.432 (0.126)
"mean self 8.78 20.210 (0.125)
"Bayes self 6.07 20.375 (0.126)
NAIVE-TS – – – 28.905 (0.095)
BAYES-UCB – – – 21.561 (0.123)
OGI – – – 20.573 (0.125)
IDS – – – 21.741 (0.119)
IRS.FH – – – 27.286 (0.098)
IRS.V-ZERO – – – 24.575 (0.105)
IRS.INDEX – – – 20.103 (0.125)
Table 3.3: Performance of the algorithms for Gaussian MAB with an excessive number of arms.
Each trained TS uses the meta-parameters found at the end of 1,000 iterations of batched policy
gradient ascent (Figure 3.3). The performance is measured in regret, defined in (3.26), and com-
puted via sample average approximation over 10,000 independent instances, and reported with the
standard error. The best results are emphasized with bold letters.
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Figure 3.4: Average number of pulls that the parameterized TS conducts on each arm in the : th
training batch during the course of policy gradient optimization with reward metric "mean and
baseline self, where : ∈ {1, 334, 667, 1000}. Each training batch contains 1,000 independent
instances, and the horizontal axes show the arm indices rearranged in the order of the average
number of pulls.
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Chapter 4: Risk-sensitive Optimal Execution via a Conditional
Value-at-Risk Objective
4.1 Introduction
A problem of significant importance for algorithmic traders in modern financial markets is
how to allocate their trading efforts over time so as to minimize the cost of trading given a task of
liquidation (or acquisition) of a specific amount of an asset. In their seminal paper, [49] framed this
liquidation problem as a mean-variance optimization that highlights a tradeoff between the average
cost (i.e., the expected implementation shortfall) and the variability of the cost (i.e., the variance
of the implementation shortfall). As a result, they have explicitly derived the optimal liquidation
schedule that is parameterized with the risk-aversion level of the trader, and their framework and
suggested solution have become standards in this area.
However, their analysis is restricted to static strategies: they only considered deterministic
schedules under which the algorithm does not adapt to changing market conditions such as the
price of the asset. This restriction makes the analysis straightforward because, under a determin-
istic schedule, the average shortfall only accounts for the transaction cost incurred due to market
impact and the variance of the shortfall only accounts for the volatility risk incurred due to random
price fluctuation. Under a dynamic strategy, by contrast, its price adaptiveness also contributes
to the variability of the outcome, which makes the average term and the risk term entangled in a
complicated way.
It has been an important objective to incorporate dynamic strategies into their framework. Some
practitioners such as [50] suggest a series of heuristics that are price-adaptive, particularly the one
that liquidates more aggressively when the price moves in a favorable direction. [51] observed
that this “aggressiveness in-the-money” (AIM) behavior can strictly improve on the optimal deter-
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ministic strategy in the mean-variance criterion. In a subsequent paper, [52] develop a dynamic
programming technique by which approximate solutions can be obtained, and prove that the op-
timal (approximate) strategy exhibits AIM, despite the lack of an analytic solution. See also [53]
for the continuous-time version of this analysis.
Another stream of work (including this paper) introduces alternative risk criteria other than the
mean-variance criterion, so as to formulate the problem into a rather tractable form. For example,
[54] formulate the problem as an expected utility maximization problem, and derive a Hamilton–
Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation that characterizes the optimal adaptive strategy. They find that
the optimal strategy is aggressive- or passive-in-the-money, respectively, if and only if the utility
function displays increasing or decreasing risk aversion, but an analytic solution is not available.
[55] propose an alternative risk criterion that utilizes the time-averaged risk exposure to the price
change driven by the geometric Brownian motion (more precisely, the risk term is formulated as the
time integration of the position value process, i.e., the product of the position process and the price
process), and explicitly solve for the optimal strategy that is shown to exhibit the AIM behavior.
[56] investigate the use of the quadratic variation of the position value process as a risk measure,
and observe that the classic static solution of [49] is again optimal.1 [57] introduce a composite
dynamic coherent risk measure and derive the optimal solution that is tractable but static. One can
also consider an entropic risk measure introduced in [58], but it can be shown that the resulting
strategy is also not price-adaptive.
In this paper, we consider the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR; also known as average value-
at-risk, tail conditional expectation, or expected shortfall) as a risk measure. In particular, we seek
an adaptive liquidation strategy that minimizes the CVaR value of the implementation shortfall in
the Almgren–Chriss framework.
The CVaR is a risk measure that quantifies the tail risk. Given a quantile value @ ∈ (0, 1]
and a random variable that represents the cost, the CVaR value at level @ is defined as the average
1This result holds only when the price process is driven by the arithmetic Brownian motion. The authors also
consider the geometric Brownian motion under which the optimal solution is shown to be price-adaptive, and they
report its AIM behavior through numerical examples.
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of the worst @-fraction of the outcomes, i.e., the tail average beyond the @th quantile of the cost
distribution. Starting from the pioneering work of [59], it has received much attention for its
intuitive definition and for its nice mathematical properties as a coherent risk measure.
From the point of view of the Markov decision process (MDP), the (static) optimization of the
CVaR value for a single period can be done efficiently, by utilizing its alternative representation
[60]. In the multi-period setting, however, the dynamic optimization of the CVaR value of the total
cost is not so trivial. As pointed out by [61] and [62], the optimal action at some point in time
may not be completely determined by the current state of the MDP, but may depend on the entire
history, and therefore the conventional dynamic programming techniques may not work.
Later studies have adopted the idea of state augmentation to overcome this issue: by intro-
ducing an extra state variable, an optimal policy can be sufficiently characterized as a Markov
process defined on this augmented state space. Broadly speaking, these studies develop CVaR
MDP frameworks using two kinds of state augmentation. The first kind introduces an extra
state variable that represents the running cost, and derives the dynamic programming princi-
ple from the alternative representation of CVaR, i.e., CVaR@ [] = min2∈R{2 + 1@E[( − 2)
+]}
[see 60]. This state augmentation scheme is adopted in e.g., [63], [64], [65], [66], [67]. The
second kind of state augmentation introduces an extra state variable that represents the quantile
value, and derives the dynamic programming principle from the dual representation of CVaR, i.e.,
CVaR@ [] = supQ:QP, 3Q
3P ≤@−1
EQ [] [see 59]. The work of [68], [69], [70], and [71] belong to
this category.
This paper adopts the second kind of state augmentation. More specifically, we consider an
augmented state space represented as (-C , &C), where -C ∈ R is the current position size of the
trader, and &C ∈ [0, 1] is a quantile value that represents the current level of risk aversion. We
observe that the dynamic optimization of the CVaR objective can be represented as a (continuous-
time) stochastic game between the trader who controls the position process -C and the adversary
who controls the quantile process &C . By analyzing the Nash equilibrium of this game, we can
identify the minimal CVaR value that the trader can achieve, and specify the trader’s optimal policy
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and the adversary’s optimal policy, which are formulated as time-stationary Markov policies on
(-C , &C).
Characterizations of optimal liquidation strategy. Using this approach, we can express the
optimal liquidation strategy in an analytic form, and the following observations can be made: (i)
the optimal strategy trades in only one direction, i.e., it keeps liquidating until it completes the
execution, (ii) it trades more aggressively when the trader is more risk-averse, and (iii) it trades
more aggressively when the price moves in a favorable direction, i.e., it is aggressive-in-the-money.
Note that the first property of the optimal strategy is encouraging in practice since the traders (or
the clients in the context of a brokerage business) typically do not want to increase their position
during the liquidation process. The second property is relatively intuitive in the sense that by
liquidating more aggressively the trader can reduce the risk exposure to the price fluctuation more
quickly. Most interestingly, the third property can be explained with the second property in our
framework. In our game-theoretic interpretation, the quantile process &C can be understood as
the likelihood that the current sample path ends up with one of worst scenarios that the adversary
selects. When a favorable event takes place, it becomes less likely that the sample path is one of the
worst scenarios, and therefore the quantile &C decreases; i.e., the trader becomes more risk-averse.
As a result, the trader is encouraged to liquidate more aggressively by the same reasoning as above.
Contributions. Our contribution is twofold.
First, we derive a tractable solution to the risk-sensitive liquidation problem via a CVaR ob-
jective within the Almgren–Chriss framework.2 As closed-form expressions are available, we can
formally characterize the behavior of the optimal liquidation strategy. We can also tractably an-
alyze its performance: compared to the classic static solution of [49], the adaptive strategy can
reduce 5–15% of the cost, measured in CVaR; and compared to the volume-weighted average
price (VWAP) strategy, it can reduce 15–25% of the cost (see §4.5).
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that obtains an analytic solution for the
risk-sensitive liquidation problem that is price-adaptive and liquidate-only (i.e., trading in only one
2More precisely, we consider a continuous-time and infinite-time version of the Almgren–Chriss framework.
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direction). By contrast, the existing work discussed above obtains either a numerical solution [52,
53, 54, 56], a static solution [57], or a strategy that may change its trading direction during the
execution [55]. We also believe that the CVaR objective offers a more interpretable quantification
of the performance of a trading strategy and a more intuitive control over the risk-aversion level
that the trader wants to achieve. However, our results are restricted to the infinite-horizon setting.
This may be restrictive in practice, but it is crucial for obtaining a closed-form solution as we can
ignore the time dimension when characterizing the value function.
Second, we introduce a novel and technically sound approach to developing the CVaR MDP
framework in the continuous-time setting. To sketch our approach briefly, we first introduce a
scaled version of CVaR that allows us to avoid the ambiguity of CVaR in the corner case (i.e.,
when @ = 0) and inherently induces the concavity of the objective (Proposition 4.2.1). We then
utilize the martingale representation theorem, by which we can rewrite the CVaR objective as a
maximization problem for an adversary who controls the quantile process &C against the decision
maker (Theorem 4.3.1), and the problem can be translated into a continuous-time stochastic game
between the decision maker and the adversary who are competing over the expected value of the
risk-adjusted outcome (Theorem 4.3.2). After this step, we are no longer dealing with the risk-
measure, and hence we can safely (time-)decompose the game into the subgames, followed by the
CVaR dynamic programming principle (Theorem 4.3.3). This naturally leads to the HJB partial
differential equations that characterize the optimal solution. Even though we do exploit the certain
structures of the liquidation problem, we believe that our approach provides a promising guideline
for developing CVaR MDP frameworks in a broader class of control problems.
We remark that our approach leverages the idea of state augmentation that incorporates the
quantile value as an extra state variable. As discussed earlier, this idea has been suggested and
utilized in prior work [68, 69, 70, 71], but in discrete-time settings. We clearly take advantage of
the continuous-time setting: by exploiting the martingale representation theorem, we can param-
eterize the adversary’s control policy with a real-valued stochastic process that can be tractably
optimized. The corresponding optimization in the discrete-time setting is typically much harder
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(see the discussion at the end of §4.3.1).
Technical challenges. As we are dealing with a continuous-time and infinite-horizon setting, the
analysis involves a considerable amount of technical difficulties. In particular, the distribution
of the total cost has an unbounded support in our setting, which makes the analysis much more
challenging. We exploit the problem structure to prove the interchangeability of optimization
operators, the convergence of solutions, etc. Despite that we make very mild assumptions, we lack
a guarantee on the admissibility of the trading strategy that is obtained from the HJB equation.
Instead, we prove that this trading strategy can be approximated by admissible ones arbitrarily
closely. See Theorem 4.4.3 and the accompanying discussion.
Organization of paper. In §4.2, we introduce the notation and formally describe the model and
the problem. In §4.3, we develop the CVaR MDP framework for which we sequentially introduce a
martingale representation of the CVaR objective, the game-theoretic representation of the problem,
and the Markov policies defined on the augmented state space. In §4.4, we derive the HJB equation,
identify its solution, and characterize the optimal liquidation strategy. In §4.5, we compare the
optimal adaptive strategy with two deterministic strategies: the optimal deterministic strategy and
the optimized VWAP strategy. In §4.6, we provide simulation results that illustrate the optimal
strategy. In the appendix, we provide the proofs that are deferred from §4.2–§4.5.
4.2 Problem
We consider a filtered probability space
(
Ω, F , F = (FC)C≥0, P
)
, where F is a natural filtration
of a Brownian motion (,C)C≥0 that satisfies the usual conditions. We denote by L? (Ω, F , P) (or
simply by L?) the set of F –measurable random variables - : Ω→ R such that E|- |? < ∞. Given
a sequence of random variables (-=)=∈N, it is said that -=
L ?→ - if lim=→∞ E|-= − - |? = 0. The
time index set is denoted by T , [0,∞). We also define P to be the set of progressively measurable
stochastic processes in this filtered probability space. We denote R+ , [0,∞) and R− , (−∞, 0].
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4.2.1 Model
We consider a continuous-time and infinite-horizon version of the setting of [49]. We postulate
a trader who wants to liquidate G ∈ X units of an asset over an infinite-time horizon. Here, G can be
negative if the trader wants to acquire the asset. We define X , [−", "] ⊂ R, where " ≥ 0 is an
arbitrary large number3 that represents the largest possible position size that the trader is allowed
to own.
Liquidation strategy. The trader’s liquidation policy is represented with a real-valued continuous-
time stochastic process c , (cC)C≥0, where cC ∈ R specifies the liquidation rate at time C. Given an








i.e., the trader liquidates cC units of the asset per unit time (or acquires −cC units of the asset per unit
time if cC < 0). While deferring a formal statement to the end of this subsection, we will restrict
our attention to the policies under which the trader’s position varies continuously over time (i.e.,
involves no impulse trades) and vanishes eventually (i.e., converges to zero as C goes to infinity).
Liquidation cost. Following the framework of [49], we define the cost process (or loss process)


















B3B represents the (cumulative) transaction cost incurred by the temporary
price impact, where the coefficient [ > 0 reflects the illiquidity of the asset. The second term∫ C
B=0 f-
G,c
B 3,B represents the (cumulative) loss incurred by the random fluctuation of the market
price, where f > 0 is the volatility of the price process and ,C is the standard Brownian motion.
The total cost (i.e., total implementation shortfall) G,c∞ , limC→∞G,cC is a random variable of
interest that we want to minimize via a CVaR objective.
3The restriction on the position size is being made to resolve the technical difficulties arising in a convergence
analysis. We later show that the choice of " does not play any role in characterizing the optimal strategy; i.e., " does
not appear in the optimal solution.
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Note that we do not consider permanent price impact in our formulation. Within the Almgren–
Chriss framework, it is well known that the contribution of permanent price impact to the im-
plementation shortfall is path-independent; i.e., it does not depend on the liquidation strategy as
long as the strategy clears all the positions eventually.4 Therefore, without loss of generality, we
can ignore the presence of permanent impact since it does not make any difference in the trader’s
decision making. See [49] for details.
Admissible strategies. We now formally define the set of admissible policies Π(G) as
Π(G) ,



















C ∈ X, ∀C ≥ 0

. (4.3)
An admissible policy c ∈ Π(G) can be dynamic and so it can adjust the trading rate adap-














∞. These conditions are to guarantee that the limit G,c∞ , limC→∞G,cC is an integrable random
variable: individual terms in (4.2) converge in L2 as C → ∞, and therefore G,cC




The last condition -G,cC ∈ X , [−", "] is seemingly restrictive, but it is merely a technical
condition. We allow " to be any arbitrary large number (e.g., " = 101010 units of the asset) so
that this constraint will never be restrictive in practice.
4.2.2 Scaled Conditional Value-at-Risk
The conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) at a quantile level @ ∈ (0, 1] is a mapping fromL1(Ω, F , P)
to R. While there exist several definitions of CVaR in the literature, we consider the one based on
4Suppose that liquidating cC shares of the asset permanently shifts the market price by −_cC . Given a liquidation








that limC→∞ - G, cC = 0.
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its dual representation as a coherent risk measure [59, 62]: given a random variable  ∈ L1,
CVaR@ [] , sup
&∈Q† (@)
E [&] where Q†(@) ,
{
& ∈ L∞(Ω, F , P), 0 ≤ & ≤ 1
@




i.e., it is defined as a maximization over a random variable& that has a bounded support [0, 1
@
] and
an expected value of one (or equivalently, a maximization over a probability measure such that it
is absolutely continuous with respect to P and its Radon–Nikodyn derivative with respect to P is
upper bounded by 1
@
almost surely).
We introduce a scaled version of the CVaR measure, which surprisingly simplifies our analysis.
Definition 4.2.1 (Scaled Conditional Value-at-Risk). Given a random variable  ∈ L1(Ω, F , P)
and a quantile @ ∈ [0, 1], the scaled conditional value-at-risk (S-CVaR) at level @ is
S-CVaR@ [] , sup
&∈Q(@)
E [&] , (4.5)
where Q(@) represents the risk envelope:
Q(@) , {& ∈ L∞(Ω, F , P) | 0 ≤ & ≤ 1, E& = @ } . (4.6)
The S-CVaR measure is obtained by simply scaling the risk envelope of CVaR by @. As a result,
S-CVaR@ [] is also given by @ × CVaR@ [] for @ ≠ 0. Nevertheless, it naturally incorporates the
case @ = 0 into its definition, for which CVaR is not well defined.5 It further has the following
useful properties:
Proposition 4.2.1 (Properties of S-CVaR). For any random variable  ∈ L1, S-CVaR@ [] satis-
fies the following properties:
(i) S-CVaR@ [] = @ × CVaR@ [], for any @ ∈ (0, 1].
5When @ = 0, CVaR0 [] is typically defined as the essential supremum of  ∈ L1, which can be infinite if the loss
distribution has an unbounded support. We have defined the S-CVaR measure using the dual representation of CVaR
so that we can effectively avoid the ambiguity at @ = 0.
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(ii) S-CVaR0 [] = 0 and S-CVaR1 [] = E.
(iii)
S-CVaR@ [] ≤ E| | and S-CVaR@ [] ≥ @E for any @ ∈ [0, 1].
(iv) The mapping @ ↦→ S-CVaR@ [] is concave on [0, 1], and hence continuous due to (iii).
(v) Suppose that  is a continuous random variable whose distribution is atomless. Then,















The proof can be found in Appendix B.2. Properties (i)–(iii) provide basic characterizations of
S-CVaR. The property (v) provides an interpretation of S-CVaR as a truncated average as opposed
to the interpretation of CVaR as a conditional average. We particularly highlight property (iv)
that shows the concavity and continuity of the S-CVaR value with respect to @, which is a crucial
property that will be exploited in our analysis.
One can interpret the definition (4.5) as a maximization problem for an adversary. This ad-
versary selects a set of scenarios so as to maximize the average cost within the selected scenario,
given a constraint that the total measure of the selected scenarios should be @. Informally,6 the
optimized random variable &★ is an indicator random variable such that &★(l) = 1 if the scenario
l is among the worst @-fraction of the scenarios, and &★(l) = 0 otherwise.
4.2.3 Risk-sensitive execution with a CVaR objective
We now introduce the CVaR risk criterion into the setting described in §4.2.1. In particular, we
seek an adaptive strategy that minimizes the CVaR value of the implementation shortfall, given an
initial position G ∈ X and a target quantile @ ∈ (0, 1]. Without loss of generality, we formulate this
optimization problem via an S-CVaR objective and define the value function + : X × [0, 1] → R













Note that the above formulation includes the case @ = 0. By Proposition 4.2.1, the value function
+ (G, @) is well defined at @ = 0, and the minimal CVaR value is simply given by + (G, @)/@ for any
@ ≠ 0. We aim to identify the optimal value function + (G, @) as well as its corresponding optimal
liquidation strategy c★.
Recall that the objective S-CVaR@ [G,c∞ ] concerns the worst @-fraction of outcomes. When
@ = 1, the problem reduces to a risk-neutral liquidation problem. When @ takes a smaller value,
the problem is equivalent to considering a more risk-averse trader who concerns a smaller fraction
of worst cases, being wary of more extreme cases. We anticipate that the trader uses this quantile
value @ ∈ [0, 1] as an input to our algorithm so as to control the level of risk-aversion that he wants
to achieve. In practice, we do not expect the traders to use an extremely small quantile value such
as @ = 0.01 or @ = 0.05: since they encounter this sort of liquidation task often, possibly on a daily
basis, it would be too conservative for them to optimize their performance in the worst 1% or 5%
of cases at a cost of sacrificing their performance in the normal 99% or 95% of cases.
4.3 CVaR dynamic programming principle
Using the definition of the S-CVaR measure (4.5), the risk-sensitive optimal execution problem
(∗) can be formulated as











As discussed in §4.2.2, we can think of an adversary who optimizes a random variable& ∈ Q(@) so
as to select the worst @-fraction of sample paths against the trader who employs a liquidation policy
c ∈ Π(G). In this section, we reformulate the adversary’s optimization problem as an optimization
over a real-valued continuous-time stochastic process rather than a random variable, and interpret
the risk-sensitive optimal control problem as a continuous-time stochastic game between the trader
and the adversary. To this end, we develop a continuous-time dynamic programming principle by
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exploiting the recursive structure of this game.
4.3.1 Martingale representation of CVaR objective
We consider an arbitrary random variable  ∈ L1(Ω, F , P) and derive an alternative repre-
sentation of S-CVaR@ []. The results in this subsection are valid not only in the context of the
liquidation problem, but also in any filtered probability space generated by a Brownian motion.
We define the adversary’s policy as a real-valued continuous-time stochastic process W ,
(WC)C≥0, which determines the adversary’s quantile process &@,W , (&@,WC )C≥0:
&
@,W




where, = (,C)C≥0 is the Brownian motion that drives the random price fluctuation. We sometimes
call WC the quantile diffusion rate by analogy to the liquidation rate cC .
The set of admissible adversary’s policies is defined as
Γ(@) ,
{
W : T ×Ω→ R
 W ∈ P, 0 ≤ &@,WC ≤ 1,∀C ≥ 0} . (4.10)
Given an admissible adversary’s policy W ∈ Γ(@), its corresponding quantile process &@,W is a
(local) martingale starting at @ ∈ [0, 1] whose diffusion term is governed by W. In particular,
the quantile process is required to take values within [0, 1] and, as a result, it has the following
properties (the proof is provided in Appendix B.3):
Proposition 4.3.1 (Properties of the adversary’s quantile process &). For any W ∈ Γ(@),
(i) (&@,WC )C≥0 is a continuous and bounded martingale taking values in [0, 1], and hence E[&
@,W
g ] =
@ for any stopping time g.
(ii) &@,W∞ , limC→∞&
@,W
C exists in [0, 1] almost surely, and also E[&
@,W
∞ ] = @.
(iii) Once &@,WC hits 0 or 1, it never escapes thereafter.
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By the martingale representation theorem, any random variable & in the risk envelope Q(@)
can be represented as the limit of a quantile process &@,W for some W ∈ Γ(@), and vice versa:




∞ |W ∈ Γ(@)
}
.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary &̃ ∈ Q(@), and Doob martingale (&C)C≥0 generated by &̃, i.e., &C ,
E[&̃ |FC] for each C (we have limC→∞&C = &̃ and &0 = E&̃ = @). By the martingale representation
theorem [72, Thm. 43 in Chap. IV], there exists a predictable process W such that &C = &0 +∫ C
B=0 WB3,B. Since &C = E[&̃ |FC] ∈ [0, 1] for any C, we have an admissible adversary’s policy










∞ |W ∈ Γ(@)
}
.
Now consider an arbitrary W ∈ Γ(@) and let &̃ , &@,W∞ . Trivially, E&̃ = &0 = @ and &̃ ∈ [0, 1].




∞ |W ∈ Γ(@)
}
.
This alternative representation of the risk envelope Q(@) immediately leads to the following
representation of the S-CVaR value, under which the adversary optimizes over the set of stochastic
processes instead of the set of random variables:
Theorem 4.3.1 (Martingale representation of the CVaR objective). For any given random variable
 ∈ L1(Ω, F , P) and @ ∈ [0, 1], we have









Proof. The result immediately follows from Lemma 4.3.1 and the definition of S-CVaR (4.5).
Let us consider the optimal martingale &★ that solves (4.11), and also recall that the random
variable &★∞(l) indicates whether the sample path l is among the worst @-fraction of scenarios.
As a Doob martingale, the quantile process &★C = E(&★∞ |FC) represents its running estimate at time
C, i.e., the likelihood that the current sample path will end up with one of the worst scenarios.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a discrete-time analogy of the adversary’s quantile process in a two-period
setting with @ = 12 . The adversary will select the worst @-fraction of sample paths (assuming that
six sample paths are equally likely to be realized, three out of six sample paths can be selected),
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and then each terminal node will be assigned a quantile value 0 or 1. The quantile values at
the non-terminal nodes can be sequentially determined in a backward direction by averaging the
quantile values of the subsequent nodes, where the quantile value at each node represents, as
discussed above, how likely the current sample path ends at one of the terminal nodes selected by
the adversary.
We can alternatively interpret this optimization as a sequential decision-making problem that
an adversary solves in a forward direction. In Figure 4.1, the root node is assigned a quantile value
@, which means that the adversary can select the @-fraction of sample paths realized thereafter.
Starting from the root node, the adversary is asked to assign quantile values to the subsequent
nodes within a budget of the average of total quantile values he can allocate, where this budget is
given by the quantile value at the current node. Then the next state is revealed and the adversary
continues to decide how to allocate the quantile values of the next stage until he arrives at a terminal
node. The adversary receives a payoff in the amount of the realized cost multiplied by the quantile
value allocated to the terminal node.
Note that the probability space generated by a Brownian motion can be well approximated by
a binomial model; i.e., each node has two branches that are equally likely to be realized. In the
binomial model, the allocation problem that the adversary solves in each period can be represented
with a single decision variable: given the current quantile value &C , the allocation of next quantile
values is of the form
{
(1 + \C)&C , (1 − \C)&C
}
, where \C is the decision variable. Note that deter-
mining the value \C is effectively equivalent to determining the diffusion rate of &C , which is in
fact the adversary’s policy WC . When there are more than two branches at some node, the alloca-
tion problem becomes much harder to solve as it involves more than one decision variable. This























C = 0 C = 1 C = 2
Figure 4.1: An illustration of the discrete-time version of the adversary’s martingale in a two-
period setting with @ = 12 . Six sample paths are equally likely to be realized and the label next
to each terminal node represents the total cost incurred along each sample path. Interpreting in
a backward direction, the adversary selects the @-fraction of terminal nodes (i.e., three out of six
nodes at C = 2), and the quantile values for the non-terminal nodes are sequentially determined
in a backward direction by averaging the quantile values of the subsequent nodes. Interpreting
in a forward direction, the adversary starts with a budget of @ at the root node, and sequentially
allocates the quantile values to the subsequent nodes.
4.3.2 Risk-sensitive liquidation as a continuous-time stochastic game
We now return to the liquidation problem, and define an outcome function  as a function of
the trader’s policy c ∈ Π(G) and the adversary’s policy W ∈ Γ(@) at each G ∈ X and @ ∈ [0, 1]:









By Theorem 4.3.1, the value function (∗) can be formulated as




 (c, W; G, @). (4.13)
The following theorem characterizes this value function as an equilibrium outcome of a continuous-
time stochastic game between the trader and the adversary.
Theorem 4.3.2 (CVaR optimization as a continuous-time stochastic game). The value function
+ (G, @) is the outcome at the Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game in which the trader and the
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adversary compete over the outcome :








 (c, W; G, @). (4.14)
Theorem 4.3.2 states that the minimax solution equals the maximin solution. This means that
the value function is, as a saddle point, the equilibrium outcome at which each player simulta-
neously plays the best response against the other player’s strategy. This may not always hold
true for a general class of risk-sensitive control problems: the convexity of the outcome function
with respect to the trader’s policy and the convexity of the policy space are required in our proof
(Appendix B.3.1) in order to instantiate Sion’s minimax theorem [73].
The following remark provides an alternative interpretation of this game based on the Girsanov
theorem.
Remark 4.3.1. The risk-sensitive liquidation problem is equivalent to the risk-neutral liquidation
problem in the presence of “price drift” injected by an adversary under a constraint that the
likelihood ratio between this altered price process and the original price process cannot exceed
1/@. In terms of the adversary’s martingale &@,W defined above, the trader solves a risk-neutral
liquidation problem where the price process is given by 3%C = f3,C + f WC&@,WC 3C.
4.3.3 CVaR dynamic programming principle
In this subsection, we develop a continuous-time dynamic programming principle. We first
state a proposition that characterizes a temporal structure of the game.
Proposition 4.3.2 (Time decomposition). Fix G ∈ X and @ ∈ [0, 1]. For any trader’s policy
c ∈ Π(G), adversary’s policy W ∈ Γ(@), and a stopping time g, we have













Fg] ] . (4.15)
Proof. Observe that G,cg is Fg-measurable and E[&@,W∞ |Fg] = &
@,W
g since &@,W is a martingale. Uti-
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Note that G,c∞ − G,cg represents the cost realized after time g. Proposition 4.3.2 states that the
final outcome can be decomposed into two terms: one term describes the subgame before time g,
and the other term describes the subgame after time g.
Observe that, in the subgame after time g, the trader is liquidating -G,cg shares and the adversary
is selecting a &@,Wg -fraction of the future scenarios realized thereafter. This time decomposition
naturally leads to the following dynamic programming principle:
Theorem 4.3.3 (CVaR dynamic programming principle). For any G ∈ X, @ ∈ [0, 1], and a stopping
time g, we have















Theorem 4.3.3 provides the optimality principle in the form of Bellman’s equation: at the
equilibrium, the outcome after time g can be sufficiently described by the subgame equilibrium
+ (-G,cg , &@,Wg ). The trader is minimizing the (risk-adjusted) cost up to time g in a consideration of
his future state -g, while the adversary is simultaneously maximizing the (risk-adjusted) cost up to
time g in a consideration of his future state &g, and the subgame starts at those future states. Like
Theorem 4.3.2, Theorem 4.3.3 relies on the saddle-point characterization of the equilibrium; i.e.,
it does not matter which player commits his policy first in the subgame. The formal proof can be
found in Appendix B.3.3.
4.3.4 (-,&)-Markov policies
Theorem 4.3.3 implies that the augmented state space (-C , &C) is sufficient to describe the
remaining subgame at time C. Therefore, if a policy is reasonable, its action at time C (cC or WC)
should be determined by the current position size -C and the current quantile value&C . To formalize
this idea, we introduce time-stationary Markov policies running on this augmented state space:
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Definition 4.3.1 ( (-,&)-Markov policies ). We say that a trader’s policy c is an (-,&)-Markov
policy coupled with W if








, ∀C, l (4.17)
for some measurable function 5 : R × [0, 1] → R.
Similarly, an adversary’s policy W is an (-,&)-Markov policy coupled with c if









for some measurable function 6 : R × [0, 1] → R.
A policy pair (c, W) is a mutually coupled (-,&)-Markov policy pair if both (4.17) and (4.18)
hold.
An (-,&)-Markov policy is characterized by a function defined on the augmented state space.
The function 5 or 6 specifies the liquidation rate or the quantile diffusion rate when the current
position size is G and the current quantile level is @. Recall that we have defined a policy, c or W,
as a continuous-time stochastic process adapted to the Brownian motion, i.e., as a (progressively
measurable) mapping c : T × Ω → R. Strictly speaking, the function 5 or 6 does not completely
determine one player’s policy unless the other player’s policy is specified. To avoid this ambiguity,
when we describe an (-,&)-Markov policy, we specify the other player’s policy that is coupled
with it.
To better understand, consider the policies c and W that are mutually coupled (-,&)-Markov
policies induced by functions 5 and 6. Under c and W, the system is completely described by
the coupled processes (-C , &C)C≥0 on the augmented state space, whose dynamics are given by the
following stochastic differential equations:
3-C = − 5 (-C , &C) 3C, 3&C = 6 (-C , &C) 3,C , (4.19)
with the initial states -0 = G and &0 = @. Even if W is not an (-,&)-Markov policy, we can still
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consider an (-,&)-Markov policy c that is induced by 5 and coupled with W, and then the position







Note also that the admissibility of an (-,&)-Markov policy is not always guaranteed: it may
fail to satisfy the admissible conditions given in (4.3) or (4.10), depending on the generating func-
tion 5 or 6 as well as the other player’s policy coupled with it. See the discussions before and after
Theorem 4.4.3.
4.4 Optimal solution
In this section, we utilize the CVaR dynamic programming principle (Theorem 4.3.3) to de-
rive a Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (HJB) equation for the risk-sensitive optimal execution problem,
and identify the functional form of the value function and optimal policies by solving this HJB
equation. For all propositions/theorems stated in this section, we defer their proofs to Appendix
B.4.
4.4.1 Minimal CVaR cost
We first state Dynkin’s formula that we can apply to the right-hand side of (4.16) in Theorem
4.3.3 so as to represent it as a time-integration.
Proposition 4.4.1 (Dynkin’s formula). Consider a function +̂ : R × [0, 1] → R such that +̂ ∈



























































For the sake of argument, suppose that the value function + is twice differentiable so that it
can be plugged into Proposition 4.4.1 in the place of +̂ . When considering an infinitesimal time
interval (i.e., g = 3C), we have
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+@@ (G, @) W20 − fGW0
}
3C. (4.25)
Observe that the terms associated with the trader’s policy c and the terms associated with the
adversary’s policy W can be separated. We can naturally infer that the value function + has to












+@@ (G, @) F2 − fGF
}
= 0. (4.26)
In the following theorem, we make this argument more formally and provide sufficient characteri-
zations of the value function.
Theorem 4.4.1 (Verification theorem). Consider a function +★ : R × [0, 1] → R+ satisfying






















(ii) +★(0, @) = 0 for all @ ∈ [0, 1], and +★(G, 0) = +★(G, 1) = 0 for all G ∈ R.






is continuous on R+ × (0, 1), increasing in G on R for each @ ∈ (0, 1), and decreasing
in @ on (0, 1) for each G ∈ R.
(v) G
+★@@ (G,@)
is continuous on R+ × (0, 1), decreasing in G on R+.
Then, + (G, @) = +★(G, @) for all G ∈ X and @ ∈ [0, 1].
In Theorem 4.4.1, conditions (i) and (ii) specify the HJB equation and the boundary conditions
that the value function has to satisfy. In fact, the value function + can be uniquely determined by
these two conditions. However, the other conditions, (iii)–(v), are also necessary to show that this
value is indeed achievable within our definition of the admissible policies, Π(G) and Γ(@). More
specifically, condition (iii) asserts the symmetry and the monotonicity of the value function with
respect to the position size G, and conditions (iv) and (v) assert certain behaviors of the optimal
policies that are implied from the HJB equation (e.g., the optimal liquidation strategy should trade
more aggressively when liquidating a larger quantity). While these properties of the value function
are what naturally follow from the problem structure, they serve as regularity conditions in our
proof to resolve technical issues arising in the convergence analysis.
Observe that the optimization terms in the HJB equation (4.27) are separated and each of them
is a trivial quadratic optimization problem. By solving these optimizations explicitly, the HJB
equation can be translated into the following partial differential equation:
+2G (G, @) ×+@@ (G, @) = −f2[ × G2 × @. (4.28)
It turns out that this differential equation with the boundary condition (ii) admits a separable solu-
tion. The value function + (G, @) can be represented as a product of a function of G and a function
of @, as identified in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4.2 (Value function). Consider a function +★ : R × [0, 1] → R+ defined as
+★(G, @) , (3/4) 23 × f 23[ 13 × |G | 43 × i(@), (4.29)
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where i : [0, 1] → R+ is the solution in C((0, 1)) to the following differential equation:
i2(@) × i′′(@) = −@, ∀@ ∈ (0, 1), and i(0) = i(1) = 0. (4.30)
Then, +★ satisfies the conditions of Theorem 4.4.1, and hence + (G, @) = +★(G, @) for all G ∈ R and
@ ∈ [0, 1].
Quantity to liquidate x









































Figure 4.2: (Left) Value function + (G, @) that represents the minimal S-CVaR loss (i.e.,
S-CVaR@ [∞]) at a quantile level @ when liquidating G units of an asset given that f = [ = 1.
The closed-form expression is provided in (4.29). (Right) Function i(@) that is derived in Propo-
sition 4.4.2. The curve {(@, i(@))}@∈[0,1] is represented in parametric form, in which the left part
of the curve is represented as {(@! (\), i! (\))}\∈[0,∞] , and the right part of the curve is represented
as {(@' (\), i' (\))}\∈[0,\̄] .
The differential equation of form (4.30) is known as the Emden–Fowler equation [74, p. 2.3.27],
and its solution can be expressed in parametric form as follows:
Proposition 4.4.2 (Parametric representation of i(@)). The function i(@) can be represented in a
parametric form that admits a closed-form expression. Define
/! (\) , −
2
c
 1/3(\), /' (\) ,
√
31/3(\) − .1/3(\) (4.31)
where  and . are the first and second kinds of Bessel functions, and  is the second kind of
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modified Bessel function. Further define









)2 ≈ 0.2910, 1 , 0 (9/2) 13 ≈ 0.1763.
(4.32)
Then, the curve {(@, i(@))}@∈[0,1] is parameterized as
{(@, i(@))}@∈[0,1] = {(@! (\), i! (\))}\∈[0,∞]
⋃
{(@' (\), i' (\))}\∈[0,\̄] , (4.33)
where7











, i! (\) , 1\
2
3 /2! (\), (4.34)
and











, i' (\) , 1\
2
3 /2' (\). (4.35)
4.4.2 Optimal adaptive liquidation strategy
Let 5★(G, @) and 6★(G, @) be, respectively, the minimizer and the maximizer of the optimization
terms in the HJB equation (4.27), i.e.,




























where we define G
1
3 = −|G | 13 for G < 0. The function 5★(G, @) specifies the trader’s optimal
liquidation rate when the current position size is G and the current quantile level is @, and similarly,
the function 6★(G, @) specifies the adversary’s optimal quantile diffusion rate in that situation.
7The values of /! (\) and /' (\) are not defined when \ = 0. However, the limit points (e.g.,
lim\↘0 (@! (\), i! (\)), lim\↗∞ (@! (\), i! (\))) do exist, and our parametric representation includes those limit
points.
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We can naturally postulate mutually coupled (-,&)-Markov policies c★ and W★ induced by these
functions 5★ and 6★, which are characterizing the equilibrium of the stochastic game.8 Under
policies c★ and W★, the system is described by the following stochastic differential equations:
3-C = − 5★ (-C , &C) 3C, 3&C = 6★ (-C , &C) 3,C , (4.38)
with -0 = G and &0 = @.
Quantity to liquidate x
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Figure 4.3: Optimal trading rate function 5★(G, @) (left) and optimal quantile diffusion rate func-
tion 6★(G, @) (right) given that f = [ = 1. The closed-form expressions are provided in (4.36) and
(4.37).
However, we cannot directly show that the policies c★ and W★ satisfy the admissibility con-
ditions introduced in (4.3) and (4.10), because the functions 5★ and 6★ exhibit extreme behav-
iors near the boundaries, as shown in Figure 4.3. For example, if &C ↘ 0, the liquidation rate







< ∞. If &C ↗ 1, on the other hand, the liquidation rate cC may vanish since







8This does not mean that the policy c★ is optimal against any adversary’s policy W, nor an (-,&)-Markov policy
induced by 5★ and coupled with W is the best response against W. It merely means that c★ is the best response against
W★ only, and vice versa. In order to obtain a best response against an arbitrary adversary’s policy W ∈ Γ(@), we may
need to characterize the best possible performance against W, e.g., + (G, @; W) , inf c∈Π(G)  (c, W; G, @), and derive
and solve the HJB equation associated with it. Nevertheless, the policy c★ is the optimal liquidation strategy that
minimizes the CVaR value of implementation shortfall.
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We instead prove that the optimal value function can be achieved “asymptotically” by a se-
quence of admissible policies that approximate c★ and W★.




5 (=) (G, @) = 5★(G, @), lim
=→∞
6(=) (G, @) = 6★(G, @), ∀(G, @) ∈ R \ {0} × (0, 1], (4.39)
and it satisfies the following properties for any G ∈ X and @ ∈ [0, 1]:
(a) For any given W ∈ Γ(@), let c(=),W be an (-,&)-Markov trader’s policy induced by 5 (=) and
coupled with W. Then, c(=),W is admissible and
lim sup
=→∞
 (c(=),W, W; G, @) ≤ + (G, @), ∀W ∈ Γ(@). (4.40)
(b) For any given c ∈ Π(G), let W (=),c be an (-,&)-Markov adversary’s policy induced by 6(=)
and coupled with c. Then, W (=),c is admissible and
lim inf
=→∞
 (c, W (=),c; G, @) ≥ + (G, @), ∀c ∈ Π(G). (4.41)
(c) Let (c(=) , W (=)) be a mutually coupled (-,&)-Markov policy pair induced by ( 5 (=) , 6(=)).
Then, c(=) and W (=) are admissible and
lim
=→∞
 (c(=) , W (=); G, @) = + (G, @). (4.42)
Theorem 4.4.3 shows that we can construct a sequence of functions ( 5 (=) , 6(=))=∈N that con-
verges to ( 5★, 6★) pointwise except at the boundaries, and further induces (-,&)-Markov policies
that are admissible and asymptotically optimal. More precisely, against any adversary’s policy W,
the sequence of functions ( 5 (=))=∈N induces a sequence of admissible policies (c(=),W)=∈N for the
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trader, and in the limit, the trader achieves an outcome that is no worse than the equilibrium out-
come. And vice versa, against any trader’s policy c, the sequence of functions (6(=))=∈N induces
a sequence of admissible policies (W (=),c)=∈N for the adversary, and in the limit, the adversary
achieves an outcome that is no worse than the equilibrium outcome. As a combination, the se-
quence of function pairs ( 5 (=) , 6(=))=∈N induces a sequence of mutually admissible policy pairs
(c(=) , W (=))=∈N that yields the equilibrium outcome asymptotically.
The construction of such a sequence of function pairs ( 5 (=) , 6(=))=∈N is straightforward. We
consider a vanishing subset of the augmented state space that contains the boundaries, i.e., {(G, @) | |G | ≤
1
=
, @ ≤ 1
=
or @ ≥ 1 − 1
=
}, and obtain 5 (=) and 6(=) by suppressing the extreme behaviors of 5★ and
6★ arising in this subset. Roughly speaking, the liquidation strategy induced by ( 5 (=) , 6(=)) mimics
the optimal strategy until it clears almost all positions (i.e., -C ≤ 1= ) or it becomes almost risk-
neutral (i.e., &C ≥ 1 − 1= ) or extremely risk-averse (i.e., &C ≤
1
=
), and then liquidates according to a
deterministic schedule thereafter. We can show that the gap between the outcome of this approx-
imated strategy and the theoretical equilibrium outcome is diminishing as = goes to infinity. We
refer the readers to Appendix B.4 for the details.
Aggressiveness-in-the-money. Despite that the admissibility of the optimal liquidation policy c★
is not guaranteed, we can still characterize its behaviors by inspecting the stochastic differential
equations (4.38). Without loss of generality, let us consider the task of liquidation (i.e., G ≥ 0).
First, we observe that the optimal policy liquidates only (i.e., 5★(G, @) ≥ 0), until it completes
the execution9 (i.e., 5★(0, @) = 0). Note that we have not imposed any constraint on the trading
direction. This formally shows that winding back the position during the liquidation process will
never be helpful in reducing the CVaR loss.
Second, when the trader becomes more risk-averse (i.e., @ ↘ 0), the optimal policy trades more
aggressively (i.e., 5★(G, @) ↗ ∞). The opposite also holds true. This is because, by liquidating
the position more quickly, it can reduce the risk exposure to the changes in price more effectively.
9We are not sure if the completion time is almost surely finite even though the position will be vanishing eventually
(i.e., -C ↘ 0). In particular, when &C ≈ 1, the optimal policy trades very slowly (cC ≈ 0) and the position process may
never hit zero. We believe that the completion time is finite with a probability of at least 1 − @.
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Even though it will be more costly in terms of market impact, it can make sure that the transactions
will be made at a certain level, which is more beneficial to a risk-averse trader than a risk-neutral
trader. We can also understand this behavior based on the alternative interpretation of the problem
discussed in Remark 4.3.1: when the risk-averse liquidation problem is cast as a risk-neutral exe-
cution problem that involves an adverse price drift, being more risk-averse is equivalent to facing
a more adverse price drift, which encourages the risk-neutral trader to trade more aggressively.
Most interestingly, we observe that when the price moves in a favorable direction toward in-
the-money (i.e., 3,C > 0), the policy becomes more risk-averse (i.e., 3&C < 0 since 6★(G, @) < 0)
and hence it trades more aggressively. This formally characterizes aggressiveness-in-the-money,
which has been observed by [51, 52, 55, 56]. Intuitively, if the trader has made some “free” money
due to the price change, he would have an additional incentive to complete the liquidation early so
as to secure his current profit, and thus he would be willing to pay an additional deterministic cost
for aggressive execution.
This behavior can also be understood in the context of a more general risk-sensitive optimal
control problem. Recall that the optimal adversary’s martingale &@,W
★
C represents the likelihood
that the current sample path leads to one of the worst @-fraction of outcomes. When something
favorable happens, it becomes less likely that the sample path is in the worst @th quantile, and
therefore &C decreases. This means that the trader will need to pay attention to a smaller fraction
of adverse scenarios; i.e., he will become more risk-averse.
A threshold behavior. While we do not have a formal characterization here, we observe that the
optimal strategy exhibits some threshold behavior, particularly near the end of the liquidation. We
observe that the policy trades aggressively when the cumulative cost C is below some threshold,
and it trades passively when the cumulative cost C is above the threshold. Near the end of the
liquidation, such a threshold corresponds to VaR@ [∞] (the value-at-risk, i.e., the @th quantile of
the loss distribution), and the liquidation rate sharply changes around VaR@ [∞]. This behavior is
related to an alternative representation of CVaR [60]: CVaR@ [∞] = max2∈R{2+ 1@E [(∞ − 2)
+]},
where the maximizer 2★ is in fact VaR@ [∞], and CVaR@ [∞] only concerns the cases where
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∞ > 2★.
To better illustrate, suppose that the trader is currently left with a small amount of position to
liquidate. If C < 2★, the trader is willing to pay a large transaction cost (up to 2★−C) to complete
the execution as soon as possible, thereby making sure that the total loss ∞ won’t exceed the
threshold 2★. If C > 2★, the trader may believe that the total loss ∞ will inevitably exceed the
threshold 2★, and then tries to minimize the expected future cost by slowing down the liquidation.
One can make a connection with aggressiveness-in-the-money, since having C < 2★ implies that
the price has moved in a favorable direction.
We believe that the threshold value is a function of remaining position size such that it increases
as the position size decreases and converges to VaR@ [∞] as the position vanishes. Moreover, the
change in the aggressiveness around the threshold also depends on the remaining position size. To
formalize this behavior, one may adopt an alternative formulation of the problem with an extra
state variable representing the cost realized so far (i.e., a Markov policy defined on the augmented
state space (-C , C)), which is in fact the approach suggested by [63] for a general class of control
problems with a CVaR objective. This might be a topic of future research.
4.5 Cost analysis: adaptive vs. deterministic strategy
In this section, we provide a comparison between the optimal adaptive strategy derived in §4.4
and the (optimized) deterministic schedules under which the liquidation is executed according to a
deterministic schedule committed at the beginning of the liquidation process.
4.5.1 Optimized deterministic schedules
First observe that any deterministic schedule will yield a normally distributed implementa-
















a variance Var[G,c∞ ] =
∫ ∞
0 f
2-2C 3C. To investigate the performance of deterministic schedules,
therefore, it suffices to formulate the CVaR value of a normal distribution.
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Given a random variable / distributed with N(0, 12), we let ^(@) be its CVaR value which
admits the following expression:
^(@) , CVaR@ [/] = q(Φ−1(1 − @)), (4.43)
where q(·) and Φ(·) are the p.d.f. and the c.d.f. of a standard normal distribution, respectively.
Consequently, we have that CVaR@ [] = ` + f^(@) for any random variable  distributed with






C 3C + ^(@)
√∫ ∞
0 f
2-2C 3C for any deterministic
schedule c.
We first focus on the set of all deterministic schedules and find the optimal one that minimizes
the CVaR cost. The next proposition shows that such an optimal schedule has the form of an
exponential schedule under which the trader’s position decays exponentially over time (i.e., the
liquidation rate is proportional to the current position size).
Proposition 4.5.1 (Optimized deterministic schedule). Given an initial position G ∈ R and a target
quantile @ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal deterministic schedule is given by an exponential schedule -C =
-04









Let EXP be this optimized exponential schedule. Then, its performance + EXP (G, @) is given by














While the proof is provided in Appendix B.1, we remark that the optimality of the exponential
schedule can be directly inferred from the result of [49]: it was shown that, given a finite time-
horizon of length ) , a mean-variance optimization results in a trajectory -C =
sinh(^()−C))
sinh(^)) -0 for
some constant ^ > 0. As ) ↗ ∞, we can observe that the optimized trajectory converges to an
exponential schedule -C = 4−^C-0.
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We next examine the volume-weighted average price (VWAP) schedules, under which the
trader liquidates the asset at a constant rate until completion so that the trader’s position decreases
linearly over time.10 The next proposition identifies the optimized VWAP schedule (see Appendix
B.1 for the proof).
Proposition 4.5.2 (Optimized VWAP schedule). Given an initial position G ∈ R and a target
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Let VWAP be this optimized VWAP schedule. Then, its performance +VWAP (G, @) is given by















We now compare three liquidation strategies: the optimal adaptive strategy (OPT) derived in
§4.4, the optimized deterministic strategy (EXP), and the optimized VWAP strategy (VWAP). We
have derived closed-form expressions (4.29), (4.45), and (4.47) that represent their S-CVaR perfor-
mance + , + EXP, and +VWAP, respectively. Given that + (G, @) ≤ + EXP (G, @) ≤ +VWAP (G, @) by their
definitions, we particularly consider the following ratios that are useful for pairwise comparison:
ΥEXPOPT ,
+ EXP (G, @)








+ EXP (G, @) − 1. (4.48)
Note that these ratios do not change even if we compare CVaR performance instead of S-CVaR
performance since S-CVaR is merely a scaled version of CVaR (see Remark 4.2.1.(i)).
These ratios can be expressed in closed form, and we observe the following. First, all the ratios
10A VWAP schedule typically refers to a strategy that liquidates an asset at a constant percent of volume (POV),
e.g., 5% of market volume throughout the liquidation process. As we assume a time-stationary market, the market
order flows are assumed stationary, and therefore a constant POV schedule is equivalent to a constant liquidation rate
schedule.
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Figure 4.4: The pairwise comparison among three liquidation strategies – the optimal adaptive
strategy, the optimal deterministic strategy (EXP), and the optimized VWAP strategy – measured
with the ratios ΥEXPOPT, Υ
VWAP
OPT , and Υ
VWAP
EXP defined in (4.48). These ratios represent the relative
percentage reductions in CVaR cost, and depend on the target quantile @ only. Each curve shows
the value of each ratio when @ ranges from zero to one.
depend only on the quantile @, but not on the other problem parameters such as the quantity to
liquidate G, the price volatility f, and the market impact factor [. Figure 4.4 plots these ratios as
functions of @. Second, the optimal deterministic schedule always outperforms to the best VWAP
schedule by 10.0% (= (4/3)1/3 − 1), irrespective of the value of @. Finally, in a moderate range
of @, from 0.2 to 0.8, the adaptive strategy outperforms the optimal deterministic strategy by 5%
to 15%, and outperforms the optimized VWAP strategy by 15% to 25%. This gap increases as @
increases (i.e., becomes more risk-neutral). More specifically, it diverges as @ approaches one, and
vanishes as @ approaches zero.11 See also §4.6.2 for a more illustrative comparison between the
adaptive strategy and the deterministic strategies.
4.6 Numerical simulations
In this section, we provide the simulation results that confirm our theoretical findings and pro-
vide illustrative comparisons between the optimal strategy and the deterministic strategies. Here-
after, we denote the optimal adaptive strategy by OPT, the optimized deterministic schedule by
11The absolute performance (i.e., the CVaR cost) of all three policies converge to zero as @ ↗ 1, and diverge to
infinity as @ ↘ 0.
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EXP, and the optimized VWAP schedule by VWAP.
4.6.1 Illustration of optimal adaptive strategy
We consider a situation where the trader wants to liquidate G = 100 units of an asset given the
volatility f = 1.09, the market impact factor [ = 0.0017, and the target quantile @ varying from
0.05 to 0.8. Without loss of generality, the initial price of the asset is set to zero.
We simulate the optimal policy OPT as follows. We first discretize the time horizon into subin-
tervals of equal length ΔC = 10−4, and generate a sample path of the standard Brownian motion
,0,,ΔC ,,2ΔC , . . .. Starting from -0 = G and &0 = @, at each time C = 0,ΔC, 2ΔC, . . ., we compute
the liquidation rate cC = 5★(-C , &C) and the quantile diffusion rate WC = 6★(-C , &C) and then up-
date the position size -C+ΔC = -C − cCΔC and the quantile &C+ΔC = &C + WCΔ,C accordingly, where
Δ,C , ,C+ΔC −,C . The expressions for 5★ and 6★ are given in (4.36) and (4.37), and the value of
i(@) can be computed using linear interpolation based on its parametric representation derived in
Proposition 4.4.2. In order to prevent numerical instability, we keep the value of quantile process
&C between n and 1 − n via truncation (we take n = 10−5); i.e., if &C < n or &C > 1 − n , it is set
to n or 1− n , respectively. This procedure is repeated until the remaining position size -C becomes
smaller than 10−2.
Figure 4.5 illustrates the sample paths of the price process f,C , the position process -C , and the
quantile process &C under OPT for different values of target quantile @ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8}
in the following two scenarios: when the price moves in an adverse direction (left), and when
the price moves in a favorable direction (right). From these results, we confirm the behaviors of
the optimal strategy characterized in §4.4.2. In every case, the position monotonically decreases
over time; i.e., the optimal policy keeps trading in one direction. Also observe that the policy
liquidates the position more aggressively as we take a smaller value for @ (i.e., as the policy be-
comes more risk-averse). In a comparison between two scenarios (left vs. right), we observe
“aggressiveness-in-the-money”; i.e., the policy trades more aggressively when the price moves in
a favorable direction (right). This behavior can also be observed within each sample path: during
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the execution process, the quantile process &C decreases when the price moves upward and the
policy trades more aggressively. In addition, the quantile process &C converges to either zero or
one, indicating whether the realized price process is among the worst @-fraction of the scenarios.
While not reported here, we observe that &C converges to one in the @-fraction of simulations and
converges to zero in the other (1− @)-fraction of simulations (recall that &C is a martingale starting
at @).
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Figure 4.5: Illustration of the optimal adaptive liquidation processes with different values for tar-
get quantile @ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8} in two scenarios: when the price moves in an adverse
direction (left), and when the price moves in a favorable direction (right). The plots in the top row
show the realized price process over time, the plots in the middle row show the position processes
-C with a label on each curve indicating the target quantile of each strategy, and the plots in the
bottom row show the quantile processes &C associated with these strategies.
4.6.2 Comparison with deterministic strategies
We provide the simulation results of the deterministic strategies (EXP, VWAP) introduced in
§4.5.1 in a comparison with those of the optimal adaptive strategy (OPT). Figure 4.6 shows the
position process trajectories under these three strategies with target quantile @ = 0.5 in the two
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scenarios as in Figure 4.5. One can immediately observe that the deterministic strategies are not
adaptive to the price changes. The optimal adaptive strategy liquidates at a similar rate to the ex-
ponential schedule during the initial periods, but it deviates as soon as it adjusts its aggressiveness
adaptively to the price changes. In particular, it becomes more aggressive when the price moves in
its favor.














































Figure 4.6: Illustration of liquidation processes under the optimal adaptive strategy (OPT, red solid
lines), the optimized deterministic schedule (EXP, blue dashed lines), and the optimized VWAP
schedule (VWAP, green dashed lines) with the target quantile @ = 0.5, and in two scenarios: when
the price moves in an adverse direction (left), and when the price moves in a favorable direction
(right).
Figure 4.7 shows the implementation shortfall distributions (i.e., the histograms of ∞) result-
ing from OPT (top) and EXP (bottom) with different values of the target quantile @ ∈ {0, 1, 0.2, 0.5}.
These histograms are obtained from 100,000 runs of simulations, where all the strategies see the
same price process realization per simulation. The resulting distributions are visually very differ-
ent: EXP yields a normal distribution whereas OPT yields a distribution that has a sharp peak at the
@th quantile. Such a sharp peak can be explained by the threshold behavior of the optimal adaptive
strategy, discussed at the end of §4.4.2.
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Figure 4.7: The distributions of the implementation shortfall (i.e., the histogram of∞) incurred by
the optimal adaptive liquidation strategy (top) and the optimized deterministic schedule (bottom),
given the initial position G = 100, the volatility f = 1.09, the market impact factor [ = 0.017, and
a varying target quantile @ ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.8} (left, middle, and right, respectively). In each plot,
the solid vertical line represents the @th quantile (i.e., the value-at-risk VaR@ [∞]), and the dashed
vertical line represents the tail average beyond the @th quantile (i.e., the conditional risk-at-value
CVaR@ [∞]). The highlighted area represents the worst @-fraction of the outcomes whose average
corresponds to CVaR@ [∞]. These are obtained from 100,000 runs of simulations.
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.8 report the summary statistics of the implementation shortfall obtained
from those simulations. We confirm that the simulation results are consistent with our theoretic
predictions, and the derived optimal adaptive strategy effectively reduces the CVaR loss across all
settings.
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Target quantile Policy CVaR (theo.) VaR Average Std. dev.
@ = 0.05
OPT 87.10 (86.41) 74.20 52.80 17.63
EXP 90.15 (89.77) 77.98 30.11 29.01
VWAP 99.18 (98.80) 85.99 33.13 31.92
@ = 0.10
OPT 77.74 (77.07) 62.41 47.56 18.66
EXP 80.97 (80.60) 66.43 27.06 30.61
VWAP 89.14 (88.71) 73.09 29.77 33.68
@ = 0.20
OPT 66.03 (65.58) 46.95 40.08 22.77
EXP 69.62 (69.32) 50.98 23.31 33.01
VWAP 76.64 (76.30) 56.14 25.64 36.32
@ = 0.50
OPT 43.90 (43.68) 11.88 24.29 42.74
EXP 47.92 (47.66) 16.14 16.12 39.84
VWAP 52.70 (52.45) 17.65 17.70 43.82
@ = 0.80
OPT 24.05 (23.85) −36.23 11.22 81.33
EXP 27.81 (27.51) −34.70 9.45 52.49
VWAP 30.65 (30.28) −38.21 10.42 57.80
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of implementation shortfall ∞ incurred by the optimal adaptive
strategy (OPT), the optimized deterministic schedule (EXP), and the optimized VWAP sched-
ule (VWAP), given G = 100, f = 1.09, [ = 0.017, and a varying target quantile @ ∈
{0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. For each combination of a policy and a target quantile, it reports the
CVaR value, the VaR value, the average, and the standard deviation of implementation shortfall
∞, measured from 100,000 runs of simulations. The numbers in parentheses in the third column
report the theoretically predicted CVaR values, computed with the expressions (4.29), (4.45), and
(4.47).
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Figure 4.8: Comparison of CVaR performance achieved by the optimal adaptive strategy (OPT),
the optimized deterministic schedule (EXP), and the optimized VWAP schedule (VWAP), given
G = 100, f = 1.09, [ = 0.017, and a varying target quantile @ ∈ {0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.5, 0.8}. Each
data point (plotted with a diamond-shaped marker) reports the CVaR value of the implementation
shortfall distribution obtained from 100,000 runs of simulations, where the error bar around the
data point represents a 90% confidence interval computed via bootstrapping. The colored bars
represent their theoretical predictions computed with the expressions (4.29), (4.45), and (4.47).
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Appendix A: Appendix for Thompson Sampling with Information
Relaxation Penalties
A.1 An illustrative example
Let us consider a Bernoulli MAB with eight periods () = 8) and three arms ( = 3) with the
following priors:
`1 ∼ Beta(3, 1), `2 ∼ Beta(1, 1), `3 ∼ Beta(1, 3), (A.1)
where '0,= ∼ Bernoulli(`0) for each 0 ∈ {1, 2, 3} and = ∈ {1, 2, · · · , 8}. Given this prior belief,
the predictive mean reward of each arm is ¯̀1 = E`1∼Beta(3,1) [`1] = 34 , ¯̀2 =
1
2 , and ¯̀3 =
1
4 ,
respectively. As an illustrative example, we examine a particular instance where the true outcome
l is given as follows:
True means `0 (\0)
Rewards '0,=
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 (0 = 1) 0.235 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
Arm 2 (0 = 2) 0.443 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Arm 3 (0 = 3) 0.787 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
Table A.1: An example of the outcome in a Bernoulli MAB with  = 3 and ) = 8.
If we consider only the priors, arm 1 is best since ¯̀1 is largest among ( ¯̀1, ¯̀2, ¯̀3). If, however,
we have full information about the parameter values, arm 3 is best since `3 is largest among
(`1, `2, `3).
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A.1.1 Inner Problems Induced by Different Penalty Functions
No penalty. To clarify the role of penalties, we first consider the case of zero penalty, i.e., IC ≡ 0,
which was not discussed in §2.3. With zero penalty, the DM at any time earns the current realized
reward without adjustment. The clairvoyant DM, who is informed of the outcome l, can find the
best action sequence for this particular outcome l. Recall that '0,= is defined to be the reward
from the =th pull of arm 0, not the reward from arm 0 at time =, and so the DM is not allowed to
skip any of the reward realizations and the total reward does not depend on the order of pulls. As
depicted in the table below, the optimal solution is to pull arm 1 four times, arm 2 once, and arm 3
three times, which yields a total reward of 7.
Payoffs under zero penalty
Maximal payoff
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
7Arm 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0
Arm 3 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1
TS penalty. Next, let us examine the penalty ITSC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − `0C (\0C ) under which the
DM earns `0 whenever playing arm 0. The hindsight optimal action sequence is to pull arm 3 (the
arm with the largest mean reward `0) eight times in a row and the DM can earn a total reward of
) × `3 = 6.296 at most.
Payoffs under ITSC Maximal payoff
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235 .235
6.296Arm 2 .443 .443 .443 .443 .443 .443 .443 .443
Arm 3 .787 .787 .787 .787 .787 .787 .787 .787
IRS.FH penalty. When the penalties are given by IIRS.FHC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − ˆ̀0C ,)−1(l),
the DM earns ˆ̀0,)−1(l) whenever playing arm 0. Recall that ˆ̀0,)−1(l) is the Bayesian estimate














and the maximal payoff is ) × ˆ̀2,)−1 =
5.333, which can be obtained by playing arm 2 throughout the entire time horizon.
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Payoffs under IIRS.FHC Maximal payoff
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11
5.333Arm 2 6/9 6/9 6/9 6/9 6/9 6/9 6/9 6/9
Arm 3 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11 6/11
IRS.V-ZERO penalty. Finally, let us focus on IIRS.V-ZEROC (a1:C , l) , AC (a1:C , l) − ˆ̀0C ,=C−1 (a1:C−1,0C )
under which the DM earns ˆ̀0,=−1(l) from the =th pull of arm 0. Since the payoff from an arm
changes over time as the Bayesian estimate evolves, playing only one arm is no longer optimal,
unlike in the previous two cases. It can be easily verified that the optimal allocation is to play arm
1 six times and arm 2 two times, as visualized in the table below.
Payoffs under IIRS.V-ZEROC Maximal payoff
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 3/4 3/5 4/6 5/7 6/8 6/9 6/10 6/11
5.314Arm 2 1/2 2/3 2/4 2/5 3/6 4/7 5/8 6/9
Arm 3 1/4 2/5 3/6 4/7 5/8 5/9 5/10 6/11
IRS.V-EMAX and the ideal penalty. Regarding the penalty functions IIRS.V-EMAXC and IidealC , we
cannot visualize the optimal solution with a table since the total payoff depends on the detailed
sequence of pulls and not only the number of pulls. While omitting the visual proof of optimality,
we have that the action sequence a∗1:8 = (1, 2, 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) achieves the maximal payoff of 5.806
under IIRS.V-EMAXC , and a∗1:8 = (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1) achieves the maximal payoff of 6.063 under
IidealC . In particular for I
ideal
C , the maximal payoff depends only on the prior belief y and the time
horizon ) , irrespective of the outcome1 l.
We have so far illustrated how the different penalty functions induce the different inner prob-
lems and the different best actions given the same outcome l. The readers may notice from the
above examples that, as the penalty function becomes more complicated, the hindsight best ac-
tion sequence becomes less dependent on a particular realization of l. Instead, it becomes more
1For details, see the proof of the strong duality theorem in §A.3.1. While the maximal value does not depend
on l, the optimal action sequence still depends on l. More specifically, it is the sequence of actions that the (non-
anticipating) Bayesian optimal policy will take when l is sequentially revealed.
136
dependent on the prior belief.
A.1.2 IRS Performance Bounds
The maximal payoffs above are calculated for a particular outcome given by Table A.1. Recall
that the IRS performance bound , I is defined as the expected value of the maximal payoff where
the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of outcome l over its prior distribution
I(), y). We can obtain this value by simulation, i.e., by solving a bunch of inner problems with
respect to the randomly generated outcomes l(1) , l(2) , · · · , l(() and taking the average of the
maximal values. For this particular Bernoulli MAB setting () = 8 with given priors), we obtain
the following performance bounds:
,0 ,TS , IRS.FH , IRS.V-ZERO , IRS.V-EMAX , ideal = +∗
6.805 6.429 6.279 6.111 6.075 6.063
We observe that the performance bounds are monotone, i.e.,,0 > ,TS > , IRS.FH > , IRS.V-ZERO >
, IRS.V-EMAX > , ideal = +∗, which is consistent with Theorem 2.4.1.
A.1.3 Illustration of the IRS Policy (IRS.V-Zero)
We illustrate how the policy cIRS.V-ZERO makes decisions sequentially when the true outcome
l is the one specified in Table A.1. At C = 1, it first synthesizes a future scenario based on the prior
belief (i.e., sampling l̃1 ∼ I(y0)) and finds the best action sequence in the presence of penalties
IIRS.V-ZEROC in the belief that the sampled outcome l̃1 is the ground truth. The following table
shows an example in which cIRS.V-ZERO plays arm 1.
C = 1 Priors y0
Payoffs with respect to l̃1 ∼ I(y0) Action
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Arm 1 Beta(3, 1) 3/4 4/5 5/6 6/7 7/8 7/9 8/10 9/11
01 = 1Arm 2 Beta(1, 1) 1/2 1/3 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 2/8 3/9
Arm 3 Beta(1, 3) 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/10 2/11
As a result of the first action (01 = 1), we observe that '1,1 = 0 (encoded in the true outcome l)
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and the associated belief is updated from Beta(3, 1) to Beta(3, 2) according to Bayes’ rule. In order
to make the next decision 02 at time C = 2, cIRS.V-ZERO simulates an outcome for the remaining time
horizon, i.e., l̃2 ∼ I(y1), independently of the outcome l̃1 used at C = 1. Again, cIRS.V-ZERO finds
the best action sequence for this new scenario and takes its first action.2 The table below shows an
instance of l̃2 in which the policy will pull arm 2.
C = 2 Priors y1
Payoffs with respect to l̃2 ∼ I(y1) Action
= = 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Arm 1 Beta(3, 2) 3/5 4/6 4/7 4/8 4/9 5/10 5/11
02 = 2Arm 2 Beta(1, 1) 1/2 2/3 3/4 3/5 4/6 4/7 5/8
Arm 3 Beta(1, 3) 1/4 1/5 1/6 1/7 1/8 1/9 1/10
We can update the prior of arm 2 as a new reward realization '2,1 = 1 is revealed. In the
following decision epochs C = 3, 4, · · · , the policy repeats the same decision-making procedure
– (i) samples l̃C ∼ I(yC−1), (ii) solves the inner problem, and (iii) plays the best arm that the
optimal solution suggests – while updating the priors as the true reward realizations are revealed
sequentially.
The following table illustrates the last decision epoch. As there remains one time period only,
the policy cIRS.V-ZERO tries to maximize ˆ̀0,0(l̃7) = ¯̀0 (y7), which is the expected mean reward
given the prior at that moment. Such a decision is totally myopic, but it is Bayesian optimal.
C = 8 Priors y7
Payoffs with respect to l̃7 ∼ I(y7) Action
= = 1
Arm 1 Beta(6, 3) 6/9
08 = 1Arm 2 Beta(2, 2) 2/4
Arm 3 Beta(1, 3) 1/4
2In case of IRS.V-ZERO, we select the arm with the largest pull allocation as a first action.
138
A.2 Algorithms in detail
A.2.1 Implementation of IRS.V-ZERO
We provide a pseudo-code of the policy cIRS.V-ZERO introduced in §2.3.3. The same logic can be
directly used to compute the performance bound, IRS.V-ZERO if the sampled outcome l̃ is replaced
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with the true outcome l.
Algorithm 5: Arm selection rule of cIRS.V-ZERO when remaining time is ) and current
belief is y
Function IRS.V-Zero(), y)
1 \̃0 ∼ P0 (H0), '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )},∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }
2 for 0 = 1, · · · ,  do
3 H̃0,0 ← H0, (̃0,0 ← 0
4 for = = 1, · · · , ) do
5 (̃0,= ← (̃0,=−1 + ¯̀0 ( H̃0,=−1)
6 H̃0,= ←U0 ( H̃0,=−1, '̃0,=)
end
end
7 "̃0,0 ← 0, "̃0,= ← −∞,∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )}
8 for 0 = 1, · · · ,  do
9 for = = 0, · · · , ) do
10 "̃0,= ← max0≤<≤={"̃0−1,=−< + (̃0,<}
11 !̃0,= ← argmax0≤<≤={"̃0−1,=−< + (̃0,<}
end
end
12 g ← )
13 for 0 =  , · · · , 1 do
14 =̃∗0 ← !̃0,g
15 g ← g − =̃∗0
end
16 return argmax0 =̃∗0
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A.2.2 Implementation of IRS.V-EMAX
We use the notation yC (n1: , l) to denote the belief as a function of pull counts n1: ,
(=1, · · · , = ) ∈ N 0 , based on the observation that the belief is completely determined by how
many times each of the arms has been pulled, n1: , irrespective of the specific sequence in which
the arms have been pulled. Given the pull counts n1: , we define the payoff of pulling arm 0 one
more time after pulling the individual arms =1, · · · , = times respectively: with C =
∑ 
0=1 =0, the
effective payoff associated with arm 0 at time C is
A I (n1: , 0, l) , ˆ̀0,=0 (l) −,TS () − C − 1, yC+1(n1: + e0, l)) +,TS () − C − 1, yC (n1: , l)) ,
(A.2)
where e0 ∈ N 0 is a basis vector such that the 0
th component is one and the others are zero. Note
that we used the fact that E
[
,TS () − C, yC)
C−1] = ,TS () − C, yC−1).
Consider a subproblem of (∗) that maximizes the total payoff given the number of pulls n1: 
across all the arms: with C =
∑ 
0=1 =0, we get





AB (a1:B, l) − IIRS.V-EMAXB (a1:B, l);
C∑
B=1
1{0B = 0} = =0,∀0
}
. (A.3)
Consequently, the maximal value " (n1: , l) should satisfy the following Bellman equation:
" (n1: , l) = max
0∈A:=0≥1
{" (n1: − e0, l) + A I (n1: − e0, 0, l)} , (A.4)
i.e., when letting 0∗ be the maximizer of (A.4), it is optimal to play arm 0∗ after making the best
effort within the allocation n1: − e0. For all feasible counts n1: ’s such that
∑ 
0=1 =0 ≤ ) , we can
compute " (n1: , l)’s by sequentially solving (A.4) in an appropriate order. By doing so, we can
obtain the maximal value of the original inner problem (∗) by evaluating
max
n1: ∈#)
{" (n1: , l)} , (A.5)
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where #) , {(=1, · · · , = ) ∈ N 0 :
∑ 
0=1 =0 = )}, and the performance bound , IRS.V-EMAX is the
expected value of (A.5) with respect to the random realization of l. The optimal action sequence
a∗1:) can be obtained by tracking " (n1: , l)’s backward.
Algorithm 6: Arm selection rule of cIRS.V-ZERO when remaining time is ) and current
belief is y
Function IRS.V-EMax(), y)
1 \̃0 ∼ P0 (H0), '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )},∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }
2 H̃0,0 ← H0, H̃0,= ←U0 ( H̃0,=−1, '̃0,=), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )},∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }
3 for each n1: ∈ #≤) do
4 Γ̃[n1: ] ← Eỹ(n1: ) [max0 `0 (\0)]
end
5 for each n1: ∈ #<) do
6 Ã I [n1: , 0] ← ¯̀0 ( H̃0,=0−1) +
(
) −∑ 0=1 =0 − 1) × (Γ̃[n1: ] − Γ̃[n1: + e0]) , ∀0 ∈
{1, . . . ,  }
end
7 "̃ [0] ← 0
8 for each n1: ∈ #≤) \ {0} in order with increasing
∑ 
0=1 =0 do
9 "̃ [n1: ] ← max0:=0>0
{
"̃ [n1: − e0] + Ã I [n1: − e0, 0]
}
10 ̃[n1: ] ← argmax0:=0>0
{
"̃ [n1: − e0] + Ã I [n1: − e0, 0]
}
end




12 for C = ), · · · , 1 do
13 0̃∗C ← ̃[m1: ]




Here, ỹ(n1: ) , ( H̃1,=1 , · · · , H̃ ,= ), #≤) , {n1: ;
∑
0 =0 ≤ )}, #<) , {n1: ;
∑
0 =0 < )}, and
in line 8, n1: iterates over #≤) \ {0} in an order in which
∑ 
0=1 =0 is non-decreasing.
Since |#≤) | = $ () ), it requires $ ( ) ) operations to compute all " (n1: , l)’s. However,
another practical issue is the cost of computing ,TS (), y) = ) × Ey [max0 `0 (\0)] which has to
be evaluated $ () ) times in total. There is no simple closed-form expression in general, and it
should be evaluated with numerical integration or Monte Carlo sampling.
A.2.3 Implementation of IRS.INDEX
We first prove the identity that was utilized in §2.3.5, and then provide the pseudo code for
IRS.INDEX policy.

















Here, the decision variable = is the total number of pulls of a stochastic arm.
Proof. Fix < , =) , i.e., the total number of pulls on the stochastic arm. Note that if 0C = 0, then
() − C) × (Γ_=C − Γ
_
=C−1) = 0 since =C = =C−1. The objective function can be represented as
<∑
==1
ˆ̀0,=−1 + () − <) × _ −
<∑
==1





where C= , inf{C; =C ≥ =} represents the time at which the =th pull on the stochastic arm is made.
It suffices to find the optimal pulling times (C1, · · · , C<) with 1 ≤ C1 < C2 < · · · < C< ≤ ) by which
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∑<




is minimized. With C0 , 0 and C<+1 , ) + 1, we have
<∑
==1








() − C=) × Γ_= −
<∑
==1




() − C=) × Γ_= −
<−1∑
==0




() − C=) × Γ_= − () − C0) × Γ_0 −
<∑
==0
() − C=+1) × Γ_= + () − C<+1) × Γ_< (A.11)
= −Γ_< − ) × Γ_0 +
<∑
==0
(C=+1 − C=) × Γ_= . (A.12)
Consider the minimum value among Γ_0, . . . , Γ
_
< and let =
∗ , argmin0≤=≤< Γ_=. In order to minimize
(A.12), it should satisfy that C=+1 − C= = ) −< + 1 for = = =∗ and C=+1 − C= = 1 for = ≠ =∗. For such
C=’s, (A.7) reduces to
<∑
==1
ˆ̀0,=−1 + () − <) × _ −
(
−Γ_< − ) × Γ_0 +
<∑
==0


















By taking its maximum value over < = 0, · · · , ) , we obtain (A.6).
The following pseudo code implements the arm selection rule of the IRS.INDEX policy when
remaining time is ) and current belief is y. In line 14, the infimum can be found via the bisec-
tion method, and ỹ0,0:) , ( H̃0,0, . . . , H̃0,) ) represents the sequence of beliefs under the sampled
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outcome.
Algorithm 7: Arm selection rule of IRS.INDEX policy when remaining time is ) and
current belief is y
Function IRS.Single.Worth-Trying(0, ), _, ỹ0,0:))
1 Γ̃_= ← EH̃0,= [max(`0 (\0), _)] ,∀= ∈ {0, . . . , )}
2 (̃
`
0,0 ← 0, (̃
Γ





3 for = = 1, · · · , ) do
4 (̃
`
0,= ← (̃`0,=−1 + ¯̀0 ( H̃0,=−1)
5 (̃Γ= ← (̃Γ0,=−1 + Γ̃
_
=


















− ) × _






11 \̃0 ∼ P0 (H0), '̃0,= ∼ R0 (\̃), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )},∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }
12 H̃0,0 ← H0, H̃0,= ←U0 ( H̃0,=−1, '̃0,=), ∀= ∈ {1, . . . , )}, ∀0 ∈ {1, . . . ,  }
13 for 0 = 1, · · · ,  do
14 _̃∗0 ← inf
{
_;IRS.Single.Worth-Trying(0, ), _, ỹ0,0:)) = true
}
end
15 return argmax0 _̃∗0
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A.3 Proofs for §2.3
Proposition A.3.1 (Mean equivalence). If the penalty function IC is dual feasible, the presence of













AC (Ac1:C , l)
]
=: + (c, ), y). (A.15)
Proof. The claim immediately follows from the definition of dual feasibility and the linearity of
the expectation operator.
A.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.3.1
Despite that the results of Theorem 2.3.1 were already well established in [4], we provide the
detailed proof as our context is slightly different from that of [4] regarding the measurability of
AC . We define an appending operator ⊕ that concatenates an element into a vector so that a1:C =
a1:C−1 ⊕ 0C .
Weak duality. Define the filtration for the perfect information relaxation GC , FC ∪ f(l) and
consider a relaxed policy space ΠG ,
{
c : cC is GC−1-measurable, ∀C
}
. Then, we have




































AC (a1:C) − IC (a1:C)
]
(A.17)
= , I (), y), (A.18)
where the inequality holds since ΠF ⊆ ΠG.
Strong duality. Fix ) and y. Let + inC (a1:C−1, l) and &inC (a1:C−1, 0, l) be, respectively, the value
function and the state-action value (Q-value) function that are associated with the inner problem
(∗) given a particular outcome l under the ideal penalty (2.22). With + in
)+1 ≡ 0, we have the
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following Bellman equation for the inner problem:
&inC (a1:C−1, 0, l) , AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) − IidealC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) ++ inC+1(a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l), (A.19)
+ inC (a1:C−1, l) = max
0∈A
{
&inC (a1:C−1, 0, l)
}
. (A.20)
We argue by induction to show that
+ inC (a1:C−1, l) = +∗() − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l)), (A.21)
&inC (a1:C−1, 0, l) = &∗() − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l), 0), (A.22)
for all a1:C−1 ∈ AC−1, 0 ∈ A and C ∈ {1, . . . , ) + 1}.
As a terminal case, when C = ) + 1, the claim holds trivially, since + in
)+1(a1:) , l) = 0 =
+∗(0, y) (a1:) , l)). Now assume that the claim holds for C + 1: i.e., + inC+1(a1:C , l) = +
∗() −
C, yC (a1:C , l)) for all a1:C ∈ AC . For any a1:C−1 ∈ AC−1 and 0 ∈ A, then,
&inC (a1:C−1, 0, l) = AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) − IidealC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) ++ inC+1(a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) (A.23)
= E [AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) ++∗ () − C, yC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l)) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)] (A.24)
−+∗ () − C, yC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l)) ++ inC+1(a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l)︸                                                             ︷︷                                                             ︸
=0
(A.25)
= E [AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) ++∗ () − C, yC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l)) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)] (A.26)
= EyC−1 (a1:C−1,l) ['0 ++∗ () − C,U(yC−1(a1:C−1, l), 0, '0))] (A.27)
= &∗() − C, yC−1(a1:C−1, l), 0), (A.28)
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where the last equality follows from the original Bellman equation (2.15). Consequently, we obtain
+ inC (a1:C−1, l) = max
0∈A
{





{&∗() − C, yC−1(a1:C−1, l), 0)} (A.30)
= +∗() − C, yC−1(a1:C−1, l)). (A.31)
Therefore the claim holds for all C = 1, · · · , ) . In particular for C = 1, we have
+ in1 (∅, l) = +
∗(), y), &in1 (∅, 0, l) = &
∗(), y, 0), ∀l. (A.32)
Note that the maximal value of the inner problem does not depend on the outcome l, i.e., it is
deterministic with respect to the randomness of l. As its expected value, , ideal(), y) = +∗(), y).
A.3.2 Proof of Remark 2.3.1
We proceed on the proof of strong duality. The policy cideal solves the same inner problem with
respect to a randomly sampled outcome l̃. When the remaining time is ) and the current belief is





&in1 (∅, 0, l̃) = argmax
0
&∗(), y, 0). (A.33)
Therefore, at each moment, irrespective of the sampled outcome l̃, the policy cideal always takes
the same action that the Bayesian optimal policy would take. Although there might be some
ambiguity regarding tie breaking in argmax, it does not affect the expected performance. Therefore,
+ (cideal, ), y) = +∗(), y).
148
A.3.3 Proof of Remark 2.3.2














AC (Ac1:C , l)

























and thus ITSC is dual feasible.
Also observe that E[AC (a1:C) | -̂)−1] = E[`0C | -̂)−1] = E[`0C | -̂)−1, C−1] and E[AC (a1:C) |C−1] =
E[`0C |C−1] for any a1:C ∈ AC . We can easily verify that each of penalty functions (2.22)–(2.26)
has a form of
IC (a1:C , l) = ITSC (a1:C , l) + FC (a1:C , l) − E[FC (a1:C , l) | C−1(a1:C−1, l)], (A.36)
for some deterministic function FC and some relaxed information set  C−1 ⊇ C−1. By invoking
Proposition 2.3 (iii) of [4], we have that IIRS.FHC − ITSC , IIRS.V-ZEROC − ITSC , IIRS.V-EMAXC − ITSC , and
IidealC − ITSC are dual feasible, and therefore so are IIRS.FHC , IIRS.V-ZEROC , IIRS.V-EMAXC , and IidealC .
A.4 Proofs for §2.4
A.4.1 Notes on regularity
Proposition A.4.1. If Ey |'0,= | < ∞ for all 0,
Ey |`0 (\0) | < ∞, and ,TS (), y) < ∞, ∀) ∈ N. (A.37)
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Proof. By Jensen’s inequality,
Ey |`0 (\0) | = Ey

















Ey |`0 (\0) | < ∞. (A.39)
The claim holds since,TS (), y) = ) × Ey [max0 `0 (\0)].
Proposition A.4.2. If Ey |'0,= | < ∞,
lim
=→∞






'0,8 = `0 (\0) almost surely, (A.40)
where ˆ̀0,= (l; H0) , EH0
[
`0 (\0) |'0,1, · · · , '0,=
]
.
Proof. Fix 0 and letH= , f
(
'0,1, · · · , '0,=
)
. First note that, by the strong law of large numbers,
lim=→∞ 1=
∑=
8=1 '0,8 = `0 (\0) almost surely. Therefore, `0 (\0) is measurable with respect toH∞ ,⋃
=H=. Also note that ˆ̀0,= = E (`0 (\0) |H=) is a Doob martingale adapted to H=. By Levy’s
upward theorem, since `0 (\0) ∈ L1 by Proposition A.4.1, ˆ̀0,= converges to E (`0 (\0) |H∞) =
`0 (\0) almost surely as =→∞.
A.4.2 Proof of Proposition 2.4.1
Asymptotic behavior of cIRS.FH. Let l̃ be the sampled outcome used by cIRS.FH. By Proposition
A.4.2, we have lim=→∞ ˆ̀0,= (l̃) = `0 (\̃0) for almost all l̃. This, together with the assumption that
`8 (\8) ≠ ` 9 (\ 9 ) for 8 ≠ 9 , since argmax0 `0 (\̃0) is uniquely defined for almost all l̃, yields
argmax
0








ˆ̀0,= (l̃) a.s. (A.41)
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TS (y) = 0
]
. (A.44)
Note that we are not assuming that cIRS.FH and cTS share the randomness. The sampled parameters
used in cTS are not necessarily the ones used in cIRS.FH, but their distributions are identical since
they are drawn from the same prior.
Asymptotic behavior of cIRS.V-ZERO. To simplify notation, let ◦
)
, IRS.V-ZERO (), y). As above,
it suffices to show that lim)→∞ ◦) = argmax0∈A `0 (\̃0) := TS for almost all sampled outcome




|`TS − `0 | and " , sup
0∈A,=≥0
 ˆ̀0,= . (A.45)
We have 0 < Δ < 2" < ∞ almost surely since `8 (\̃8) ≠ ` 9 (\̃ 9 ) for 8 ≠ 9 and lim=→∞ ˆ̀0,= = `0 <
∞ almost surely for all 0. In addition, there exists # ∈ N such that
 ˆ̀0,= − `0 < Δ4 , ∀= ≥ #, ∀0 ∈ A. (A.46)
For such # , we have
inf
=≥#





, ∀0 ≠ TS . (A.47)
Note that TS, Δ, " , and # do not have the dependency on ) .
To argue by contradiction, suppose that ◦
)
≠ TS for some large ) such that ) ≥ 2#+ 8"#
Δ
+2.












where the ties are broken arbitrarily in argmax{}. We let =◦(0) be the 0th component of n◦1: .
According to the specified arm selection rule, we have ◦
)
= argmax0 =◦(0) and hence =◦(◦) ) ≥
b)2 c (> #). We prove the claim for the following two cases:
Case 1: If =◦(0TS) ≥ # , consider an allocation n†1: that is a deviation from the given optimal
allocation n◦1: such that arm 0
TS gets one pull whereas arm ◦
)
gets one less pull: i.e., =†(TS) =




) − 1, and =†(0) = =◦(0) for any 0 ∉ {TS, ◦
)
}. The change in the














where the inequality follows from (A.47) and that =◦(TS) ≥ # and =◦(◦
)
) ≥ # . The allocation
n†1: is strictly better than n
◦
1: , which contradicts the assumption that n
◦
1: is an optimal allocation.
Case 2: If =◦(TS) < # , consider an allocation n†1: that is a deviation from the given optimal
allocation n◦1: such that arm 
◦
)





) − #) if 0 = TS,
# if 0 = ◦
)
,






















































) ≥ b)2 c, the last term is strictly positive, which is a contradiction.
We’ve shown that for almost all l̃, when ) is large enough, the optimal allocation n◦1: must
allocate more than a half of the pulls on arm TS = argmax0 `0 (\̃0). This concludes the proof.
A.4.3 Proof of Theorem 2.4.1
Proof of “,TS (), y) ≥ , IRS.FH (), y)”
Proof. It immediately follows from Jensen’s inequality: since max(· · · ) is a convex function,










E ( `0 (\0) | -̂)−1)
]
= , IRS.FH (), y). (A.56)
Proof of “, IRS.FH (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-ZERO (), y)”
Lemma A.4.1 (Variant of Jensen’s inequality). Suppose that i : R ↦→ R is an increasing (deter-
ministic) function. Then, for any real-valued random variable - such that E|- | < ∞,
E [max {- + i(-), 0}] ≥ E [max {E(-) + i(-), 0}] . (A.57)
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Proof. Define ` , E(-) and 5G (C) , max{C + i(G), 0}. Since 5G (·) is a convex function for each G ∈ R,
5G (C) ≥ 5G (`) + (C − `) · 5 ′G (`) = max{` + i(G), 0} + (C − `) · 1{` + i(G) ≥ 0}, ∀C, ∀G. (A.58)
By setting C = G, we get
max{G + i(G), 0} = 5G (G) ≥ max{` + i(G), 0} + (G − `) · 1{` + i(G) ≥ 0}, ∀G. (A.59)
Note that, since 1{` + i(G) ≥ 0} is increasing in G, (i) for any G ≥ `, (G − `) ≥ 0 and 1{` + i(G)} ≥
1{` + i(`)}, and (ii) for any G < `, (G − `) < 0 and 1{` + i(G)} ≤ 1{` + i(`)}. Therefore,
(G − `) · 1{` + i(G) ≥ 0} ≥ (G − `) · 1{` + i(`) ≥ 0}, ∀G ∈ R. (A.60)
Combining this with (A.59), we get
max{G + i(G), 0} ≥ max{` + i(G), 0} + (G − `) · 1{` + i(`) ≥ 0}, ∀G ∈ R. (A.61)
For random variable - , by taking expectation, we get
E [max{- + i(-), 0}] ≥ E [max{` + i(-), 0} + (- − `) · 1{` + i(`) ≥ 0}] (A.62)
≥ E [max{` + i(-), 0}] + E(- − `) · 1{` + i(`) ≥ 0} (A.63)
= E [max{` + i(-), 0}] . (A.64)
Corollary A.4.1. On a probability space (Ω, F , P), let i(G, l) : R×Ω ↦→ R be a function such that
(i) the mapping G ↦→ i(G, l) is increasing for each l ∈ Ω and (ii) for some sub-f-field H ⊆ F ,
the mappingl ↦→ i(G, l) isH -measurable for each G ∈ R (i.e., i(·, l) is a deterministic function
conditioned onH ). Then
E [max {- (l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] ≥ E [max {E(- |H)(l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] . (A.65)
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Proof. Define
`(l) , E(- |H)(l),  (l) , 1{`(l) + i(`(l), l) ≥ 0}. (A.66)
By (A.61), we have
max{G + i(G, l), 0} ≥ max{`(l) + i(G, l), 0} + (G − `(l)) ·  (l), ∀G ∈ R, for each l ∈ Ω. (A.67)
Since `(l) and  (l) areH -measurable,
E [max{- (l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] ≥ E [max{`(l) + i(- (l), l), 0} + (- (l) − `(l)) ·  (l)] (A.68)
= E [E (max{`(l) + i(- (l), l), 0} + (- (l) − `(l)) ·  (l) | H)]
(A.69)
= E [max{`(l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] + E [E ( (- (l) − `(l)) ·  (l) | H)]
(A.70)
= E [max{E (- |H) (l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] (A.71)
+ E
(E(- |H)(l) − `(l))︸                       ︷︷                       ︸=0 · (l)
 (A.72)
= E [max{E (- |H) (l) + i(- (l), l), 0}] . (A.73)
Corollary A.4.2. On a probability space (Ω, F , P), let (0, · · · , ) ) be H -measurable real-














E ( - | H) · 1{8 ≥ = + 1} + (8 − = − 1)+ × - + 8
}]
(A.74)
for any = = 0, 1, · · · , ) .
Proof. When = = ) , both sides become E [max0≤8≤) {8}], which makes the claim true. Fix = < ) and
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define
i(G, l) , max
=+1≤8≤)
{(8 − = − 1) × G + 8 (l)} − max
0≤8≤=
{8 (l)} . (A.75)



































- (l) + max
=+1≤8≤)
{(8 − = − 1) × - (l) + 8 (l)} − max
0≤8≤=
8 (l)︸                                                                 ︷︷                                                                 ︸












E (- |H) (l) + max
=+1≤8≤)

























E ( - | H) · 1{8 ≥ = + 1} + (8 − = − 1)+ × - + 8
}]
. (A.82)
Proof of “, IRS.FH (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-ZERO (), y).” Define
#) ,
{









What we want to show is













































=0 × ˆ̀0,) −1
)}]
, (A.86)
where 0∧1 , min(0, 1). Observe that, IRS.FH = *1,0,, IRS.V-ZERO = * ,) , and*:+1,0 = *:,) . Therefore,
it suffices to show that
*:,= ≥ *:,=+1, ∀: = 1, · · · ,  , ∀= = 0, · · · , ) − 1. (A.87)
Fix : and =. Define a sub-f-field
H , f
(
{'0,B}0=:,1≤B≤= ∪ {'0,B}0≠:,1≤B≤) −1
)
. (A.88)











=0 × ˆ̀0,) −1
)
: n1: ∈ #) , =: = 8
}
. (A.89)






(8 − =)+ × ˆ̀:,) −1 + 8
}]
. (A.90)



































ˆ̀:,) −1 |':,1, · · · , ':,=
)
= ˆ̀0,=, and equation (b)
holds since (: (8∧=) + ˆ̀:,= · 1{8 ≥ =+1} =
∑=
B=1 ˆ̀:,B−1 · 1{8 ≥ B} + ˆ̀:,= · 1{8 ≥ =+1} =
∑=+1
B=1 ˆ̀:,B−1 · 1{8 ≥
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B} = (: (8 ∧ (= + 1)).
A note on the proof. One may wonder if the above result can be derived in a simpler way by
exploiting the properties of nested filtration [e.g., Proposition 2.3 of 4]. Unlike the proof of,TS ≥
, IRS.FH, however, the proof of , IRS.FH ≥ , IRS.V-ZERO does not simply follow from the fact that
f( -̂)−1) is larger than f(C−1).
Consider a Bernoulli MAB with  = 2, ) = 2, and a prior distribution Beta(1, 1), and let us
introduce its variation whose reward function is given by A′C (·) as follows:
A′1(01) = A1(01), A
′
2(a1:2) = −^A2(a1:2), (A.95)
where AC (·) is the reward function of the original Bernoulli MAB. When ^ > 0, one can show that






























If ^ is large enough, we obtain, IRS.FH < , IRS.V-ZERO, which is opposite to the above result.
Recall that the additional gain from knowing the future information can be decomposed into
two components; the gain from knowing the immediate reward and the gain from knowing the next
belief state, where IRS.V-ZERO considers the former component only. When those two compo-
nents are not aligned as in this example (i.e., a higher A′1 leads to a worse next belief state), the DM
can exploit the penalties if they penalize only for the first component (e.g., when A′1 is smaller than
expected, the DM will get compensated for this difference but she can still earn the larger reward
in the next period).
This is also related to the fact that IIRS.V-ZEROC does not correspond to zero penalty under the
some (partial) information relaxation, but should be understood as an approximation of IidealC under
the perfect information relaxation. As opposed to TS and IRS.FH, the optimal solution to the
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IRS.V-ZERO’s inner problem may depend on the entire outcome l. With the terminology of
[4], there is a mismatch between the filtration that generates the penalties and the filtration that
characterizes the relaxed policy space.
Proof of “,TS (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-EMAX (), y)”
To show that,TS ≥ , IRS.V-EMAX, we take a completely different approach that utilizes Theo-
rem 4 in [10]. We here rephrase the definition and the theorem therein using our notation.
Definition A.4.1 (Supersolution). An approximate value function +̂ : N0 × Y ↦→ R is a superso-
lution to the Bellman equation (2.15) if





'0,1 + +̂ () − 1,U(y, '0,1, A))
]}
, ∀y ∈ Y, ∀) ≥ 1, (A.98)
with +̂ (0, y) = 0 for all y ∈ Y.
Remark A.4.1. If +̂ (·, ·) is a supersolution, then for any given l, ) , and y,
+̂ ()−C+1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)) ≥ Ey
[
AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l; y) + +̂ () − C, yC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l; y))
C−1(a1:C−1, l)] ,
(A.99)
for all 0 ∈ A, a1:C−1 ∈ AC−1 and C ∈ {1, . . . , )}.
Lemma A.4.2 (Theorem 4 of [10], rephrased). Consider a penalty function ÎC generated by +̂ (·, ·):
ÎC (a1:C , l;), y) , AC (a1:C , l) − Ey [AC (a1:C , l) |C−1(a1:C−1, l) ] (A.100)
+ +̂ () − C, yC (a1:C , l; y)) − Ey
[
+̂ () − C, yC (a1:C , l; y))
C−1(a1:C−1, l)] .
If +̂ (·, ·) is a supersolution, then the performance bound induced by penalty function ÎC is tighter
than +̂: i.e.,
, Î (), y) ≤ +̂ (), y). (A.101)
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And this holds in a stronger sense: for each outcome l, the maximal value of the inner problem
with respect to l (denoted by + Î,in1 (∅, l;), y) in the proof) is smaller than or equal to +̂ (), y).




C (a1:C−1, l;), y) = max
0∈A
{





)+1(·, l;), y) = 0. Then, we have ,




1 (∅, l;), y)
]
. To prove the claim, it
suffices to show that, for any given l,
+
Î,in
C (a1:C−1, l;), yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)) ≤ +̂ () − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)) , (A.103)
for all a1:C−1 ∈ AC−1 and for all C = 1, · · · , ) + 1.
We argue by induction. As a terminal case, when C = ) + 1, the inequality (A.103) holds
trivially since both sides are zero. Fix C and suppose that the inequality (A.103) holds for C + 1.
Omitting l for brevity, we get
+̂ () − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1)) −+ Î,inC (a1:C−1;), yC−1(a1:C−1)) (A.104)
= +̂ () − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1)) −max
0∈A
{






+̂ () − C, yC (a1:C)) −+ Î,inC+1 (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0;), y)︸                                                 ︷︷                                                 ︸
≥0 (∵ induction hypothesis)
+ +̂ () − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1)) − E
[
AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0) + +̂ () − C, yC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0))
C−1]︸                                                                                                    ︷︷                                                                                                    ︸





Proof of “,TS (), y) ≥ , IRS.V-EMAX (), y).” Recall that IIRS.V-EMAXC is a penalty function gener-
ated by,TS. We observe that,TS (·, ·) is a supersolution: for any ) and y,

































'0,1 +,TS () − 1,U(y, 0, '0,1))
]}
. (A.112)
The last equality holds since E
[
,TS () − 1,U(y, 01, A1(01, l)))
]
= ,TS () − 1, y), as argued in
(2.39). By Lemma A.4.2, we have, IRS.V-EMAX (), y) ≤ ,TS (), y) which also holds in a stronger
sense.
A.4.4 Proof of Theorem 2.4.2
Suboptimality decomposition
As in §A.3.1, we define the Q-values of the inner problem given a particular outcome l, a
penalty function IC (·), a time horizon ) , and a prior belief y.
&
I,in
C (a1:C−1, 0, l;), y) = AC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l) − IC (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l;), y) (A.113)
++ I,in
C+1 (a1:C−1 ⊕ 0, l;), y),
+
I,in










)+1(·, l;), y) ≡ 0. Additionally define the total payoff of an action sequence and the hind-
sight best action under penalties:
SI (a1:) , l;), y) ,
)∑
C=1
AC (a1:C , l) − IC (a1:C , l;), y), (A.115)
0
I,∗





C (a1:C−1, 0, l;), y)
}
. (A.116)
We have + I,in1 (∅, l;), y) = maxa1:) ∈A) S
I (a1:) , l;), y).
Proposition A.4.3 (Suboptimality decomposition). Given a non-anticipating policy c ∈ ΠF and
a dual-feasible penalty function IC , the suboptimality gap is the sum of the instantaneous subopti-
malities of individual actions taken by c along the sample path: i.e.,
























where the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of outcome l and the randomness
of policy c.
Proof. The first equality immediately follows from the definition of , I and mean equivalence
(Proposition A.3.1). Now fix l, ) , and y. Consider the (pathwise) suboptimality of the action
sequence Ac1:) compared to the clairvoyant optimal solution. It can be decomposed into the instan-
taneous suboptimalty incurred by the individual action at each time:
max
a1:)













By taking expectation, we obtain the second equality.
The next lemma shows that the instantaneous suboptimalty of the first action can be expressed
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in terms of mean reward metrics for each of the IRS penalty functions.
Lemma A.4.3. Fix time horizon) , prior belief y, and the true outcomel, and hide the dependency
on them in notation for &I,in1 (·), 0
I,∗
1 (·), `0 (·) and ˆ̀0,= (·). For each of the penalty functions I
TS,
IIRS.FH, and IIRS.V-ZERO, the instantaneous suboptimalty of action 0 ∈ A satisfies the following:







1 (0) = `0I,∗1 − `0 . (A.120)







1 (0) = ˆ̀0I,∗1 ,)−1 − ˆ̀0,)−1. (A.121)












Proof. (1) When I ≡ ITS, we have
&
I,in
1 (0) = `0 + () − 1) ×max0′ `0′ . (A.123)
Since the last term does not depend on action 0, the claim follows.
(2) When I ≡ IIRS.FH, we obtain the claim by replacing `0 with ˆ̀0,)−1 in the above proof.












Let n∗1: be the optimal allocation. Observe that the suboptimality is incurred only when =
∗
0 = 0, it
is no worse than ˆ̀0∗,=∗
0∗
− ˆ̀0,0 (the loss if the payoff when pulling 0 one more time but pulling 0I,∗1
one less time). Since =∗
0∗ ≤ ) − 1, the claim follows.
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Recursive structure of IRS penalty functions
To describe the recursive structure of Bayesian MAB problems explicitly, we define a shift
operatorMC : AC ×Ω ↦→ Ω,
MC (a1:C , l) ,
(
'0,=0 ;∀=0 > =C (a1:C , 0),∀0 ∈ A
)
. (A.125)
The shifted outcomeMC−1(a1:C−1, l) encodes the remaining reward realizations after taking a1:C−1.
Remark A.4.2 (Recursive structure of remaining uncertainties). Conditioned on HC−1(a1:C−1, l),
the remaining uncertainties are sufficiently described by yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y), i.e.,
MC−1(a1:C−1, l) | C−1(a1:C−1, l) ∼ I(yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)). (A.126)
Remark A.4.3 (Recursive structure of IRS penalties). Each of penalty functions (2.22)–(2.26) has
the following form:
IC (a1:C , l;), y) = iI (MC−1(a1:C−1, l), ) − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)), (A.127)
for some function iI : Ω × N × Y ↦→ R, i.e., the penalty at each time is completely determined by
the remaining rewardsMC−1(a1:C−1, l), the remaining time horizon ) − C + 1, and the prior belief
yC−1(a1:C−1, l) at that moment.
Remark A.4.2 immediately follows from Bayes’ rule, and Remark A.4.3 can be easily verified.
We observe the recursive structure of the sequential inner problems that the DM solves throughout
the decision-making process, which can be characterized by the following property.
Proposition A.4.4 (Generalized posterior sampling). For each of penalty functions (2.22)–(2.26),
the IRS policy c is randomized in such a way that it takes an action 0 with the probability that the
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FC−1] = P [0I,∗C (Ac1:C−1, l) = 0FC−1] , ∀0, ∀C. (A.128)
The source of uncertainty in the LHS is the randomness of the policy (embedded in l̃) and that in
the RHS is the randomness of nature (embedded in l). Here we assume that the tie-breaking rule
in argmax of (A.116) is identical to the one used when cI solves the inner problem.





∅, l̃;) − C + 1, yC−1(Ac1:C−1, l; y)
)
, (A.129)
where l̃ ∼ I(yC−1(Ac1:C−1, l; y)), i.e., the action that the clairvoyant DM will take in an MAB
instance specified by horizon )−C+1, prior belief yC−1(Ac1:C−1, l; y), and the outcome l̃. Therefore,
it suffices to verify that the inner problem that c solves at time C is identically distributed with
the sub-inner problem with respect to ground-truth l (i.e., the subproblem given the past action
sequence Ac1:C−1).
Fix time C, past actions a1:C−1 = Ac1:C−1, and the true outcome l. The sub-inner problem deter-











By Remark A.4.3, for any B ∈ {C, . . . , )}, the penalty at (inner) time B is given by
IB (a1:C−1 ⊕ a′C:B, l;), y) (A.131)
= iI (MB−1(a1:C−1 ⊕ a′C:B−1, l), ) − B + 1, yB−1(a1:C−1 ⊕ a
′




() − C + 1) − (B − C),
yB−C (a′C:B−1,MC−1(a1:C−1, l); yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)
ª®®®®®¬
(A.133)
= IB−C+1(a′C:B,MC−1(a1:C−1, l);) − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)). (A.134)
For rewards, similarly, we have AB (a1:C−1 ⊕ a′C:B, l) = AB−C+1(a′C:B,MC−1(a1:C−1, l)). Therefore, the











Given the fact that the shifted outcomeMC−1(a1:C−1, l) and the sampled outcome l̃ are identically
distributed with I(yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y)) conditionally on C−1(a1:C−1, l) (Remark A.4.2), this sub-






AB (a′1:B, l̃) − IB (a
′
1:B, l̃, ) − C + 1, yC−1(a1:C−1, l; y))
}
, (A.136)
which characterizes the IRS’s action cC . Therefore, 0
I,∗
C (Ac1:C−1, l) is identically distributed with
cC conditioned on FC−1.
Remark A.4.4. Utilizing the recursive structure of IRS penalty functions, Lemma A.4.3 can be
extended to describe the instantaneous suboptimality of the Cth action. Fix true outcome l and
past actions a1:C−1, and hide the dependency on them in notation for &I,inC (·), 0
I,∗
C (·), =C (·), `0 (·)
and ˆ̀0,= (·).
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C (0) = `0I,∗C − `0 . (A.137)







C (0) = ˆ̀0I,∗C ,=C−1 (0I,∗C )+)−C − ˆ̀0,=C−1 (0)+)−C . (A.138)







C (0) ≤ max0≤=≤)−C
{
ˆ̀0I,∗1 ,=C−1 (0I,∗1 )+=
}
− ˆ̀0,=C−1 (0) . (A.139)
Preliminary lemmas on MAB with natural exponential family distributions
We first describe the notion of sub-Gaussian random variable as an effective tool for bounding
its tail behavior.
Definition A.4.2 (Sub-Gaussian random variable). A random variable - is f-sub-Gaussian if





, ∀_ ∈ R, (A.140)
for some f > 0.
Lemma A.4.4. Given a random variable - , suppose that there exists f > 0 such that
P [- ≥ E- + If] ≤ 4−I2/2, ∀I ≥ 0. (A.141)
Then, the following holds:
E
[





2/2, ∀I > 0. (A.142)
Corollary A.4.3. If a random variable - is f-sub-Gaussian, it satisfies the condition of Lemma
A.4.4 and hence the inequality (A.142) holds.
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Proof. With ` , E- , we have
E
[





P [- ≥ G] 3G =
∫ ∞
C=I




















By combining these two inequalities, we obtain the desired result.
The corollary simply follows from Markov inequality: for any I ≥ 0 and _ ≥ 0, we have














By taking _ = I
f
, it follows that P[- ≥ ` + If] ≤ 4−I2/2.
We now return to the context of MAB problems and show that the mean reward metrics are
sub-Gaussian.
Lemma A.4.5 (Sub-Gaussianity of mean reward metrics). Consider the setting of Theorem 2.4.2,
i.e., the reward distribution of arm 0 is described by an !-smooth log-partition function 0 (\0)
and hyper-parameters (b0, a). Then, the conditional mean reward `0 is
√
!/a-sub-Gaussian: i.e.,





, ∀_ ∈ R, (A.146)
where ¯̀0 = E(b0 ,a) [`0] =
b0
a
is the prior predictive mean reward (i.e., the unconditional mean

















, ∀_ ∈ R. (A.147)
Proof. We first prove that `0 is
√
!/a-sub-Gaussian. Due to !-smoothness condition, 0 (\0) is
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finite valued for all \0 ∈ R. For any _ ∈ R, we have




















50 (b0, a) exp
{





































































where we have utilized that (i) `0 (\0) = ′0 (\0) and (ii) 0 (\0 + X) ≤ 0 (\0) + X′0 (\0) + !2 X
2.
Since ¯̀0 = b0/a, we obtained the desired result.





a + = . (A.157)
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)  \0}=] (A.159)
(88)

















































where we have utilized that (i) '0,8’s are conditionally independent given \0, (ii) the moment-
generating function of '0,1 is given by E[_'0 |\0] = exp (0 (\0 + _) − 0 (\0)), (iii) 0 (·) is !-
smooth, (iv) ′0 (\0) = `0 (\0), and (v) `0 is
√
















a(a+=) -sub-Gaussian, and so is ˆ̀0,=.
Lemma A.4.6. Consider the setting of Theorem 2.4.2. With f= ,
√
!=










2/2, ∀I > 0. (A.166)
Proof. Recall that the posterior predictive mean reward process { ˆ̀0,=}=≥0 is the martingale with
respect to the filtration generated by reward realizations '0,1, '0,2, . . . and whose mean is ¯̀0.
Therefore, {exp(_ ˆ̀0,=)}=≥0 is a positive submartingale for any given _ ≥ 0. By Doob’s maximal
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Therefore, by taking _ , I
f=
, we have P
[
max0≤8≤= ˆ̀0,8 ≥ ¯̀0 + If=
]
≤ 4−I2/2, and by invoking
Lemma A.4.4, we obtain the claim.
Proof of Theorem 2.4.2
Lemma A.4.7. Consider one of the IRS penalty functions ITS, IIRS.FH, and IIRS.V-ZERO. As dis-





C , l) −&
I,in
C (a1:C−1, 0, l) ≤ `*C (a1:C−1, 0
I,∗
C , l) − `!C (a1:C−1, 0, l), (A.169)
for some `*C (a1:C−1, 0
I,∗
1 , l) and `
!




C (a1:C−1, l). Suppose




`*C (a1:C−1, 0, l) −*C (0)





!C (0) − `!C (a1:C−1, 0, l)




for some constants * > 0 and ! > 0. Then, for IRS policy c induced by the chosen penalty
function, we have





*C (cC ) − !C (cC )
]
. (A.172)
Proof. Let ∗C , 0
I,∗
C (Ac1:C−1, l), and let EC [·] denote E[·|FC−1]. By Proposition A.4.4 we have
EC [*C (cC )] =
∑
0∈A
*C (0) · PC [cC = 0] =
∑
0∈A











































*C (cC ) − !C (cC )
]
. (A.177)
We further observe that
EC
[(







`*C (0) −*C (0)
)+]











Similarly, we have EC
[ (
!C (cC ) − `!C (cC )
)+] ≤ !
)
. Combining all these results, we have






































*C (cC ) − !C (cC )
] )]
(A.182)





*C (cC ) − !C (cC )
]
. (A.183)





C (0, =) , ˆ̀0,# cC−1 (0)+=, (A.184)
which represent, respectively, the number of pulls on arm 0 prior to time C under policy c, and
the posterior predictive mean reward process given the past actions Ac1:C−1. Observe that for each
0 ∈ A, the process { ˆ̀cC (0, =)}=≥0 is a martingale, as discussed Remark 2.2.1.
Further define









which is measurable with respect to FC−1. In the context of Theorem 2.4.2, the prior/posterior of










to `0, and therefore Lemma A.4.5 implies that ˆ̀cC (0, =) is ΔC (0, =)-sub-Gaussian conditioned on
FC−1.
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C (0) = `0I,∗C − `0 = ˆ̀
c
C (0I,∗C ,∞) − ˆ̀cC (0,∞). (A.186)
We construct the confidence intervals as follows:
*C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0) +
√
2 log) × ΔcC (0,∞), !C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0) +
√
2 log) × ΔcC (0,∞), (A.187)





so that `0 is ΔcC (0,∞)-sub-Gaussian conditioned













where we use the fact that 2 log) ≥ 1 for any) ≥ 2. Symmetrically, we have E
[




. By Lemma A.4.7, we have






























































































































Combining all these results, we conclude that



























C (0) = ˆ̀cC (0
I,∗
C , ) − C) − ˆ̀cC (0, ) − C). (A.195)
We construct the confidence intervals as follows:
*C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0) +
√
2 log) ×ΔcC (0, ) − C), !C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0) +
√
2 log) ×ΔcC (0, ) − C). (A.196)




ˆ̀cC (0, ) − C) −*C (0)














Symmetrically, we have E
[ (
!C (0) − ˆ̀cC (0, ) − C)
)+FC−1] ≤ √!/a) .




× ) − C
a + #c













































a + = −
1








































































































where we have utilized that (i) the concavity of




Combining all these results, we conclude that








































C (0) = max0≤=≤)−C
{
ˆ̀cC (0I,∗C , =)
}
− ˆ̀cC (0, 0). (A.210)
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We construct the confidence intervals as follows:
*C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0) +
√
2 log) × ΔcC (0, ) − C), !C (0) , ˆ̀cC (0, 0). (A.211)





ˆ̀cC (0, =) −*C (0)








ˆ̀cC (0, 0) − !C (0)
FC−1] = 0. (A.213)
The rest of the proof is almost identical to the case of IRS.FH:














































Appendix B: Appendix for Risk-sensitive Optimal Execution via a
Conditional Value-at-Risk Objective
Organization of appendix. The appendix is organized as follows. In Appendix B.1, we iden-
tify the optimal deterministic strategy and its performance for §4.5.1. The CVaR performance of
the optimal deterministic strategy is utilized as an upper bound on the CVaR performance of the
optimal adaptive strategy. In Appendix B.2, we provide the basic characterizations of S-CVaR
measure introduced in §4.2. In Appendix B.3, we provide the preliminary characterizations of the
value function, and by applying Sion’s minimax theorem, we prove Theorem 4.3.2 and Theorem
4.3.3 stated in §4.3. The main challenge here is to verify the conditions of Sion’s minimax theorem.
In Appendix B.4, we provide proofs for §4.4. We first state and prove Theorem B.4.1 from which
Theorem 4.4.1 and Theorem 4.4.3 follow almost immediately. Proposition 4.4.1, Proposition 4.4.2
and Theorem 4.4.2 are proven separately.
B.1 Optimal deterministic schedules




















30 13 1 23
2 23
. (B.1)




G. Since 5 ′(G) = − 0
G2
+ 12√G , the equation 5








Proof of Proposition 4.5.1. We prove the optimality of exponential schedules and identify the op-
timal decaying rate.
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First we consider a mean-variance optimization problem:
minimizec∈D(G) E[G,c∞ ] + _Var[G,c∞ ], (B.2)
where D(G) is the set of all deterministic policies and _ ∈ (0,∞) is a penalty for variance term.










where ¤-C , 33C -C . By applying calculus of variations, the optimal schedule -
★ has to satisfy
_f2-★C − [ ¥-★C = 0, at each time C, with boundary conditions -★0 = G and limC→∞ -
★
C = 0. The
solution is uniquely given by an exponential schedule
-★C = G exp (−C/d_) , (B.4)



























d∈(0,∞) and is attained by
exponential schedules.














d∈(0,∞) . Therefore, the
optimal solution of the following mean-deviation optimization problem
minimizec∈D(G) E[G,c∞ ] + \
√
Var[G,c∞ ], (B.6)
is also given by an exponential schedule, for any given \ ∈ (0,∞).
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Finally, observe that for any deterministic schedule c ∈ D(G) the resulting cost CG,c∞ is nor-





























is minimized by an exponential schedule. Using (B.5), the optimal time




















This concludes the proof.
































We state the following lemma that identifies the boundary values of S-CVaR@ [G,EXP∞ ], which
is useful to characterize the optimal value function.
Lemma B.1.2. The function ^(@) given in (4.43) satisfies
sup
@∈[0,1]






=^(1 − 1/=) = 0. (B.11)









for any I ∈ R, we have
sup@∈[0,1] ^(@) ≤ 1√2c < ∞. Also note that ^(@) = ^(1 − @) since Φ
−1(@) = −Φ−1(1 − @) and
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q(I) = q(−I). Therefore, it suffices to show that lim=→∞
√
=^(1/=) = 0.
We have the following tail bounds of standard normal distribution [75, Theorem 1.2.3]: for any
I > 0, (
I−1 − I−3
)
q(I) ≤ 1 −Φ(I) ≤ I−1q(I). (B.12)








for large enough = (such that I−3= ≤ 12 I
−1
= ) since lim=→∞ I= = ∞. Observe that 1/= ≤ q(I=)/I= ≤
q(I=) = exp(−I2=/2)/
√
2c ≤ exp(−I2=/2) and thus I= ≤
√
2 log =. We further deduce that, since

























B.2 Preliminary characterizations of S-CVaR
Lemma B.2.1. The risk envelope Q(@) is a non-empty, convex and weakly* compact subset of L∞.
Proof. It is non-empty because &(l) = @ is always feasible.
Consider&1, &2 ∈ Q(@) and&_ , _&1+(1−_)&2 for some _ ∈ [0, 1]. Since&1(l), &2(l) ∈
[0, 1], we have &_ (l) ∈ [0, 1], and by the linearity of expectation, E[&_] = _E[&1] + (1 −
_)E[&2] = @. Therefore, &_ ∈ Q(@) and thus Q(@) is convex.
Finally, note that Q(@) is a closed subset of the unit ball in L∞(Ω, F , P). Given that L∞ is the
dual space of L1, it is weakly* compact by Banach-Alaoglu theorem.
Proof of Proposition 4.2.1. Proof of claim (i) and (v). Claim (i) immediately follows from the
dual representation of CVaR value [62, Example 6.16]:




E [&] , (B.15)
and claim (v) follows from the following identity [62, Theorem 6.2]:
CVaR@ [] = E
[















Proof of claim (ii). When @ = 0, the risk envelope Q(@) has a single element&(l) = 0, and hence,
sup&∈Q(0) E[&] = 0. When @ = 1, the risk envelope Q(@) also has a single element &(l) = 1,
and hence, sup&∈Q(0) E[&] = E.
Proof of claim (iii). For any & ∈ Q(@), we have |E[&] | ≤ E [|& |] ≤ E| | since |& | ≤ 1
almost surely, and therefore,
S-CVaR@ [] ≤ E| |. Furthermore, Q(@) contains &(l) = @, and
therefore, CVaR@ [] ≥ E[@] = @E.
Proof of claim (iv). Consider @1, @2 ∈ [0, 1] and @_ , _@1 + (1 − _)@2 for some _ ∈ [0, 1].
Let &∗1 ∈ argmax&∈Q(@1) E[&] and &
∗
2 ∈ argmax&∈Q(@2) E[&] (the maximum is attained since
Q(@) is weakly* compact). Let &_ , _&∗1 + (1 − _)&
∗
2. Observe that &_ ∈ [0, 1] a.s. and
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E[&_] = _E[&∗1] + (1 − _)E[&
∗
2] = _@1 + (1 − _)@2 = @_. Therefore, &_ ∈ Q(@_). Trivially,




1] + (1 − _)E[&
∗
2], and thus
S-CVaR@_ [] = sup
&∈Q(@_)
E[&] ≥ E[&_] = _E[&∗1] + (1 − _)E[&
∗
2] (B.17)
= _ S-CVaR@1 [] + (1 − _) S-CVaR@2 [] . (B.18)
This concludes the proof.
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B.3 Proofs for §4.3
From now on, we characterize S-CVaR@ [ · ] as a mapping from L2 to R. This can be done
without loss generality since we have G,c∞ ∈ L2 for any feasible policy c ∈ Π(G). This is to utilize
the fact that L2 is reflexive so that its weak* topology coincides with its weak topology.
Lemma B.3.1. The risk envelope Q(@) is a weakly compact subset of L2.
Proof. As stated in the proof of Lemma B.2.1, Q(@) is a closed subset of the unit ball in L∞,
which is a subset of L2. By Banach–Alaoglu theorem, it is weakly* compact in L2 and hence
weakly compact since L2 is reflexive.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.1. Proof of claim (i). Note that (&@,WC )C≥0 is a continuous local martingale
since it is a stochastic integral of a progressively measurable process with respect to Brownian
motion [72, Theorem 33 in Chap. III]. Since &@,WC ∈ [0, 1] for any C ∈ [0,∞) by the definition of
Γ(@), it is a bounded local martingale, which is indeed a martingale [72, Thm. 51 in Chap. I].
Proof of claim (ii). The limit limC→∞&@,WC exists due to martingale convergence theorem [72,
Theorem 10 in Chap. I].













martingale, we have E[&@,W
g′ |Fg] = &
@,W
g ∈ {0, 1} for any g′ ≥ g. Since 0 ≤ &@,Wg′ ≤ 1, we have
&
@,W
g′ ∈ {0, 1} almost surely.
B.3.1 Proof of Theorem 4.3.2
Within this subsection, we characterize the trader’s policy with its position process (-C)C≥0




- : T ×Ω→ R



























so that we have -C = 
G,c
C if - ∈ X(G) and c = ¤- .
We aim to prove Theorem 4.3.2 by utilizing Sion’s minimax theorem:
Lemma B.3.2 (Sion’s minimax theorem [73]). Let X be a convex subset of a linear topological
space and Y a compact convex subset of a linear topological space. If 5 is a real-valued function
on X × Y with 5 (G, ·) upper semicontinuous and quasi-concave on . , for each G ∈ X, and 5 (·, H)









5 (G, H). (B.21)
















Proof. It can be easily verified that ‖ · ‖X is a valid norm (as a norm of Sobolev space). Also note
that ‖- ‖X < ∞ for any - ∈ X(G). Now consider - (1) , - (2) ∈ X(G) and - (_) , _- (1) + (1−_)- (2)
for some _ ∈ [0, 1]. Observe that (i) - (_)0 = G, (ii)
√∫ ∞
C=0




( ¤- (2)C )23C ∈ L4, and thus E [(∫ ∞C=0 ( ¤- (_)C )23C)2] < ∞, (iii) similarly, E [∫ ∞C=0 (- (_)C )23C] <
∞, and (iv) supC≥0 |-
(_)
C | ≤ _ supC≥0 |-
(1)
C | + (1 − _) supC≥0 |-
(2)
C | ≤ " . Therefore, - (_) ∈ X(G),
and hence X(G) is a convex set.


















We have shown that X(G) is a convex subset of a linear space endowed with a norm ‖ · ‖X (Lemma
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B.3.3), and Q(@) is a compact convex subset of L2(Ω, F , P) endowed with the weak topology
(Lemma B.3.1). In what follows, we verify the other conditions required in Lemma B.3.2:
(i) The mapping - ↦→ E[-∞&] is convex and continuous in norm ‖·‖X for any given& ∈ Q(@).
(ii) The mapping & ↦→ E[-∞&] is concave and weakly continuous on Q(@) for any given
- ∈ X(G).
Proof of claim (i). The convexity immediately follows from the fact that the mapping - ↦→ -∞ is
quadratic. We now focus on the continuity.
Fix - ∈ X(G) and consider a sequence
(
- (=) ∈ X(G)
)



























¤-2C 3C, = ,
√∫ ∞
C=0




¤-C − ¤- (=)C
)2
3C. (B.25)
We then have  ∈ L4, = ∈ L4, and | − = | ≤ Δ= (triangle inequality) where Δ=
L4→ 0 due to the
above condition (B.24). Further observe that








( ¤- (=)C )23C












2 − 2= + f ∫ ∞
C=0
(





where the first inequality holds since |& | ≤ 1. Regarding the first term of (B.28), we have
E




























































[-∞& − - (=)∞ &] = 0, (B.34)










. This concludes the proof.
Proof of claim (ii). The concavity immediately follows from the fact that the mapping& ↦→ -∞& is




=∈N converging to& in L2-weak topology:
i.e., lim=→∞ E[/&=] = E[/&] for any / ∈ L2. Since -∞ ∈ L2 for any - ∈ X(G), the continuity
of the mapping & ↦→ E[-∞&] immediately follows.
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B.3.2 Preliminary characterizations of value function
Proposition B.3.1. The value function + (·, ·) satisfies the followings:





(ii) + (G, @) is convex in G on R for each @ ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) + (G, @) is concave in @ on [0, 1] for each G ∈ R.
(iv) + (G, 0) = + (G, 1) = + (0, @) = 0 for each G ∈ R and @ ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Proof of claim (i). Note that E[G,c∞ ] ≥ 0 for any c ∈ Π(G). By Proposition 4.2.1.(iii), we
have S-CVaR@ [G,c∞ ] ≥ 0 for any c ∈ Π(G), and hence + (G, @) ≥ 0. The upper bound follows
from Proposition 4.5.1 given that 325/3 < 1.
Proof of claim (ii). Fix @ ∈ [0, 1] and define iW : R ↦→ R as follows:
iW (G) , inf
c∈Π(G)
 (c, W; G, @), (B.35)
so that we have + (G, @) = maxW∈Γ(@) iW (G). Since the pointwise maximum of a set of convex
functions is convex, it suffices to show that iW (·) is convex for each W ∈ Γ(@).
Fix W ∈ Γ(@) and consider any G1, G2 ∈ R. For any n > 0, by definition of infimum, there exist
c1,n ∈ Π(G1) and c2,n ∈ Π(G2) such that
 (c1,n , W; G1, @) ≤ iW (G1) + n,  (c2,n , W; G2, @) ≤ iW (G2) + n . (B.36)




C = G_ −
∫ C
B=0
c_,nB 3B = _-
G1,c
1, n



















B 3,B ≤ _
G1,c
1, n
































= _ (c1,n , W; G1, @) + (1 − _) (c2,n , W; G2, @) (B.40)
≤ _iW (G1) + (1 − _)iW (G2) + n . (B.41)
As a result, we have
iW (_G1 + (1 − _)G2) ≤  (c_,n , W; G_, @) ≤ _iW (G1) + (1 − _)iW (G2) + n . (B.42)
Since G1, G2, _, n were arbitrarily chosen, iW (·) is convex on R.
Proof of claim (iii). Fix G ∈ R and define iG : [0, 1] ↦→ R as follows:
ic (@) , sup
W∈Γ(@)
 (c, W; G, @), (B.43)
so that we have + (G, @) = infc∈Π(G) ic (@). Since the point-wise infimum of a set of concave
functions is concave, it suffices to show that ic (·) is concave on [0, 1] for each c ∈ Π(G).
Fix c ∈ Π(G) and consider any @1, @2 ∈ [0, 1]. Since Γ(@1) and Γ(@2) are weakly compact,
there exist W1 ∈ Γ(@1) and W2 ∈ Γ(@2) such that
 (c, W1; G, @1) = ic (@1),  (c, W2; G, @2) = ic (@2). (B.44)
Given some _ ∈ [0, 1], let @_ , _@1 + (1 − _)@2 and W_ , _W1 + (1 − _)W2 (i.e., W_C (l) =
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C = @_ +
∫ C
B=0
W_B 3,B = _&
@1,W
1






C ∈ [0, 1] almost surely for any C, i.e., W_ ∈ Γ(@_). Therefore,




























= _ (c, W1; G, @1) + (1 − _) (c, W2; G, @2) (B.47)
= _ic (@1) + (1 − _)ic (@2). (B.48)
As a result, we have
ic (_@1 + (1 − _)@2) ≥  (c, W_; G, @_) = _ic (@1) + (1 − _)ic (@2). (B.49)
Since @1, @2, _ were arbitrarily chosen, ic (·) is concave on [0, 1].
Proof of claim (iv). The claim immediately follows from claim (i).
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B.3.3 Proof of CVaR dynamic programming principle
We first state a proposition that is useful for proving upper-semicontinuity of a mapping with
respect to the weak topology.
Lemma B.3.4 ([76], Proposition 2.10. Restated for upper-semicontinuity). Let Y be a locally
convex space. A proper concave function 5 : Y → [−∞,∞) is upper-semicontinuous on Y if and
only if it is upper-semicontinuous with respect to the weak topology on Y.
We next prove a minimax theorem that includes the value function and the stopping time, which
extends Theorem 4.3.2.


























Proof. Let us first define
Qg (@) , {E(& |Fg) : & ∈ Q(@)} . (B.51)




g |W ∈ Γ(@)
}
. With the















-g & ++ (-g, &)
]
. (B.52)
We aim to prove the followings:
(i) The mapping - ↦→ E
[
-g & ++ (-g, &)
]
is convex and continuous on X(G) with respect to
the norm ‖ · ‖X for any given & ∈ Qg (@).
(ii) Qg (@) is a non-empty, convex and weakly compact subset of L2(Ω, Fg, P).
(iii) The mapping & ↦→ E [+ (-g, &)] is continuous on Qg (@) endowed with L2-norm for any
given - ∈ X(G).
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(iv) The mapping & ↦→ E
[
-g & ++ (-g, &)
]
is concave and upper-semicontinuous on Qg (@)
endowed with L2-weak topology for any given - ∈ X(G).
Together with the convexity of X(G) (Lemma B.3.3), we obtain the desired claim by utilizing
Sion’s minimax theorem (Lemma B.3.2).
Proof of claim (i). The convexity of the mapping - ↦→ E
[
-g & ++ (-g, &)
]
immediately follows
from the convexity of + (·, &), which was shown in Proposition B.3.1.(ii). Now fix - ∈ X(G)
and consider a sequence (- (=) ∈ X(G))=∈N such that ‖- − - (=) ‖X → 0 as = → ∞. Analogous
to the proof of Theorem 4.3.2, we can show that -
(=)
g &




L1→ -g. By continuous mapping theorem, we further obtain that + (- (=)g , &)
?
→ + (-g, &) as
= → ∞. Given that supC≥0 |-
(=)
C | ≤ " for all = ∈ N, the sequence
(









3 ×" 43 ×@′ 13 ^(@′) 23
}
< ∞, and hence uniformly integrable. Therefore,
+ (- (=)g , &)











-g & ++ (-g, &
]
, which concludes the proof.
Proof of claim (ii). The proof is identical to those of Lemma B.2.1 and B.3.1 except thatL∞(Ω, F , P)
and L2(Ω, F , P) are replaced with L∞(Ω, Fg, P) and L2(Ω, Fg, P), respectively.
Proof of claim (iii). Fix & ∈ Qg (@) and consider a sequence (& (=) ∈ Qg (@))=∈N such that & (=)
L2→
& as = → ∞. By continuous mapping theorem, we have + (-g, & (=))
?
→ + (-g, &). Since the
sequence
(
|+ (-g, & (=)) |
)







|" | 43 × @′ 13 ^(@′) 23
}
< ∞), we further have + (-g, & (=))
L1→ + (-g, &), which concludes the proof.
Proof of claim (iv). The concavity of the mapping& ↦→ E
[
-g & ++ (-g, &)
]
immediately follows
from the concavity of + (-g, ·), which was shown in Proposition B.3.1.(iii). On the other hand, by
combining the result of claim (iii) with Proposition B.3.4, we can show that the mapping & ↦→
E [+ (-g, &)] is upper-semicontinuous on Qg (@) endowed with L2-weak topology. Therefore, it




is upper-semicontinuous with respect toL2-weak
topology.
Fix & ∈ Qg (@) and consider a sequence (& (=) ∈ Qg (@))=∈N such that E[/& (=)] → E[/&] as
= → ∞ for any / ∈ L2. Since -g ∈ L2, we have lim=→∞ E[-g & (=)] = E[-g &], which implies
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Before proving Theorem 4.3.3, we introduce additional notation to describe Markovian struc-
ture of problem. We denote by (- C,G,cB )B≥C the trader’s position process under control c that begins
from the value G at time C: i.e.,





















f- C,G,cD 3,D . (B.54)




















The policy spaces are defined analogously as well:
ΠC (G) , {c ∈ Π(G) | cB = 0,∀B < C } , ΓC (@) , {W ∈ Γ(@) | WB = 0,∀B < C } . (B.56)
We prove Theorem 4.3.3 by utilizing Proposition B.3.2 and Proposition 4.3.2.
Proof of Theorem 4.3.3. Define















We aim to prove + (G, @) = * (G, @).
Proof of “+ (G, @) ≤ * (G, @)”. Fix n > 0. By definition of * (G, @), there exists c◦ ∈ Π(G) such
that


















On the other hand, we have that for any C ≥ 0, Ĝ ∈ X, and @̂ ∈ [0, 1],













by time homogeneity of the problem. Consequently, for each l ∈ Ω and W ∈ Γ(@), there exists
ĉl,W ∈ Πg(l) (-0,G,c
◦









+ n ≥ max



























where the second inequality follows from the fact that the given W may not be optimal for the
period C ≥ g.





c◦C (l) if C < g(l),
ĉ
l,W
C (l) if C ≥ g(l),
(B.62)
i.e., it implements an n-optimal solution to the Bellman equation before g, and then implements
another n-optimal solution for the remaining horizon. We observe that cW ∈ Π(G) since c◦C (l) ∈
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Π(G) and ĉl,WC ∈ Π(G). Combining all there results, we obtain

















































































= + (G, @) − 2n . (B.68)
Since the choice of n was arbitrary, we deduce that* (G, @) ≥ + (G, @).
Proof of “+ (G, @) ≥ * (G, @)”. By minimax equality result for * (G, @) (Proposition B.3.2), there
exists W◦ ∈ Γ(@) such that













By minimax equality result for + (G, @) (Theorem 4.3.2) and by time homogeneity of the problem,
we further have that for any C ≥ 0, Ĝ ∈ X, and @̂ ∈ [0, 1],













Therefore, for each l ∈ Ω and c ∈ Π(G), there exists Ŵl,c ∈ Γg(l) (&0,@,W
◦




































For each c ∈ Π(G), consider an adversary’s policy Wc : T ×Ω→ R constructed as
WcC (l) ,

W◦C (l) if C < g(l),
Ŵ
l,c
C (l) if C ≥ g(l).
(B.73)
We observe that Wc ∈ Γ(@). Combining all there results, we obtain








































































= + (G, @). (B.78)
This concludes the proof.
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B.4 Proofs for §4.4
B.4.1 Proof of Theorem 4.4.1




, 6★(G, @) , fG
+★@@ (G, @)
.
These functions should be well-defined on R × (0, 1) due to the condition (i). By the condition
(iii), we have +★G (0, @) = 0, and consequently, by the condition (iv), we have 5★(0, @) = 0 and
5★(G, @) ≥ 0 for G ≥ 0. Also observe that




@E2 −+★G (G, @) E
}





+★@@ (G, @) F2 − fGF
}
, (B.79)
for any G ∈ R and @ ∈ (0, 1).
We further define a sequence of function pairs ( 5 (=) , 6(=))=∈N:
5 (=) (G, @) ,

5★(G, @) if (G, @) ∈ A=,
G/= if (G, @) ∉ A=,
6(=) (G, @) ,

6★(G, @) if (G, @) ∈ A=,





(G, @) ∈ R × [0, 1]
 |G | > 1= , 1= < @ < 1 − 1= } . (B.81)
We now prove the following:
Theorem B.4.1. Fix G > 0 and @ ∈ (0, 1), and consider functions +★, 5★, 6★, 5 (=) , and 6(=)




, 11−@ }, we have the followings:
(i) For any adversary’s policy W ∈ Γ(@), a (-,&)-Markov trader’s policy c(=),W induced by 5 (=)
and coupled with W is admissible: i.e., c(=),W ∈ Π(G).
(ii) For any trader’s policy c ∈ Π(G), a (-,&)-Markov adversary’s policy W (=),c induced by 6(=)
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and coupled with c is admissible: i.e., W (=),c ∈ Γ(@).
(iii) Mutually coupled (-,&)-Markov policy pair (c(=) , W (=)) induced by ( 5 (=) , 6(=)) is admissi-
ble: i.e., c(=) ∈ Π(G) and W (=) ∈ Γ(@).
(iv) + (G, @) ≤ +★(G, @).
(v) + (G, @) ≥ +★(G, @).
(vi) For any W ∈ Γ(@), (c(=),W)=∈N defined in (i) satisfies lim sup=→∞  (c(=),W, W; G, @) ≤ + (G, @).
(vii) For any c ∈ Π(G), (W (=),c)=∈N defined in (ii) satisfies lim inf=→∞  (c, W (=),c; G, @) ≥ + (G, @).
(viii) (c(=) , W (=))=∈N defined in (iii) satisfies lim=→∞  (c(=) , W (=); G, @) = + (G, @).
Proof. Throughout the proof, we define a sequence of hitting times (g=)=∈N as follows:
g= , inf
C≥0
{(-C , &C) ∉ A=}. (B.82)






★ (-B, &B) 3B, ∀C ≤ g=,
-g=4
−(C−g=)/=, ∀C ≥ g=.
(B.83)
Observe that -C ∈ [0, G] for any C ≥ 0, and in particular, -C is monotonically decreasing over time.
Given that (&C)C≥0 has a continuous sample path and = is large enough such that @ ∈
[ 1
=




we also have &C ∈
[ 1
=
, 1 − 1
=
]
for any C ∈ [0, g=]. Then, the sample path of (-C)C≥0 for each l
is uniquely determined (i.e., the associated SDE has a unique strong solution): the uniqueness









, 1 − 1
=
)
⊂ A= due to the condition (iv), and the uniqueness on [g=,∞) immediately follows
from the fact that -C = -g=4
−(C−g=)/= for C ≥ g=.
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We then show that g= is almost surely bounded. For any C < g= (so that (-C , &C) ∈ A=), by the
condition (iv), we have
5 (=) (-C , &C) ≥ 5★(-C , 1 − 1/=) ≥ 5★(1/=, 1 − 1/=) := U= > 0. (B.84)
Then, for any C < g=, we have 3-C/3C = − 5 (=) (-C , &C) ≤ −U=, and hence -g= ≤ G −U=g=. Together





on any sample path.
We further have that, by the condition (iv), for any C < g=,





































































Also note that supC≥0 |-C | ≤ G ≤ " . Therefore, c(=),W is admissible: i.e., c(=),W ∈ Π(G).








★ (-B, &B) 3,B, ∀C ≤ g=,
&g= , ∀C ≥ g=.
(B.90)









, 1 − 1
=
)
⊂ A=. Therefore, for each l, the sample path of (&C)C≥0 is unique and continuous
(given that = is large enough so that @ ∈
[ 1
=
, 1 − 1
=
]
, and (-C)C≥0 is continuous), and hence &C ∈[ 1
=
, 1 − 1
=
]
⊂ [0, 1] almost surely for any C ∈ [0,∞), and hence W (=),c is admissible.
Proof of claim (iii). Under the mutually coupled policy pair (c(=) , W (=)), the process pair (-C , &C)C≥0
satisfies (B.83) and (B.90) simultaneously. By the same argument above (claim (ii)), we can show
that W (=) is admissible, and also that c(=) is admissible by claim (i).
Proof of claim (iv). Fix W ∈ Γ(@) and consider c := c(=),W ∈ Π(G). For any C < g=, since



















5★ (-C , &C)






























































≤ +★ (G, @) , (B.99)
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where the first inequality follows from the non-negativity of +★(·, ·). On the other hand, by the
definition of g= and the continuity of sample paths, we have either -g= =
1
=




















{+ (1/=, @′)} ++ (G, 1/=) ++ (G, 1 − 1/=) := = (G), (B.101)
where the second inequality follows from that -g ≤ G under policy c(=),W and + (·, @) is increasing
on [0,∞). It can be shown easily that lim=→∞ = (G) = 0 for any G due to Proposition B.3.1.












≤ +★(G, @). (B.102)
Utilizing Theorem 4.3.3 with (B.101) and (B.102), we further obtain














































+ = (G) (B.105)
(B.102)
≤ +★(G, @) + = (G). (B.106)
Since lim=→∞ = (G) = 0, we obtain + (G, @) ≤ +★(G, @), which concludes the proof.
Proof of claim (v). The proof is almost symmetric to that of claim (iv). Fix c ∈ Π(G), and consider
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≥ +★ (G, @) . (B.113)
























{+★(1/=, @′)} ++★(", 1/=) ++★(", 1 − 1/=) := =, (B.115)
where the last inequality follows from the feasibility of c (i.e., |-g= | ≤ "), the monotonicity
of +★(·, @) (condition (iii)), and the concavity of +★(G, ·) (condition (i)). In particular, by the
conditions (ii)–(i), we have lim=→0 = = 0.
Since c was chosen arbitrary, we further deduce that























By utilizing Theorem 4.3.3 and above results, we obtain





































≥ +★(G, @) − =. (B.120)
By taking =↗∞, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of claim (vi). To simplify notation, let c := c(=),W and g := g= temporarily. By Proposition
4.3.2, we have


























≤ +★(G, @) = + (G, @). (B.122)
Therefore,









































Note that after time g=, the policy c(=),W trades according to the exponential schedule (i.e,.
-C = -g=4
−(C−g=)/=), and thusg=,-g= ,c∞ is normally distributed conditional on -g= : more specifically,












































































Since sup@′ ^(@′) < ∞, lim=→∞
√
=^(1/=) = 0, and lim=→∞
√
=^(1 − 1/=) = 0 (Lemma B.1.2), the









0 and this concludes the proof.









@,W (=) , c
g=
)]












Observe that we have &∞ = &g= since 6




























































@,W (=) , c
g=
]










By taking lim inf=→∞ on both sides, we obtain the desired result.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.1. We aim to show that + (G, @) = +★(G, @) for any G ∈ R and @ ∈ [0, 1].
From Theorem B.4.1.(iv) and (v), we deduce that + (G, @) = +★(G, @) for any G > 0 and @ ∈
(0, 1). By symmetry, the same argument holds for any G < 0 and @ ∈ (0, 1). From Proposi-
tion B.3.1.(iv) and the condition (ii), we can also verify that their boundary values match: i.e.,
+★(G, @) = + (G, @) = 0 if G = 0 or @ ∈ {0, 1}.
B.4.2 Other proofs
Proof of Proposition 4.4.1. Observe that +̂ (-C , &C) is differentiable along the sample path before
g since &C ∈ (0, 1) for any C ≤ g. By applying Itô’s formula, we obtain
+̂ (-g, &g) = +̂ (G, @) −
∫ g
C=0
+̂G (-C , &C)cC3C +
∫ g
C=0





+̂@@ (-C , &C)W2C 3C.
(B.135)








C=0 f-C3,C . By applying Itô’s product rule, we further obtain










(−f-C&C + -CWC) 3,C . (B.136)
Since
∫ g
C=0 +̂@ (-C , &C)WC3,C and
∫ g
C=0 (−f-C&C + -CWC) 3,C are local martingales, from above re-
sults, we deduce that
E
[
g&g + +̂ (-g, &g)
]






c2C&C − +̂G (-C , &C)cC +
1
2






We obtain the claim by rearranging terms.
205
Proof of Theorem 4.4.2. We prove that the function +★, defined in (4.29), satisfies the conditions
(i)–(v) in Theorem 4.4.1.
Verification of condition (i). Observe that i′′(@) = − @
i2 (@) < 0 for any @ ∈ (0, 1), and thus and























Therefore, it suffices show that +★G












(3/4) 23 × f 23[ 13 × |G | 43 × i′′(@)
)
= f2[ × G2 × i2(@) × i′′(@) = −f2[G2@.
Verification of conditions (ii)–(iii). These conditions can be easily verified by inspection.




= (3/4)− 13 × f 23[ 13 × G 13 × i(@)
@
. Its continuity and













. As a result, i(@)
@
is monotonically decreasing in @ on (0, 1).
Verification of condition (v). Note that G
+★@@ (G,@)




and monotonicity (with respect to G) is trivial.
Proof of Theorem 4.4.3. The claims follow from Theorem B.4.1.(i), (ii), (iii), (vi), (vii), and (viii).




= @=i<, and the differential equation that we have corresponds to the case of  = −1,
= = 1, and < = −1/2. In this case, the solutions can be written in parametric form [74, p. 2.3.27]:
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for constants 0 and 1 such that  = −92 (1/0)
3,








, i(\) = 1\ 23 /2(\), / (\) = 11/3(\) +2 1/3(\),
(B.139)
or








, i(\) = 1\ 23 /2(\), / (\) = 11/3(\) +2.1/3(\),
(B.140)
where \ ∈ R+ is the parameter, and 1 and 2 are arbitrary constants.
Note that the expression (4.34) is obtained by taking 1 = − 2c and 2 = 0 in (B.139), and the
expression (4.35) is obtained by taking 1 =
√
3 and 2 = −1 in (B.140). Therefore it suffices to
show that the curve {(@! (\), i! (\))}\∈(0,∞]
⋃ {(@' (\), i' (\))}\∈(0,\̄] is a valid graph satisfying
the boundary conditions: i.e.,
(i) lim\↗∞
(
@! (\), i! (\)
)
= (0, 0).
(ii) (@' (\̄), i' (\̄)) = (1, 0).
(iii) The left part and the right part meet at a point, i.e., lim\↘0
(




@' (\), i' (\)
)
.
(iv) They have the same slope at the contact point, i.e., lim\↘0 3q!/3\3@!/3\ = lim\↘0
3q'/3\
3@'/3\ .










= 0. Therefore, lim\↗∞ @! (\) = 0 and lim\↗∞ i! (\) = 0, which proves (i).
Next, observe that the value of \̄ was chosen to satisfy /' (\̄) = 0, and the value of 0 was








= 1, which proves (ii).
Finally, with some algebra, it can be shown that
lim
\↘0
























3 × 2 13 1Γ( 23 )
0Γ( 13 )
, (B.142)
where Γ is the Gamma function. These results prove (iii) and (iv).
Some notes on the determination of constants. In the representation of the general solution,
(B.139) and (B.140), there are seven constants to identify: 0, 1, \̄, !1, !2, '1, and '2. The
upper limit \̄ and the constant 0 are uniquely determined by (!1, !2, '1, '2) due to (ii), and the
constant 1 is also uniquely determined by 0 due to the identity (1/0)3 = 9/2. We can also observe
that the curve {(@(\), i(\))}\∈R+ is invariant to a uniform scaling of (!1, !2, '1, '2), and thus
we can set '4 = −1 without loss of generality. We can further obtain a system of equations from









from (iii), and '2 = −
√
3'1 from (iv). These equations uniquely determine the values of !1,
!2, and '1.
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